Here is the full transcript of Prof John Mearsheimer’s interview on Daniel Davis / Deep Dive, January 4, 2026.
Brief Notes: In this sobering episode of the Daniel Davis/ Deep Dive, renowned international relations scholar Professor John Mearsheimer examines the mounting tensions in East Asia following large-scale Chinese military drills and an $11 billion U.S. aid package to Taiwan. Mearsheimer warns that the 2026 geopolitical landscape is fraught with risk, particularly as Japan signals its readiness to defend Taiwan, a move that the Chinese view as a direct threat to their “sacred territory”.
The conversation dives deep into the strategic “Achilles heel” of the United States—its degraded industrial base compared to China’s formidable manufacturing capacity—and the terrifying potential for a conventional conflict to spiral into nuclear war if homelands are attacked. From the vulnerabilities of aircraft carriers to the critical role of submarines, this interview provides a stark, realist assessment of why avoiding a war over Taiwan is the most vital challenge of the 21st century.
The Growing Crisis in East Asia
DANIEL DAVIS: They just had this big Chinese drill, the third large-scale where they basically rehearsed a blockade of the island. Where is this thing going and are you worried about it?
PROF JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, I’m very worried about it. I mean, we don’t pay much attention to it because our mind is focused on the Middle East and on Ukraine. And the potential for trouble in East Asia between the United States and China and China and its neighbors is enormous.
What you see going on vis-a-vis Taiwan is very worrying. It’s one of the three big flashpoints out there, the other two being the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
And two things have recently happened that greatly anger the Chinese. The first is that the Japanese Prime Minister said in early December of 2025 that if China were to invade Taiwan, Japan would see that in all likelihood as a threat to its survival. I think that was interpreted by the Chinese quite correctly as meaning that Japan would come to the defense of Taiwan.
And this of course enraged the Chinese because the Chinese believe that Taiwan is a domestic political issue for Beijing and it’s none of Japan’s business. Plus, you have the history of what happened in the past, especially in World War II, in terms of Sino-Japanese relations. So this was one big incident.
And then the other was, as you pointed out, we gave—we, the United States—gave $11.1 billion in military assistance to Taiwan, which is all designed to help Taiwan defend itself against an attack from China.
So you have this situation where the Chinese desperately want to take Taiwan back. They think that it’s sacred territory that belongs to them. And they also surely understand that it has great strategic value for them.
And we on the other hand, and here I’m talking not just about the United States, but the Japanese as well, we both understand that we have a deep-seated strategic interest in keeping Taiwan on our side of the ledger.
And the end result is you have this head-to-head face-off between the United States and Japan on one side and China on the other side over Taiwan. And how this plays out over time is very hard to say. But you can tell all sorts of plausible stories about how you get a war over Taiwan.
And you could do a similar thing with regard to the South China Sea and the East China Sea. And by the way, you can do a similar thing with regard to the India-China border up in the Himalaya Mountains. There have been a spate of articles that have come out to talk about the military buildup on the Indian side and on the Chinese side of the line of control up there. And of course the potential for a real war is there for sure.
So East Asia is a dangerous area, much the way the Middle East is and the way Ukraine is.
The Question of Taiwan’s Sovereignty
DANIEL DAVIS: And what are your concerns about diplomacy and sovereignty? For example, there are those who say, well, we obviously see—there are those who say, basically Taiwan is independent, so there’s no point in even messing around. We might as well just call out what it is.
But then there’s others that say, well listen, in the realistic terms of things, you have to look at this the way—what really makes sense is Taiwan helped by going down that path and saying they’re independent if that spawns a war that would be catastrophic and destructive.
And I don’t want to go into too much detail here. My assessment is that there is no prospect even if you succeeded in stopping China from completely capturing Taiwan. I doubt we could. But even if your so-called best case scenario, you now have this situation to where you almost have permanent conflict because China will never tolerate a permanent American military presence on Taiwan.
So why would you even want to go down that path when you can, as the United States especially privately, tell the leaders of Taiwan, “We will never go to war for you. So you need to understand that. And so you need to take whatever bilateral relations you need with China to make sure that they don’t attack you. And if you go too far, you’re going to be on your own,” which would seem to preclude a war because I think the status quo can go on without any war as long as Taiwan doesn’t move anymore in that direction. What do you say to that?
PROF JOHN MEARSHEIMER: I think there is absolutely no question that we want to do everything we can to avoid a war over Taiwan as well as over the South China Sea and the East China Sea. We do not want to get into a war with China. I want to make that very clear.
But I also believe at the same time we have a deep-seated interest in containing China and not allowing it to conquer Taiwan.
So we have to walk a very fine line here.
Now I think it’s clear that if Taiwan were to declare its independence, or we, the United States, were to say that Taiwan is a sovereign state, that this would lead to military action by China. The Chinese have made this clear over time.
So we have historically leaned very heavily on the Taiwanese to never say that they are independent. And I think if they were moving in that direction, we would come down on them like a ton of bricks. Because again, we don’t want a war over Taiwan. We’re interested in containing China or deterring China, but not provoking a war.
But the problem that you face is that if you make it clear, if you, the United States and you, Japan, make it clear you’re going to defend Taiwan, that gives the Taiwanese a lot of maneuver room to talk about declaring independence. So it’s very important for the United States to understand that they’re maneuvering in dangerous waters here and they’re going to have to go to especially great lengths to make sure that Taiwan does not do anything to provoke China and cause it to use military force.
Let me make one final point about this, Danny. I’ve looked reasonably closely at how easy it would be for Taiwan to be conquered or captured by China. And I think at this point in time and for the foreseeable future, as long as the United States and Japan come to the defense of Taiwan, it’s almost impossible for China to conquer it at some reasonable cost.
The fact is it would involve a large-scale amphibious operation across the Taiwan Strait. And as you know well, amphibious operations are among the most difficult military operations possible. And with all those American submarines that would be in the water and with all the drones and missiles that would be available on the Taiwanese, American, Japanese side, and given how vulnerable that assault force, that amphibious assault force would be coming across the Taiwan Strait, I think it’d be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for China now, given the balance of military power, to conquer Taiwan at some reasonable cost.
So I think as long as we’re smart politically, given the military balance of power, we can avoid a war over Taiwan in the foreseeable future.
The Cost of Conflict
DANIEL DAVIS: But are you concerned? Because certainly virtually every scenario simulation I’ve seen run on that, which for some reason I’ve seen only go out to 30 days, hasn’t gone beyond that. Many of them say that we could prevent, as you suggest, an outright military conquest by China over Taiwan.
But then that comes at profound cost to our side. Aircraft carriers going to the bottom, jets getting knocked down, Marines getting killed, et cetera. We’ve had another guest on here before who used to be a diplomat to China. He said even in that case, China would simply retool and go on because they would not allow the situation to exist on Taiwan without going back again until they finally end up conquering it.
So then we could get tied in and just sucked in to a long military extension that we can’t afford in any capacity, whether it’s personnel, planes and ships, or money. So that seems like that would be a big time losing proposition to us with almost no upside. How do you see it?
PROF JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, what I’m saying to you, and this is consistent with what you’re saying, is that China can’t win the war and we can’t win the war, at least in the short term. So we’re in a situation where we’re not really thinking about defeating China in a war over Taiwan. That’s not going to happen.
What we’re going to try to do is stymie the Chinese, prevent China from taking Taiwan, and then it will turn into a long war. And the question is, where do you go from there? And who knows? And you want to remember, Daniel, though you didn’t say this, both sides do have nuclear weapons.
DANIEL DAVIS: I was literally just about to say that. But yeah, that’s just on the conventional level. That gets a lot more worrisome after that.
PROF JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Exactly. Both sides have nuclear weapons. And furthermore, you’re fighting this war not completely, but partially out in the water where the possibility of using nuclear weapons is much greater than if you’re fighting it on land.
The point here is that neither side would win a quick and decisive victory and it would turn into a protracted war. And I think the threat of that outcome is a powerful force for deterrence. That would be my argument here, and you just want to make it clear to the Chinese, and it’s clear to the Americans as well, that you can’t win.
By the way, with regard to aircraft carriers, I don’t think there’ll be any aircraft carriers involved in the fight. I think they would be sunk to the bottom of the Jolly Roger very, very quickly. I think the weapons that really matter for the United States in this scenario are submarines. Yeah, I’d be building submarines and not aircraft carriers.
America’s Achilles Heel: The Industrial Base
DANIEL DAVIS: Yeah, been arguing that for a long time. What do you suggest there in terms of the sustainability? Because my bigger worry is, I’ll just concede that maybe you’re right and nobody would win a decisive victory in the near term, however defined.
But that long term, it seems to me, from what I’ve been able to read, and you know a lot more about this than I do, is that China has seen some of the lessons, not even just in the Russia-Ukraine war, but even before that, that they need to have a bigger industrial base where they can sustain all the key logistics required for a sustained combat, especially in missiles, missile defense, and other kinds of ammunition. And we absolutely don’t. So we couldn’t sustain one that they could. How do you see that?
PROF JOHN MEARSHEIMER: I think this is our Achilles heel. The truth is we have seen how important an industrial base is in a modern war. We thought after the Cold War ended that you didn’t need a modern industrial base. We didn’t think you had to worry about shipbuilding. We were wrong.
And what’s happened in Ukraine is decisive evidence that we were wrong. And as you correctly point out, this is a real problem for us in a fight with China in East Asia because they have a formidable industrial base, much like the Russians do, and we have run down our industrial base.
And as you well know, Danny, the Trump administration has been trying very hard to bring that industrial base or that manufacturing base back from the dead. But it’s easier said than done.
So I think one could make an argument that if we get into a long war, or let’s put it this way, if there’s no quick victory for either the Chinese and the United States in a fight over Taiwan and it begins to evolve into a long war, we would be at a significant disadvantage.
And then that’s when the question of nuclear weapons comes into play. Right? Because if the United States is desperate, you know, if you’re willing to go to war over Taiwan, you’re effectively saying this is a vital strategic interest. You don’t go to war, you don’t go to war with a country like China unless a vital strategic interest is involved.
So you’re in a situation that really matters and you’re losing, and you’re the United States. Where are you? China. The question is, what do you do then next?
And by the way, just to take this a step further, you want to understand that in a war over Taiwan, there will be all sorts of military assets on the Chinese mainland opposite of Taiwan that the United States will attack. So we will be attacking the Chinese homeland.
It’s also very important to understand that when you look at those assets, the nuclear command and control and the conventional command and control systems are intertwined in all sorts of ways. And a lot of weapons that can be used with conventional warheads can be used with nuclear warheads.
And in a conflict that sometimes, if not always impossible to distinguish which weapons have nuclear warheads and which have conventional warheads. So all I’m saying is that in a war over Taiwan, you’re not going to simply be fighting out in the water in the Taiwan Strait. You’re not going to be simply fighting over Taiwan itself. There’s going to be major fighting inside of China. This is the Chinese homeland.
The Risk of Escalation to the American Homeland
DANIEL DAVIS: Let me ask if that scenario were to come to pass and we were attacking conventionally targets on Chinese mainland, what is the prospect that they would, whether through submarine or otherwise, hit American assets either on our homeland or in the region?
The Threat to U.S. Military Assets in the Pacific
PROF JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, there would be. There’s no question they’re going to hit all of our assets in the region. And these will mainly be military bases in Japan, maybe South Korea as well.
But if you’re talking about a fight over Taiwan, there’s no question that American military assets that are located in Japan—and this would include an air base like the one at Kadena on Okinawa—they’ll definitely go after that. And the attacks will be massive.
The Chinese have huge numbers of ballistic missiles, and so there’s no question on that front. Whether they go after the American homeland is another matter. But if you’re the Chinese and you see the Americans attacking your homeland, the incentives for you to attack the American homeland are very great.
And what exactly that means is hard to say. I mean, Guam is not one of the 50 states, but it is a big fat target out in the Pacific Ocean that they could go after.
The Imperative of Avoiding War
DANIEL DAVIS: That is all the more reason why there never needs to be war between the United States and China under any circumstances. Let’s hope sanity prevails there.
Listen, I really appreciate you coming on today. It’s got a little bit of a downer stuff, but it’s critical that we understand what’s at stake so that we can avoid the worst of these outcomes. And we really appreciate you pointing that out.
And of course we see you’ve got a lot of stuff here on your Substack, your reviews of 2025 and a whole bunch of other stuff. People can go to mearsheimer.substack.com to find all that you need of John in between his lovely visits here. And we will look forward to the very next one you come by. Thanks, John. Appreciate it.
PROF JOHN MEARSHEIMER: You’re more than welcome. And once again, Happy New Year, Danny.
DANIEL DAVIS: Same to you. We always appreciate you coming on and we appreciate you guys too. Be sure and recognize that we are on podcast now. We’re all over the place. Anywhere that you need so that you can get your unintimidated and uncompromised truths on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Podcast Addict and we have our own Substack. It is danieldavisdeep.substack.com.
Of course, we’re also on X. We’re on Instagram, man, we’re all over the place. Make sure that you share this with your friends. Folks, let’s just keep this going. Don’t keep that stuff to yourself. Share it with other people so they can have access to what you have. Because we all need the truth in these days.
Thank you very much, folks. We’ll look forward to seeing you on the next episode of Daniel Davis Deep Dive.
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