Kishore Mahbubani: A Declining West, a Rising East: Achieving a New Global Balance (Transcript)

And when future historians look at our time in the last 80 years, at the end of the day you have to acknowledge that we have created overall a better world for humanity. A lot of us and certainly we in East Asia have prospered as a result of a world order that the West gifted to us in 1945. That world order has served us very well.

But the reality is that that world order is now under threat. And what I hope to do is to explain to you where the threat comes from and what we need to do about it.

I’ll try to divide my remarks into three parts. In part one, I want to explain how the world has changed so dramatically and these dramatic changes of course mean that we have to change the world order. And then in part two I’ll explain where the resistance to this change is coming from. And then in part three, hopefully suggest why it would be wiser for those who are resisting this change to avoid doing so.

Part One: How the World Has Changed

Let me begin with part one. And just to illustrate to you with a few statistics of how much the world has changed fundamentally especially in terms of the shift of power as Cheng was saying in his remarks earlier, the shift of power from the west to the east. I give you three examples which will illustrate how dramatic the shift of power has been.

# European Union vs China

First, I’ll compare the European Union with China. In 1980, 45 years ago, the combined economy of the EU was 10 times larger than China, 10 times. Today EU and China are about the same size. By 2050, EU will be half the size of China.

I want to emphasize one point. This kind of massive structural shift in one human lifetime of 70 years where the European Union goes from being 10 times larger to becoming half the size in 70 years, these kinds of structural shifts don’t happen very often and because they are happening now, the pressure for change becomes very real.

# United Kingdom vs India

But let me give you two other examples. The second one I’ll compare the United Kingdom and India and this is a good comparison to make. Just remember a hundred years ago quite remarkably, a hundred years ago a hundred thousand Englishmen could effortlessly rule over 300 million Indians. I mean looking back now it’s quite stunning that that happened. I mean just imagine today the British Prime Minister sending 100,000 Englishmen to run India today. It would be massacred, right? That happened 100 years ago.

But I can tell you even as recently as 1990, 35 years ago, the British GDP was still four times larger than that of India, right? But last year, India surpassed the British with a larger economy and by 2050, India will be four times the size of the British. Right? Look at that. In 1990, the British were four times bigger than India. By 2050, India will be four times bigger than UK. A major fundamental shift.

# Germany vs ASEAN

And then you have a third example because everyone knows the China story, everyone knows the India story. I’m glad you mentioned ASEAN, Cheng, but ASEAN has also done remarkably well. As recently as 2000, Germany which is the industrial powerhouse of Europe was three times bigger than ASEAN. By last year or this year, Germany and ASEAN are about the same size and by 2050, Germany will be half the size of ASEAN. Again in barely 50 years Germany goes from being three times bigger to becoming half the size of ASEAN.

So you can see therefore there has been a massive shift of power in the world. So when such massive shifts of power happen, the logical thing to do, the rational thing to do is to adapt our world order, adapt international organizations to deal with a different world. Unfortunately, that is not happening.

Part Two: Where the Resistance Comes From

So in part two of my remarks, I hope to speak about where the resistance is coming from and it’s a deep resistance. Now I’m going to speak about the West broadly speaking but you’ll be surprised that I’m going to give a bit more emphasis on the European Union rather than the United States because overall one of the remarkable things about the United States is that it has basically kept the size of its GDP in the world relatively constant which is quite an amazing achievement by the United States.

Around 2000 it was 25% of the world’s GDP, today is still around 25% of the world’s GDP. So the United States has been changing, adapting, growing in its own unusual ways. And everyone thinks that when you talk about the world order, you must talk about the threats posed by President Donald Trump and his tariffs and so on and so forth. And of course all those things are disrupting the world.

But at the end of the day, it’s the structural adjustments that have to be made that are more important than the temporary tariffs that you see. You can get very distracted by the issue of Trump and tariffs but by so doing you’re not paying attention to the deeper structural challenges that have to be dealt with.

# European Resistance to Change

And here in terms of structural changes, since power has shifted away from Europe very clearly, it’s Europe’s resistance to change in international organizations that has become in some ways the biggest problem in terms of adapting to a new world. And just to give you, let me illustrate that point with two examples.

# The IMF Example

The first is of course in theory the world’s most powerful international economic organization which is the IMF. And it’s interesting that if you go to the IMF website and my research assistant found this and this is what the IMF website says in the IMF’s own fact sheet on how it makes decisions. It claims that “Voting power and decision-making at the IMF reflect its member countries’ relative economic position.” Let me repeat that. This is what the IMF says. “Voting power and decision-making at the IMF reflect its member countries’ relative economic position.”

And then it goes on to say, “The IMF works to ensure that its governance structure keeps pace with changes in the world economy, including the larger role that emerging market and developing countries now have.” So it’s very clear that the IMF honestly admits that voting structure must reflect the new economic balance of power in the world.

Now I already told you that the EU and China’s share of global GDP is about the same, at 17%. And therefore, the IMF voting share of the EU should be 17% and the IMF voting share of China should be 17%. Guess what the numbers are? The Europe share of IMF voting structure is 26% instead of 17% and China’s share is 6% instead of 17%.

So, even though the IMF website says clearly voting shares reflect a country’s share of global economic power, that’s not shown. And the reason why the change doesn’t happen is because the European countries have done a brilliant job of fighting this incredible resistance to change in very artful ways of ensuring that the voting shares don’t keep up with the new order. And so that’s one example of resistance to change.

Now, if the IMF is the – incidentally, I’m not the only person who says this. I came across a quote recently by a Brazilian economist, Paulo Batista Jr., who is, by the way, a former executive director at the IMF, and in a recent report he said, “European resistance to reform is a long-standing intractable problem at the root of a large part of the IMF’s increasingly legitimacy problems. Europe makes at most partial or even only verbal concessions on these matters.”

European Resistance to Change in International Organizations

So this European resistance to change has been noted and documented by lots of other people too. Now the second example I was going to give, I was going to say, if the IMF is the most powerful international economic organization. The most powerful international political organization by far is the UN Security Council.

The UN Security Council is the only international body that has the power to make decisions that are binding and mandatory on all member states of the UN. So in a sense that’s where the real power is and for those of you who have been familiar with my writings in the UN, you know that I’ve also discussed the UN Security Council at great length and in theory the UN Security Council has got 15 members, the five permanent member states, P5 of US, Russia, China, UK, France and the 10 other elected members.

But I can tell you that after Singapore spent two years in the UN Security Council and I was the Singapore ambassador to the UN, when I left the UN Security Council, I came to the conclusion that the UN Security Council has got five members and ten observers. And the ten observers were treated – and by the way, one of the French ambassadors was very honest about it. When Singapore tried to propose some changes in the working methods of the UN Security Council to try and improve the Security Council, the French ambassador said, “Why are these tourists trying to change the furniture in our living room?” Which is very honest I must say. But that reality is that it’s the five permanent members who run the UN Security Council.

The Outdated Composition of the UN Security Council

Now what’s interesting about this composition of these five permanent members is that in theory the five permanent members are supposed to represent the great powers of the day and there’s no doubt in 1945 the five great powers of the day were United States, then Soviet Union, China, UK and France. But this is 2025 and you’ve already seen how the British economy has shrunk and how the French economy has also shrunk relative to the rest of the world, but they still remain permanent members of the UN Security Council resisting change.

And this is a story I got to know very well because The UN actually set up something called the Open Ended Working Group on UN Security Council Reform in 1993 I think and we are now in 2025. Thirty-two years have gone by, nothing has changed. So someone said let’s change the name of the working group from open-ended working group on UN Security Council reform to never-ending UN Security Council reform.

This is a serious suggestion. But I can tell you incidentally, unless you’ve been in the trenches and I’ve been actually in the trenches fighting these issues of trying to reform international organizations, you have no idea how brilliant the Europeans are at fighting change. Brilliant. Because what they will say upfront is that, of course we are for change. Yes, we are for change.

But behind the scenes they know exactly what levers to pull, what to do to ensure that change doesn’t happen. And so you have this rather crazy situation whereby, Europe, for example, as I mentioned earlier, now has 17% of the global GNP but in terms of permanent membership seats they have 40% because UK and France make up two-fifths of the five permanent members.

A Proposal for Britain to Give Way to India

And that’s why I wrote an article in the Financial Times last year and I’m actually genuinely surprised the Financial Times published it. It shows you how open-minded the Financial Times is. I said that, clearly I gave you the data already how India’s economy is now larger than the British.

By 2050, it will be four times bigger than the British. So the British perhaps as a nice act of atonement for the colonization of India should voluntarily give up their permanent membership seat to India. And that’s actually, I’m glad you laugh because it sounds funny, but it is actually a serious suggestion Because Britain today represents a country of the past. India represents a country of the future. And the past must give way to the future.

And you know, some of you must have noticed in a recent column by Martin Wolf on the state of his own country UK I’ll never forget the first line of his column. The first line of his column said the UK has failing politics, a failed state and a failing economy. Failing politics, a failed state and a failing economy. So why are you clinging on to permanent membership? Why not give away?

That’s a rational, logical thing to do. But sadly, it is not happening.

The Democratic Paradox of Global Governance

So in the five minutes that I have left, I’m going to try and explain why we should work to persuade the Europeans that is actually in Europe’s interests to make way for other powers in many of these key international organizations. Because at the end of the day, the most important fact that the West should realize is that if you look at the world’s population, there are 8 billion people in the world, only 12% live in the West, 88% live in the rest of the world. And we are now, as everyone understands, we live in a small interdependent shrinking world, right?

In fact, Kofi Annan very aptly compared it to a global village. Now if you are living in a small, densely interconnected global village and you are 12% of the population, it’s in your interest as a minority to ensure that the village is well run, is stable and not chaotic. Right? So you want to have a village council that is functioning well.

And what’s interesting is that it is at the end of the day, it is the West, and certainly Europe, that taught the world that when you want to have village councils, the best village councils are the Democratic village councils, where people vote.

And so the village council must represent the village as a whole and not represent a minority. And this is at the end of the day the biggest paradox about our time. Because domestically the Western countries preach the virtues of democracy, stunningly. Democracy is the best way of running a society. But when it comes to the global village, please don’t speak about democracy.

Don’t ask for any allocation of power on the basis of our share of global population, we want to keep our privileged seats. And that, you can see that contradiction there very clearly. And that contradiction also means that they are laying the seeds for trouble that is coming. Because if the Global Village Council at the end of the day doesn’t represent the views of the majority of the population of the world, they can become irrelevant.

The UN Security Council’s Dilemma

And so I’ve always said, having served on the UN Security Council, that the UN Security Council is going to face a major dilemma.

And the dilemma is quite simple. You can keep your composition, the British and French as permanent members, and you lose your credibility. But if you want to keep your credibility, then you’ve got to change your composition. That’s the dilemma. And the obvious solution is the credibility of the UN Security Council is much more important than its composition.

So bring in the new powers and certainly bring in the powers that are rising. So I hope that as a result of our discussion today, we can work together and try to persuade the West that the world has changed, that us all adapt to this change. Thank you very much.

Fireside Chat with Professor Daniel Bell

PROFESSOR DANIEL BELL: So thank you, Kishore, for the wonderful talk. And normally as a commentator, or I’m supposed to disagree, but frankly I don’t disagree with anything you say, So let me push it in a few directions.

First of all, here in Hong Kong we strongly value the freedom of speech, but I’m going to ask for one tiny little constraint because, as you know, my home country is Canada and we’ve been subject to unprovoked bullying by a large neighbour to the south. So please don’t mention the name of that political leader, otherwise I might have a panic attack. So that’s the one constraint. And I’m glad you didn’t mention it just now. So other than that, feel free to say anything.

The first, I mean, if the Security Council is so difficult to reform, I mean, what about alternative international organizations? I mean, maybe that’s where there’s more promise. Could you – do you have any ideas about that? Is it BRICS or which would it be? It sounds like the Security Council really is almost impossible to…

I mean even today frankly, there’s no political representatives from Europe or from North America. So I mean they’re not really open to this sort of suggestion seems to me. So maybe we need to look outside that and think of alternative organizations. Could you use any ideas about that?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well you’re absolutely right.

By the way, I’m glad you mentioned you’re from Canada. I should add I’m an honorary Canadian since I got my master’s degree from Dalhousie and I also spent 10 years serving as a non-resident High Commissioner of Singapore to Canada. I’ve discovered by the way that, I’ll show you, many of you know that Canada is one of the nicest countries in the world. And suddenly Canada discovers that being nice to your neighbor for 50, 60 years means nothing.

And in some ways, I’m glad you raised that issue, because there’s one point I didn’t emphasize at the beginning of my remarks, which is that geopolitics is the most cruel game in the world.

And we are today in terms of geopolitical shifts of power, experiencing far more geopolitical shifts of power, and I gave you some example, than any other time. And it’s very important therefore for countries, even nice countries like Canada, have got to understand that being nice is not enough. That you’ve got to learn to be very geopolitically shrewd and cunning and Machiavellian if you’re going to survive in this world.

Sunrise and Sunset Organizations

And I would say in terms of our world order you’re absolutely right. There are, if it’s very difficult to adapt the established top level institutions UN, IMF and so on and so forth.

There are other institutions that are rising in an ad hoc fashion and clearly among these organizations some are sunrise and some are sunset. So I give you the obvious example. Until recently, one of the most powerful organizations was the G7 countries, right? It was the United States and six other European members plus the European Union. And at one time when the leaders met, all the G7 leaders looked equally strong.

Today when you watch meetings of G7 leaders, it’s like Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. And you know I’m not even exaggerating. And I mean One of the photographs that will go down as one of the defining moments of the 21st century is the photograph you saw recently of President Donald Trump in his White House sitting at the desk. And all the European leaders were sitting in the sofa like children in front of their school teacher. I mean that photograph was so damning and this is the same Europe that says We will not give up our seats. We are very powerful. They behave like school children. But that’s an illustration of how power shifts have happened.

By contrast, if you look at BRICS, right? BRICS is Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.

That’s clearly a sunrise organization because a lot of countries are planning to join, right? It’s interesting. One, no one is applying to join the G7 but it breaks everyone’s writing. That’s an example of how power is also shifting. But there are also another important organization which I think right now is having a rough time which is the G20.

The G20 at the end of the day will become more significant in the decades to come and the G20 as you know was formed as a result of a global financial crisis and initially only the finance ministers used to meet but after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, even George W. Bush convened a meeting of the G20 leaders to try and deal with a global financial crisis. So that’s an example of how there are various forms of adaptation taking place. But these forms of adaptation are not enough. So it’s important therefore for especially the Asian countries to work harder to say that their voice must be represented much more strongly.

China-India Relations: A Complex Dynamic

PROFESSOR DANIEL BELL: Okay, great. One question, the two huge powers that could pose an alternative to a kind of West-centric order, obviously of China and India. And you know both countries very well and you’re sympathetic to both, which is kind of rare. And the ties seem to be improving now. What can they do further to improve ties, to form some sort of G2 again?

Any suggestions along those lines?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, I mean the China-India relationship, I think you should all know, is very complicated. And right now, well actually Until about three, four months ago, relations between China and India, they were not bad. They were very bad. I mean they were not talking to each other, right?

I mean I’m sure you’re all aware that after the clash that took place in Galwan in June 2020, China and India ties went in the nose dive. Fortunately, In the last few months, step by step, the ties have been improving and I think it’s likely that Prime Minister Modi is going to go to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting I think at the end of this month and that’s a big deal. It’s a really big deal that the Prime Minister of India is going back to China.

I think for the China-India relationship to improve, a lot more work needs to be done by both sides. And here I must say that if I had been given this talk here, even four months ago, I would have been very pessimistic about China-India relations, but we must thank one gentleman for significantly improving China-India relations.

And this is the gentleman, he said his name I should not mention. But I have to give credit where it’s due. And President Donald Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff on India is one of the biggest shocks that India has ever got in recent times. But more than that, as you all are aware, India and Pakistan also had a military clash a month or two ago. And after the military clash, President Donald Trump invited the Chief of Army of Pakistan for a special White House lunch.

And the Indians saw this as a slap in the face for them. And so there is now, even as we are speaking, a tremendous amount of reevaluation going on in Delhi about where India’s place in the world is. And we are now in the midst, so you’re going to watch a kind of a transition that is happening. So on the China-India front, hopefully things will be much better by the end of this year. Great.

Hong Kong and One Country, Two Systems

PROFESSOR DANIEL BELL: Thank you. So, a few more minutes left and then we open it to Q&A. One little question about Hong Kong since we have many people here from Hong Kong. I mean, as you know, the one country, two systems, it pulls in opposite direction, or at least seemingly opposite direction. So my first question is how can Hong Kong strengthen its commitment, its national identity, its commitment to China as a political identity without weakening the two systems? Any suggestions along those lines?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well I think the one country, two system is actually a brilliant solution to the question of how you integrate Hong Kong into China. And I think that the important thing is that I believe China realizes that Hong Kong is a better asset to China if it actually keeps its differences rather than dissolving the differences and becoming just like any other Chinese town or city. And in fact, the differentiation therefore becomes an asset to China.

So if you can keep up your British, what they call, common law traditions, which is what we have in Singapore also, and you keep that going, and you keep up your modern business practices and everything. Hong Kong is therefore a bigger asset to China. But it’s important therefore that the leaders of Hong Kong communicate that much more strongly, both domestically and internationally. Because I think that frankly, and my sense is that at the end of the day, Beijing wants Hong Kong to succeed.

And part of the reason why Beijing wants Hong Kong to succeed is because the United States doesn’t want Hong Kong to succeed. I mean it’s a fact. I told you earlier on that geopolitics is a cruel business, right? In some ways, paradoxically incidentally, because President Trump is one of the least ideological presidents of recent times, he, as you know, he doesn’t pay much attention to issues like Hong Kong and Taiwan, but his predecessor did.

And so for that reason, if China sees that Hong Kong is under threat is in China’s interest to see the success of Hong Kong. But one last point about people in Hong Kong, I used this analogy before, in the US-China contest Hong Kong is going to become a political football. And if you are going to be caught in a geopolitical game, the Hong Kong establishment must develop geopolitical instincts and understand the game that is being played and then understand sometimes when to dodge, you know, when the arrows are coming.

Personal Reflections on Karl Marx

PROFESSOR DANIEL BELL: Great. We’re rapidly running out of time, so let me ask a few quick, more personal questions and also with quick answers if you don’t mind. I love your memoirs as you know and there’s a few things about it that I want to ask a little bit. First of all you mentioned that you were kind of fond of Karl Marx And also in your interview with Brian, you also mentioned that. So can you go a little bit more detail, which part of Marx do you like? Is it theory of alienation, of exploitation? Is it communism as a higher ideal? What part of Marx do you like?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Have you got three hours? Just one minute, please.

Well I mean, I was, you know, I wrote my, basically I wrote my master’s thesis comparing the concepts of freedom and equality in the writings of Karl Marx and John Rawls. John Rawls, by the way, is the greatest American philosopher of the 20th century, a brilliant guy. When I started my research, I thought my sympathies would be more with John Rawls than with Karl Marx. I ended up actually sympathizing with Karl Marx more. Because Karl Marx will go down in history as probably the most brilliant thinker on social and political issues.

So his whole concept of substructure and superstructure. So we all think that the way we think about our society is a result of our imagination, rationality and all that. He said, no. What emerges in your society is a consequence of the economic distribution of power. And where that economic power is distributed then decides what kind of society you will have.

And that was one of the most brilliant insights and no one else before Karl Marx came out with that. And so, don’t read Das Kapital, but if you can read the earlier essays of Karl Marx, they are absolutely brilliant. And I think even Rawls would acknowledge that about Karl Marx. We should teach Marx in Hong Kong schools. So thank you.

Favorite Political Leaders

PROFESSOR DANIEL BELL: Maybe just one last question since we’re running out of time. Who is your favorite political leader, first among the dead and second among the living?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, among the dead is easier for me. It’s certainly Lee Kuan Yew. And see, Because I had an opportunity, one of the greatest privileges of my life is that I’ve shaken hands with world leaders, you know, dozens of them. And none of the ones I met actually were as politically shrewd, frankly, as politically cunning as Lee Kuan Yew was.

And I tell you, I was in 1999, I was in a room like this, small room but all CEOs and people like George H.W. Bush was there, Henry Kissinger was there, Zbigniew Brzezinski was there, Sam Huntington was there, you know, really formidable meeting and at that meeting there was David Frost interviewing George H.W. Bush and David Frost asked George H.W. Bush, you met so many world leaders, who is the one world leader who impressed you the most within a split second George H.W. Bush, Lee Kuan Yew.

So, you know, that shows you that among the… He was an amazing figure for a leader of a very small country. His influence was outsized. Okay. So that among the living, very difficult question. Okay.

Q&A Session

PROFESSOR DANIEL BELL: This part is an open Q&A for everybody. Is there any questions or comments? Can you – Do you mind introducing yourself briefly as well?

EDDIE TAM: Hi, my name is Eddie Tam. Thank you very much. Brilliant presentation. I’m very happy also that India and China’s relationship seems to be improving in the recent months. And you mentioned several times about the restructuring of the Security Council, but I think on record, if I’m not mistaken, actually the US, Russia, UK and France are in support of India’s rise to be accepted into the Security Council as permanent member.

But I think on the record, actually China is the only one which stands in the way. Am I correct that I’ve just checked that there could be hints of China dropping the opposition? I hope that happens. So that doesn’t seem to drive with your explanation that is UK which stands in the way and they don’t want to give up the seat. Yeah, maybe they don’t want to give up the seat but they seem to support the inclusion of India but whereas China for now I think that’s not.

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, my first response to you is whenever countries say in public that they support India, be careful because it’s often the countries that are supporting you that are the ones that are best at undermining you. And by the way, I’ve seen with my own eyes, okay, Countries that in public would say, of course we support India’s inclusion. But then what you do, the way you prevent reform is that you introduce what I call poison pill amendments. And when you put up in the poison pill amendment, you ensure that nobody can accept it and therefore there can be no reform and therefore India cannot get in. There are ways and means of your real position is not what your public position is.

And so I’m not sure for the record exactly what China’s position is. I don’t think China has opposed India’s admission. But I don’t know whether or not China has publicly supported also any countries. But I do believe that it is in China’s national interest to see a different UN Security Council. And I would say, don’t listen to what countries say, observe what is their national interest. And that will tell you what their real position will be.

Incidentally, in my book, The Great Convergence, you’ll find that I have proposed a 7-7-7 formula, seven permanent members, seven semi-permanent members, and seven elected members. And the reason why I propose seven semi-permanent members is because for every country that wants to get in, there’s a neighbor that says, why not me? So India wants to get in, Pakistan says, why not me? Japan wants to get in, South Korea says, why not me? Brazil wants to get in, Argentina says, why not me?

But the most brilliant ambassador to the UN, I remember, was the Italian ambassador because in the 1990s when everybody was pushing for Japan and Germany to become permanent members, the Italian ambassador got very upset. He says, “Why are you pushing only for Japan and Germany? We Italy, we lost World War II also.” And the true story, amazing.

But I tell that story to tell you that the opposition to reform is very deep, very subterranean, very cunning. So don’t pay attention to public statements. Watch what’s going on underground.

PROFESSOR DANIEL BELL: We had a question from Professor Brian Wong.

PROFESSOR BRIAN WONG: Thank you very much, Prof. Shaw. I very much appreciate your time and time. It’s an honor to see you here in Hong Kong again. I get a lot of questions from young secondary school students and university students in Hong Kong who are bright, ambitious and want to contribute towards foreign policy and want to pursue a career in foreign policy. But as it stands, I think Hong Kong youth often struggle with entering into the mainland foreign ministry system and also making a difference for their own country which is China.

What advice would you give to Hong Kong youth if they want to pursue a career oriented around international affairs and what advice would you give to the government in relation to cultivating future diplomats on behalf of China? Thank you.

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well I think one lesson I learned now, I mean since I was a career diplomat for 33 years and I’ve stepped down, clearly I’ve now been independent for 21 years. And you can make a difference on the global scene by serving as a diplomat and I enjoyed my 33 years as a diplomat. I mean that I learned more from my two years as being ambassador on the UN Security Council than I learned the previous 30 years because I learned how naked power is.

When I tell you that geopolitics is a cruel game, I can say that with great conviction because I saw with my own eyes how cruel it is. I’ve seen it. But at the same time, you can also make a difference internationally and globally through various public fora and speaking out and so on and so forth. So there are lots of opportunities in terms of speaking out in international. I know that you have done it, Brian. Daniel has done it. Cheng-Li has done it.

And I would say there are many opportunities to make a difference because at the end of the day if you are able and I have discovered that if you want to change anything internationally don’t appeal to ideals, don’t appeal to principles, Appeal to the national interests of the countries. And so, if you want to try and change the China-India relationship, I try to explain to my Chinese friends and to my Indian friends, why is it in their respective national interest to make the changes, not on a high principles or ideals because at the end of the day, the real interest matter much more than all these ideas do. Thank you.

Global Financial Infrastructure and Dollar Dominance

SALMAN KHAN: If I might switch gear a little bit, just ask a question about global finance. So you talked about the structural change that we’ve seen, but the global financial structure, infrastructure is very much still denominated and anchored in the U.S. Dollar. So global trade, access to finance, very much depend on access to dollar, including in places like Hong Kong. So how do you see this dollar dominance and the global financial infrastructure that’s still very much anchored in a, say, US-centric system affect the path of globalization or structural change going forward? How does that affect dependence on dollar, if I might just ask that?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, you’re absolutely right. The dollar is completely indispensable to the global financial system. The dollar will remain the global reserve currency for decades to come and even if the Chinese economy becomes bigger than the US economy and I think it could happen in let’s say 10 to 15 years from now, the US dollar will still remain as the global reserve currency. That’s a fact.

But at the same time, some of the recent actions that have been taken by the US, by the West, have led to countries questioning their reliance on the US dollar. So For example, the seizure of the Russian assets of $300 billion is clearly illegal under international law. You can’t do it unless the UN Security Council mandates it, right? But that gesture has led to many countries saying, now we got to hedge our bets. We cannot put all our reserves in US dollars.

So there’s a progressive, very slow process of moving away from the US dollar in many years. And the other danger that the US dollar faces is that right now, for example, when China exports calves to Argentina, it gets paid with dollars. Argentina exports beef to China, it gets paid with US dollars. Surely you can create a new mechanism using blockchain technology and all that to bypass the US dollar. That hasn’t happened yet but the pressure to look for alternatives has grown significantly.

Naval Power and Modern Warfare

ALVINA: Historically, you’d see that a nation’s naval power is extremely important to its country’s power position in the world. So in this current shift in the structural shift of power, how important is a nation’s naval capabilities and its naval bases and how does it play a role in terms of geopolitics and would this actually play into U.S. Interest because its global naval power in terms of resisting change that you have mentioned?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, I must say that’s a very profound question on the role of navies, right? You know, I’m not a military expert, but I have in my book “Has China Won,” actually did say that it is now pointless for United States to send aircraft carriers close to China.

Remember that in Bill Clinton’s time in 1996, when there was a crisis between China and Taiwan, Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers. He didn’t actually send them through Taiwan’s Straits, but he sent them close enough to say, “I can control the Taiwan Straits with two aircraft carriers.”

1996, right? 29 years have passed. Tomorrow, if there’s a crisis between China and Taiwan, US cannot send two aircraft carriers because nowadays with hypersonic missile technology, aircraft carriers have become sitting ducks. In fact, it doesn’t make sense to build aircraft carriers because they were supposed to be invincible, now they’re not invincible anymore.

So you can see therefore, actually again I’m not a military expert, but what’s been the most effective in most of the recent battles? Drones, small little drones. And they are amazing that there is more damage that can be done by little drones. So the nature of warfare is changing.

Wars as a Sunset Industry

But at the same time, I also want to emphasize that even though there are wars in Ukraine, there are wars in Gaza, most countries in the world are coming to accept that wars are stupid. And the good news for the world is that wars in general are sunset industry.

There are some places where they break out and I run something called the Asian Peace Program by the way at the National University of Singapore. You can Google and look at it on our website. And I assert there that wars are a result of geopolitical incompetence.

The Ukraine war could have been avoided if the Europeans had shown some sensitivity of what are Russia’s core national interests. It doesn’t mean that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is justified but you could have prevented it by acknowledging that Russia has got legitimate security interests.

And in the same way the Gaza war could have been avoided if the West had tried harder, pushed harder for two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. And I say this publicly to my Israeli friends. If I as a friend see you walking towards a cliff, do I say stop or do I say keep walking? I see Israel walking towards a cliff because Israel has alienated global public opinion. Very unwise, right?

So but in the end of the day, if you want to prevent wars, to go back to my earlier point, you’ve got to be very cunning in geopolitics, understand countries’ core interests and work around them. Thank you.

Questions on Asian Century and Multipolar World

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We had two questions very quick. Each of you speak on that table very quickly, please.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, Professor Mahbubani, a journalist from the South Lanfang Media Group. I want to ask a question that goes to the… Well, you are hailed as the muse of the Asian century. So how should China, India, ASEAN and other Asian countries can coordinate to join to shape a more inclusive and sustainable Asia century, well, based on especially in global governance, climate response and maybe multilateralism? Thank you.

LI TENG: Thank you, Ambassador Mahbubani. So my name is Li Teng from Chinese University of Hong Kong. So my question is about the idea of multipolar world, the idea of multipolar global order. So on the one hand, it could be more inclusive, more diversified, more plural, but on the other hand, it could be more fragmented, more unstable. So I would like to seek your view about this multipolar global order, how it’s going to look like in the coming decades. Thank you.

The Asian Century and Multipolar World Order

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Two small questions with short answers. And Mali says I have two minutes. By the way, I should emphasize at the outset, since you very kindly called me ambassador up there, I’m no longer an ambassador. I don’t speak for anybody. I speak only for myself. And Singapore doesn’t have the American tradition of keeping your title as ambassador.

First question on the Asian Century. As you know, I did publish a book called “The Asian 21st Century” and the good news about the book was that the publisher’s target was 20,000 downloads. Instead, there have been over 4.1 million downloads of the book in 160 countries. The reason I mention that is that that’s an indicator that the world is psychologically preparing for an Asian century.

But for that to happen, it’s very important that Asia remains at peace. And it’s actually quite amazing that we in Asia haven’t had a major war. We’ve had skirmishes, but no major war probably since 1979. It’s quite amazing and this is a stunning feature of Asia that no one has acknowledged but for us, for the Asian century to happen, our priority number one is make sure there’s no major war.

And even though there’ll be competition, there’ll be rivalry, there’ll be tensions, okay, we can manage that. But you’ve got to avoid a major war. That’s condition number one to ensure that the Asian century happens because I think the economic development momentum is real and will continue.

Now on the multipolar world, I think the multipolar world is already here. It has arrived but of course it’s fluid because some of the powers are going up, some of the powers are going down. But this multi-polar world, I think Cheng Li, you quoted JD Vance saying about how the multi-polar world has come. And it is actually good for the world that we are having a multipolar world instead of unipolar or bipolar.

Because in a multipolar world, there are more actors. And so there are more balancing forces at play in conflicts and rivalries and it creates a multi-polar world, creates more opportunities. So for example the third independent pole that’s going to emerge now clearly is India. Because there was a time when it thought that India might be moving closer to the US, thanks to President Donald Trump, that’s not going to happen.

And so India is going to move back to us playing a more independent role and that creates options for countries. So therefore it’s a very fluid, dynamic, changing world but the result will be a multipolar world.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: One very quick 30 seconds. What is your next project?

PROFESSOR KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, I think my next project is quite simply to continue what I said in my remarks today to try and persuade the West that it is wiser for them to create room for other new powers to emerge because that will create a better world for the West. Okay, thank you.

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