Editor’s Notes: In this insightful interview, MIT Professor and missile defense specialist Theodore Postol joins Glenn Diesen to provide a critical technical assessment of the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel. Postol argues that modern missile defense systems, such as the Patriot and Iron Dome, are largely ineffective against advanced Iranian missiles and drones that are increasingly supported by Russian and Chinese technology. He also warns of the grave risks associated with nuclear escalation in the region, offering a sobering perspective on the “fog of war” and the reality of modern military capabilities. This discussion serves as a deep dive into the technical disparities and geopolitical stakes defining the current war. (Mar 9, 2026)
TRANSCRIPT:
Introduction
GLENN DIESEN: Welcome back. We are joined by Theodore Postol, professor of Science and Technology and National Security at MIT, who is a specialist on nuclear weapons delivery systems, missiles and missile defense, who has also done some work for the Pentagon. So thank you very much for coming back on.
TED POSTOL: Well, my great pleasure for being invited by you.
GLENN DIESEN: Well, I have been looking forward to speaking with you because in this war against Iran, it’s largely a war about missiles and missile defense, essentially who can create the most pain and absorb the most pain, is able to exhaust adversary.
And I thought you are the recipient of this Norbert Wiener award from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility for uncovering all these deceptions which has previously been made about missile defense. So I thought who better to have a critical view, you know, cut through all this fog of war because there is a lot of focus these days on narrative control. So it obscures reality.
And yeah, I wanted to get yours. Well, I guess a good place to start is your overall assessments of this war. I mean, what is that stands out or what is your takeaway?
Iran’s Military Capabilities and the Drone Threat
TED POSTOL: Well, I think you got a fantastic assessment just recently from Larry Wilkerson. But I’ll give you my assessment from my narrow, much narrower, because Larry I think is really broad and has all this experience, but from my much narrower technologist point of view.
So let me caveat my initial discussion by pointing out that I literally have been working night and day to try to keep up with what’s going on. And it takes time to put together slides and videos which I hope I’ll be able to show some that will be helpful. They will try to inform your audience because looking at a video is one thing, knowing what it’s telling you is another.
So let me start out by just saying that from a purely technical point of view, again, not from this much broader and wiser perspective of someone like Larry has on this, it’s very clear that this war is going as someone like I, and more importantly Larry would have guessed. What we’re seeing now is in the initial phases of the war, the United States and Israel are doing tremendous damage to Iran. But of course, Iran is a country of 90 million people and it’s a very cohesive country with all of the internal problems it has. It’s still basically a cohesive culture.
And it doesn’t appear to me that the situation is in any way favoring the outcome that both President Trump and Premier Netanyahu are talking about. That is to say, it hardly seems likely that there will be any collapse of the kind that both these leaders are aiming at.
I have to say though, I’m beginning to become extremely concerned with Netanyahu. I’m going to say it just because I’ve been thinking about it. This man is a homicidal maniac, and this is the kind of homicidal maniac that could use a nuclear weapon at some point.
Iran as a Nuclear Threshold State
So I think perhaps next time I’m on I can remind your audience about the capabilities of Iran as a nuclear weapon state. It is not a non-nuclear weapon state. It is not a nuclear weapon state who has built a nuclear weapon, at least as far as we know. But it is a weapon state that could build a nuclear weapon on very short notice, and it would not be possible to stop them from building a nuclear weapon, even if you were using nuclear weapons on Iran while they were constructing their nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons.
They have enough enriched uranium hexafluoride to construct 10 atomic bombs, which would be much more than enough to finish off Israel as a state. Israel is not a state of 90 million people. It’s 8 or 9 million. It’s got a few large critical cities. And 10 nuclear weapons would be far more than is needed to end Israel as a state.
And there is no way to stop Iran. I could talk a little bit about that at some future time. What you need to do could be easily housed in a tunnel that’s not necessarily especially large, and you could actually do the final enrichment. You need to get weapons grade uranium, and build a nuclear weapon that does not need to be tested. It’s important to understand this is a uranium weapon and it would not need to be tested. It simply is well within the reach of Iran to build these nuclear weapons.
So we need to start thinking about the possibility we could see nuclear weapons used. Now I do not think Iran will use nuclear weapons against Israel first, but I think as this war goes on, the situation is going to continue to deteriorate.
Iranian Ballistic Missile Precision and Drone Effectiveness
We already can see — I’ll show some evidence for this — that the attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa have been extremely effective, and it looks like the precision of delivery that the ballistic missiles now being used by Iran is higher than what we saw earlier.
I think that is probably because Iran was using older ballistic missiles in the earlier attacks, since it’s clear that their strategy has been aimed at saving their most capable damaging attacks for a long war if it occurs. So I don’t think they were expending their most capable missiles during the earlier wars we saw in June, for example.
So we’re now seeing much more capable missiles. I’ll talk a little bit about them. And also we’re seeing the effects of drones at a level that I have to say I should have expected, but I have to say I’ve been a little surprised by it. And this is because of two technical factors that are extremely important and not nearly as well understood by the general public as it should be — and in general public, I include the press.
The first is that China and Russia are giving real time, high resolution satellite data of the targets that Iran is interested in attacking in the Persian Gulf states and also in Israel itself. So the location of these potential targets is known essentially in real time.
How Iranian Drones Achieve Precision Targeting
Now the drones have a homing capability that I’d like to describe because I don’t think people appreciate how extraordinarily effective this homing capability is. Basically what I’ll describe is how these drones from thousands of kilometers range can get real time homing information and real time guidance from Iranians who are sitting in control centers in Iran.
So if you want to run a drone into a radar station or into a docked ship or into an oil facility, if you decide you’re going to attack those, you can attack with essentially tens of meters precision, which is more than enough precision to essentially destroy most things that you’re concerned about.
This is extremely important that people understand that these drones are extraordinarily problematic. They can be intercepted, as I’ll discuss, but there are large numbers of them. They carry large enough warheads that they can do tremendous damage against significant targets. And they’re ubiquitous. They’re just ubiquitous. There are just thousands of them and there can be thousands more. And they’re going to simply overwhelm what is left of the air defenses and missile defenses that are now being depleted by the Iranian attacks.
This is the Ukraine war 2.0 here. What the Russians did in Ukraine is they used drones very effectively to essentially deplete the entire air defenses of Ukraine. And then Ukraine is essentially naked and they could then go about their business destroying large parts of Ukrainian facilities.
Now, in the case of Iran, they do not have a functioning air force to deliver munitions against Gulf and Israeli targets. So they’re confined to using ballistic missiles. But they have thousands of these ballistic missiles, and these ballistic missiles are more and more capable. And I’ll describe some of these more advanced capabilities very shortly.
The Iridium Satellite System and Drone Guidance
So let me start by describing how these drones get their targeting information. And we see a lot of evidence that they have been destroying key radars in the Gulf States. The Bahrain Naval base has been up in flames and they’ve done tremendous damage. Unfortunately, I’ve been so overwhelmed I haven’t had a chance to put together the materials on that. But probably many of your audience have already seen it if they look at videos that are just on the web.
But in any case, let me just turn on the share here.
What this slide shows you is a satellite constellation known as Iridium. Most people have heard about Starlink, but Iridium is something that’s been operating a longer time. It operates at higher altitudes, and it basically gives you satellite telephone operation. So it’s similar to Starlink.
What you’re seeing, if you focus on the circles, you see what the circles show is the range at which an Iridium phone system on the surface of the Earth can communicate with a satellite. And in the middle we see there’s a satellite. And so this satellite is sort of like a phone modem. It has about a 300 kilobit per second downlink and a 700 kilobit per second uplink. Now those numbers are relevant as I’ll show you shortly.
If you see these brighter lines here, these are links between the satellites. So if I’m at a location, say under this particular satellite, and I want to communicate with some location that’s on the other side of the planet. So this next slide here just shows you on a Mercator projection the overlapping circles. I think there’s 76 of these satellites — I may have that wrong, but they’re somewhere around that. And these satellites are in polar orbits. And anywhere on the Earth you can communicate with anywhere else on the Earth with a data rate of about 350kbps, or 700 uplink, 350 downlink.
So if you look at one of these terminals — this is not a terminal, this is a device that goes into, let’s say, an airplane or a drone. This is an Iridium mobile system communication device. It’s small, it’s light, it only takes a little bit of power, and it has an ability to communicate from the drone at up to 350 kilobits per second.
I’ve shown you these are two satellite photos of Tel Aviv from about 1,300 feet above the city. This top photograph just shows you a high definition photograph of Tel Aviv. This is the same photograph down here, but at 240p resolution, much lower resolution. This will give you 20 to 30 frames per second. You can see it’s slightly blurrier. But this resolution is more than adequate to provide the operator of the drone in Iran the information they need to then command the drone to do maneuvers.
So you now have this global first person vision drones anywhere in the world. That is very significant.
Drone Launch Systems and Commercial Technology
So when you look at these drones, here you have a drone that can be launched in very large numbers. If you look at this particular drawing of a launcher that carries five drones, you can see this tube at the bottom of this drone. What the tube is, is a rocket motor. So what happens is when this vehicle, when this cage that carries the drones is erected in a near vertical direction, then each of the drones can be launched using its rocket motor to get it up to speed, because it has a fairly underpowered propeller motor. But the propeller motor is only adequate to keep the drone at an adequate speed to keep it in the air. So you need the rocket motor to launch the drone onto an aerodynamically stable trajectory. That’s of course easy to do.
So if you look at a drone, you can see there are all kinds of equipment that you can put on this drone. In fact, we now know that the Iranians are using Iridium communications. So this particular drone doesn’t necessarily have Iridium communications, but it’s not hard to obtain that.
Here is an example of a drone. Some very helpful individual who also works at the Department of Defense alerted me to an error I made in an earlier presentation. This is actually an American drone, not an Iranian Gen 2 drone. But it looks exactly — it’s indistinguishable from the Iranian drone. And you can see here you have an optical system of some kind. It could be an infrared optical system, it could be visual, or it could be both.
This is one of the things that is extremely important to understand when you understand the nature of technology disparities that would normally be a problem, or in the past would have been a problem, for less developed states relative to the more advanced developed states like the United States. The availability of very high technology commercial systems — cameras that literally would fit between my fingers, infrared cameras — those cameras, infrared and visible, are extraordinarily high technology devices that are extremely difficult to build and really require very high technology industrial bases. But they are commercially available ubiquitously. You can go out in the street almost and buy one, go into a hobby store.
So it doesn’t matter that you can’t manufacture them. What matters is you can obtain them.
For example, when you have improvised explosive devices, which have been a tremendous problem for the Americans in Iraq, those devices are really incredibly advanced technology because they’re an explosive device which is well within the local technology capabilities, plus a very advanced cell phone which is very, very far beyond the technology capabilities of the people who are using it, but available — go in a store and buy one. So I take this phone and I attach it to a detonator on this relatively deadly but constructible improvised explosive device. And now I have a remote device that I can detonate from long range.
So it’s this kind of promulgation of all these kinds of technologies. A satellite system like Iridium that is very advanced, but it’s available to anybody. I can’t screen phone calls on Iridium. It’s not going to be possible. Iridium is designed to service aircraft. You go on an international flight, you want to look at videos, you may be looking at Iridium or more likely Starlink, but there are these fast terminals that are available, and it’s just a matter of buying the device and installing it.
So here is an Iridium antenna hole. You can see how large it is by the size of the hand of this man, and he’s installing it on an airplane. So this airplane can have cell phone communication. If you put this antenna on a drone, you buy that device I showed you earlier, install it, and you have two-way television communication. So this means that the drones are tremendously more problematic than I think most people realize they are.
Drone Warhead Damage and Depleting Air Defenses
So if we look at the amount of damage one of these drones can do — this is probably one of the drones with a smaller warhead, maybe a 100 pound warhead. And this is a drone with maybe a 100 or 200 pound warhead that hit a building. And we have lots of videos of these drones hitting buildings.
So the situation is really not very favorable to the West — in this case both Israel and the American military bases in the Persian Gulf — because the satellite information given by China and Russia is very detailed. And you can have a drone en route, taking an hour or two or more to get to the target area, but you can update it 10 minutes before it arrives in the area.
No wonder Bahrain is in flames, because the Iranians are getting real time data on what’s going on in Bahrain. And these drones can come in, they can hit radar systems, which reduces the chances of the radars detecting them for interceptors to be launched. And they can then go about their business without worrying about air defenses.
So as time goes on, the attacks will be more and more effective because what’s going to happen is the radars are going to be depleted over time and also the interceptors are going to be depleted. So these air bases are going to see more and more damage. The only possibility that they will start seeing less damage is if the Iranians run out of drones. And there’s very little reason to believe that that’s going to happen because these drones are being manufactured in real time and there are probably hundreds per day that can be manufactured. The Russians are manufacturing thousands per day.
We also don’t know if the Russians or the Chinese will decide to transfer more drones to the Iranians, because this is a war that’s now becoming of concern to the Russians and the Chinese, which is part of the reason they’re already beginning to help Iran.
Advanced Ballistic Missile Warheads and Countermeasures
So this is not a situation that is going to develop favorably for Iran’s adversaries. Now in addition to these problems, we have the problem of countermeasures that we’re seeing in the ballistic missiles.
I apologize for the discombobulated presentation, but this is an Alpha Ta warhead. What you see here is the warhead — this section is the explosive section. These fins allow the warhead in the atmosphere to be guided. I’ve done aerodynamic calculations in the past and I can tell you that this vehicle can start maneuvering in a significant way at 25 or 30 km altitude. These fins, even though the air is quite thin at 25 to 30 km, can provide enough lift that you can reorient this vehicle and cause it to maneuver.
This rocket motor has two effects. It creates thrust to increase the speed of the incoming warhead. The incoming warhead might arrive at the top of the atmosphere at about 3 kilometers per second, so Mach 10. But it can easily get another kilometer per second of speed while going into the atmosphere from the rocket motor.
Now, very few people would know this — it’s just because I’ve been looking at this thing over many years. What this rocket motor does is that when the warhead gets to lower altitude — and these altitudes may be 5 or 10 km — this motor is still releasing gas. This gas comes out of the back of the vehicle and reduces the drag on the vehicle. In other words, the air is flowing over this vehicle at low altitude at very, very high speed — Mach 12, Mach 13. So there’s kind of a vacuum behind this vehicle. That vacuum creates a pressure that’s pulling the vehicle from behind and causing it to slow up. This is called base drag.
But this rocket motor continues to emanate gas, and that gas then alleviates the vacuum so that now the vehicle is not being pulled from behind, and the vehicle comes in at a higher rate and doesn’t slow down nearly as much. So these things are hitting the ground at speeds in excess of Mach 10, Mach 12.
At a speed of Mach 10, this vehicle delivers twice the explosive damage as its total weight, because the weight of the vehicle alone gets converted by kinetic energy — because the velocity is so high — to thermal energy, to just explosive energy, plus the exploding munitions. So this vehicle could be delivering potentially 2 tons of explosive power. That’s a lot of damage-inflicting capability.
Here is something that I’m still a little speculative on, but I’m pretty sure we understand this at this point.
The Fraud of Missile Defence: Intercept Rates and Escalation Risks
GLENN DIESEN: From watching this interception or attempted interception. What is the general idea though about ability to defend? I mean you covered it quite well. But is it diminishing fast? Was it never great?
Patriot Missile Failures: A History of Deception
TED POSTOL: It’s diminishing fast. And it’s diminishing fast from a very low number. I mean the interception, this is a total fraud perpetrated not only on the public but also on… I mean you can find… You know, as you may know, in the Gulf War of 1991, I was the sole voice, along with my very talented colleague George Lewis, describing the Patriot’s failure in the Gulf War of 1991. We eventually showed, and it was eventually accepted, that the Patriot had not intercepted a single Scud warhead in the Gulf War of 1991.
Now the Patriot used at that time was the Patriot PAC-2 Interceptor, which was a bargain at a million dollars each. Now you have the Patriot PAC-3 which has some improvements and it’s a bargain at $4 million each. But the problem with this interceptor, although they have made improvements that were clearly aimed at solving the problems with the PAC-1 and PAC-2, which failed catastrophically, it turns out the PAC-3 is also failing catastrophically too. It’s maybe a 3 or 4 or 5% intercept rate against Iskander and longer range ballistic missiles.
So we have not been seeing a high level of intercept rate even earlier. And what you see is deja vu all over again. As I joke with my friends, in the Gulf War of 1991 we got all these videos that we were analyzing, and the videos were very hard to obtain then. We didn’t have all this stuff on the Internet. So we went to broadcasters and we begged them to allow us to copy their broadcast videos of engagements. It took us months to collect the videos. And in each of these videos, you would see the misses. In fact, we collected the videos and we showed that they were all misses.
So we had a large number of videos. And if you listened to the journalists talking, they would say, “There’s a hit, there’s a hit, there’s a hit.” And what they were calling hits were the explosions of the Patriot interceptors, because they have a warhead on them, in empty space. I could show that video if you’re interested. I could do that on another show. It’s kind of an interesting piece of history because this is what happened in the Gulf War of 1991.
And since there’s no memory in either the journalism community or even in the military community, I’m afraid we’re seeing the same thing. We’re seeing Patriot PAC-3s exploding in the air. They make little fireballs. They’re not intercepts. They’re just detonations in free air.
I can show you again, if we have another… I can be more organized. Actually, if you think we want to schedule something, I can go through what an intercept looks like, because we have evidence of intercepts — very, very unusual. But we’ve been able over time to find them. That’s because we have dozens and dozens and dozens of videos where there are no intercepts. And every once in a while we find a video where there is an intercept. It’s not because intercepts are common. It’s because they’re so uncommon. We have to go through video after video after video to find them.
But we know we can see intercepts. That’s what’s important about finding one. Because the fireball from an intercept is very big and very distinctly larger and brighter than the fireball from an exploding Patriot PAC-3 interceptor. So that’s how you can tell it’s an intercept. And that’s because the Patriot PAC-3 runs into the front of the warhead and detonates it. If it runs into the side and detonates, no cigar. So that’s what’s going on.
Collapsing Intercept Rates and Growing Damage on the Ground
The intercept rates are very, very low. They have not gotten better. If they’re lower now, it’s only because they’ve run out of Patriot interceptors to use. And it looks like there may have been some successful Iron Dome intercepts, but even they’re at a lower rate yet. So I would say between Iron Dome and the Patriot PAC-3, the intercept rates have been a few percent at most, when the interceptors have been available. Things get worse because they run out of interceptors.
But I don’t know if it matters much. What is going to get worse is the damage-inflicting capability, because these accelerated warheads — the ones that have powered flight below altitude — do a lot more damage when they hit the ground because their kinetic energy is very high. They almost double the explosive power because of all this kinetic energy being converted into explosive power. And we’re seeing more and more of these come in, and I can show you some of them in a follow-on discussion. They do tremendous damage. They are really doing damage on the ground.
I just exchanged… my wife came in and showed me, just before this, a message we got from very good friends we have in Israel who have been against Netanyahu. I don’t have a good firsthand sense of what’s going on in Israel in the population, because all our friends are against what’s been happening there. But we were told that things are hellish on the ground. That’s what we were told. Things are hellish on the ground, and they look hellish from what I can tell from videos. And it’s going to get worse. This is going to go on indefinitely. We’re only seven days into the war, eight days into the—
The Risk of Nuclear Escalation
GLENN DIESEN: Well, once the war can’t be won on the ground anymore, we often see that the strategy, the tactics and the targeting also changes. Only over the past day now is—
TED POSTOL: My concern is that this homicidal maniac will try to use, will resort to using nuclear weapons — a nuclear weapon against Iran. And if that happens, Iran will respond whether or not they now have nuclear weapons. It may take them a few weeks, but they’ll have the nuclear weapon and they will respond. That’s what we could have.
So I hope the United States has control over the Israelis that they’d like to say they do, because I don’t know if anyone can stop this guy. We have been playing with fire with this guy Netanyahu. This man is a homicidal maniac. So I am extremely worried. I’m getting more concerned, and incidentally, if Larry disagrees with me, I’d be interested to know. I mean, we should bring it up. I saw Larry’s comments just on your show earlier. I think he agrees with me, but I’m not sure. But I really value his insider experience, which I don’t have. I’m becoming very concerned about what’s going to go on over the next months or even year or more.
GLENN DIESEN: What I was going to say is, from the attacks on the fuel depots now in Tehran, we have this toxic rain which burns skin and destroys lungs. You have attacks on the desalination plant which provides water, which is also a war crime. And Trump recently made a statement that the map of Iran will probably not look the same after this war. So it looks as if — I’m not sure if it’s going to come from introducing Kurdish fighters or otherwise — either way, I think the escalation is really going out of control. So the prospect of a nuclear weapon should not be ruled out as a fail-to-win.
Walking Into a Global Nuclear War
TED POSTOL: Well, Glenn, you’re obviously a deeply studied person on this subject, more so than I, but I have to tell you that I’m beginning to become concerned that we’re walking into a global nuclear war. I think it could escalate. It would stay in the Middle East initially, but God knows where it could escalate. There are so many unknown parameters at this point. But hopefully it won’t happen. But if it starts in the Middle East, it doesn’t have to spread, but there are lots of scenarios where it could. So we are really moving into unknown—
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