Inside the Gaza Peace Plan – TED Explains the World with Ian Bremmer (Transcript)

I would say that there is more reason for optimism today than there has been in the last two years. But that is not quite reason for optimism. There’s still lots of things that can and likely will go wrong before we get to yes. So it’s progress. I’m extremely happy to see that. But as of right now, we don’t yet have a deal.

HELEN WALTERS: So obviously there is so much going on behind the scenes at the moment. And I just wonder if you might let us in on a little bit of those conversations. What are you hearing? What is happening? Who’s talking to whom and what are the next things that are going to happen?

Behind the Scenes: The Gulf Connection and US Leverage

IAN BREMMER: Well, the most important things that have happened is that the Gulf states had a summit meeting with President Trump. It was very productive, it was very warm. These are some of the leaders that he is personally closest to, and Jared and his family member, his most trusted advisors like Steve Witkoff, are closest to. They are politically very aligned in the near and medium term. And it led to real progress.

It led to progress in Trump’s irritation, even anger, with the Israeli decision to engage in strikes against the political leaders of Hamas while they were on Qatari territory, an ally of the United States. And it led to an agreement, this plan that was announced between the US and Israel in the Oval Office that Netanyahu accepted almost all of, with a lot of pressure from the United States.

So the first thing that’s happening behind the scenes is that Trump’s alignment with the Gulf and his effort to ensure that there are strong and durable relations, even as things have happened that they really don’t like on the ground in Gaza, in Qatar, more broadly, that is very real. That was, we’ll remember, the first trip that Trump made as president when he was first elected back in 2016, and he was there in 2017, was to Saudi Arabia when all of the Gulf leaders came together and he touched the orb and the whole thing. We shouldn’t forget that those relations are still among his strongest globally. And that has helped significantly in getting towards an agreement to end the war in Gaza.

Secondly, Trump has a lot of leverage on Israel, and so far he’s been very reluctant to use it. Trump has acted very unilaterally. When you’ll remember, Trump directly engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Iranians. He didn’t ask permission of Israel to do that. He didn’t coordinate that in advance with Israel. He directly authorized negotiations with Hamas to get an American hostage released. That was not coordinated in advance with Israel.

So Trump has been very happy to act unilaterally on issues that the Israelis have a very significant stake in. Netanyahu has also acted unilaterally on many occasions in strikes that the Israelis have taken against Iran, for example, against Hamas in Qatar that I already mentioned, for example, other places.

But that unilateralism by the Israeli Prime Minister has not led to meaningful consequences from the United States until now, until the last couple weeks. And the willingness of Trump to use that leverage to force the Israelis to apologize to the Emir of Qatar, and we can talk about exactly what happened there, to force the Israelis to accept a 20-point plan that they made some changes on, but then Trump made some changes back on them, essentially, and we can talk about that too.

That is deployment of American leverage against Israel to get the Israelis to yes in a similar way that Trump forced Zelensky to get to yes on the critical minerals deal when he showed that he was willing to actually suspend intelligence sharing. Trump had the cards, Zelensky did not. Trump has the cards, Netanyahu does not.

And if Trump is willing to deploy that leverage, then Bibi really needs Trump for his ongoing elections and his political support, not to mention his national security, in a way that Trump doesn’t actually need Bibi, even though Trump is very personally aligned towards Israel and that matters. And we’re seeing that play out. So that’s really, I think, the behind the scenes has been about that. It’s been about the US-Gulf relationship, it’s been about the US-Israel and particularly the US-Netanyahu relationship.

The Next Steps: Negotiations in Egypt

HELEN WALTERS: So then there are plenty of talks happening now. What are the next steps for this peace process? Who needs to be brought in, where, by whom and how?

IAN BREMMER: Well, there are talks. You and I are talking right now on Monday and there are talks going on right now in Egypt between the United States and Israel and Hamas, intermediated by the Egyptians, by others. These are extremely important.

And frankly, by the time this airs, we’re going to have more information about how successful they’ve been. But I mean, we have to get from the 20-point plan that Israel said yes to, to an agreement in principle that Hamas accepted but was not the same as the Israeli plan, but that Trump immediately said, “Yes, they want peace,” and so Israel, you’ve got to stop bombing. And Israel in return basically stopped bombing.

And now they’re sitting down to figure out the places where they say they agree, but they don’t quite agree. There are a lot of details that require the United States to use leverage they have with the Israelis and leverage it’s unclear they have against Hamas. Not because Hamas is powerful, they’re not, but because Hamas increasingly is acting like a bunch of dead-enders that don’t have, not only don’t have trust for anyone, but is facing assassination and the end of their organization. So they in a sense have much less to lose. And that makes them harder to get over the finish line.

HELEN WALTERS: It makes them incredibly dangerous. It feels like this could all slip away. But who do you see then, if Hamas does agree to stop, who emerges as a Palestinian leader?

Post-Hamas Governance: A Technocratic Approach

IAN BREMMER: If Hamas actually disarms, they will not be a part of any Gaza reconstruction or governance. That is not acceptable to anyone outside of Hamas. No one wants that. So if this is going to go forward, Hamas is done.

Doesn’t mean there won’t be radicals that aren’t a part of any governance structure that will still have some kind of allegiance or fealty. Doesn’t mean it won’t morph into some other organization that doesn’t recognize the right of Israel to exist. But that won’t be Palestinian governance on the ground.

Gaza and Palestinian governance is going to morph into, once a ceasefire is agreed to, and that may be soon and it may not be soon, but when it happens, you’re going to have a technocratic group that is essentially put in place with approvals of the United States and the Gulf. It’ll be paid for mostly by the Gulf. It’ll be administered in the near term, perhaps by Tony Blair, acting as a temporary governor, who has a lot of support from the United States, from Trump, from Jared Kushner and from the Gulf states who he has been engaged with at the highest levels. It’s been the biggest part of his business for well over a decade now.

And the security will be provided not by Palestinians, but probably by the Egyptians, perhaps by some UN peacekeepers, paid for again by the Gulf states. So we’re not yet, I mean, this is not a state. This is a governance model without elections. It’s a governance model with Palestinians that are seen to be trusted in capable hands and of executing on basic needs for reconstruction that will be funded and with security that is provided by non-Palestinians.

And if that happens, by the way, Helen, that is by far the best possible outcome near-term, given what everyone has been through for the last two years. So we all want this. There’s a reason why the Europeans, the Brits, the Canadians, the Japanese, the Americans, including a lot of Democrats, the Gulf states are all saying they support this deal, because there is no other way forward at this point.

HELEN WALTERS: Right, right. For actual progress, we need to do something.

IAN BREMMER: What Trump announced, if you remember back when he had the Jordanian king in town months and months ago, which was this making Gaza into a Riviera on the Mediterranean and the Palestinians will all leave and the Gulf will build it out, that was never going to happen. It was never going to be accepted. And Trump has completely abandoned that plan. And that’s really important.

It’s a skill that Trump has, that his ability when something that he floats completely fails, his ability frequently to forget that it was ever anything that he even talked about, is important and is a component of how we might be getting to yes here. The fact that he had a plan that was completely unworkable, that he was pushing, and he has thrown away.

The Question of Palestinian Representation

HELEN WALTERS: But isn’t it fair to say that, so they’re calling it the Board of Peace, I believe. And just to flag that the governance that you describe, if it’s led by Tony Blair, who’s a Brit, it’s supported by the Americans, it seems to be a technocratic organization, as you say, but basically not run by people from the region that is actually being affected by all of the decisions that they make.

We’ve seen this happen before. We’ve seen this happen before and it not go well. So how is it possible, or do you think it’s possible that in any way actually including Palestinians from the start is, why is that not just a kind of a base level condition for any of this?

The Challenge of Palestinian Leadership

IAN BREMMER: Well, I think because everyone can’t agree on who the initial leader is going to be. And picking Palestinians to be in charge from day one made it a lot harder to get everyone on board. I mean, that is the reality. And I’m not suggesting this is ideal, I’m not suggesting it’s permanent, I’m not suggesting it’s where we’re going to be in a year. But if the Gulf states are paying for it and the Americans are doing the diplomatic lifting and if it ends the war, and let’s keep in mind this war is involving humanitarian aid being blockaded from getting in to Gaza with 2 million Palestinians facing extraordinarily unconscionable conditions.

With people dying of starvation, not to mention the fact that there’s been an ongoing war with tens of thousands of people getting killed, some of whom are Hamas militants, many of whom are civilians, kids, women, the elderly, the infirm. So I’d love to get to good governance. I’d love to get to a state which is even farther than good governance. But the first thing we need to do is end the war.

And again, I think everyone needs to understand that a ceasefire with borders that are secured by not just Israel and occupying power, but by others that will want humanitarian aid to get in with Hamas out. That is a huge win for the ability of the Palestinian people to survive, to get a basic education, to have medical care, all of the things that they haven’t had for most of two years now.

The Reality of a Palestinian State

Now look, it is important that the two state solution still, at least in principle, exists. You and I have seen that. Now some 150 countries around the world have recognized a Palestinian state that does not exist. That includes a majority of American allies around the world. That’s important. But the Israeli people don’t support a Palestinian state. The Israeli government doesn’t support a Palestinian state. The plan that’s been put forward doesn’t completely close the door on one, but it makes it very hard at some indeterminate time in the future.

And the Gulf states are willing to live with it, they’re willing to fund it without any more specificity than that. And I will tell you that at this point, I feel like a Palestinian state is functionally dead. And I think that’s a great misfortune in the same way that I think it’s functionally dead that Ukraine will ever get all their territory back, even leaving aside Crimea. And they deserve to get their territory back and the Palestinians deserve to have a state. I don’t think it’s possible. I don’t think it’s feasible.

So when you’re asking me a question about, hey, in the early days, if this works, how come Blair is running it and not a group of Palestinians that everyone can agree on? And the answer is because we can’t get to there from here. And that’s, I don’t have a better answer for you. I’d like to have a better answer, but nobody cares what Ian wants. I mean, it’s not how things get done.

HELEN WALTERS: Ian, we all care deeply what you want, but yes, okay, granted, in this state, maybe what you say does not go, but I am curious. Maybe I’m just not as pessimistic as you, or maybe I don’t know enough. But it surprised me that the Palestinian state was cited in the 20 point plan. Trump put this, obviously not with any kind of roadmap to get there, but what is the alternative? What is the alternative to actually giving Palestinian statehood?

The Saudi Push and Trump’s Position

IAN BREMMER: Well, first of all, the Saudis pushed very hard in their behind the scenes meetings with Trump and with his advisors for a time frame of two years. And they couldn’t get it. So all they could get was a nominal acceptance of a state in the future, which Trump himself again flipped on. Trump wanted a Palestinian state in his first term and that’s what got you the Abraham Accords. And then over the past months, he said the time has passed for a Palestinian state. It’s done, it’s not going to happen. I don’t support it anymore.

Now, in principle, he is saying he’s at least open to it, that that should be the outcome if all of these other hurdles are passed through. But what I’m telling you, Helen, is that the reality is that the Israelis have a de facto veto. They are militarily dominant over what happens in this territory. Just as they are in a number of other territories that right now belong to adversaries. Which includes a bunch of Syria, it includes Iran, it includes Yemen, it includes Lebanon, southern Lebanon.

Israel has essentially veto power, not through any legal means, but through the military capacity and willingness to set rules. And as long as the Israelis refused to allow a Palestinian state. And again, that’s not just Bibi, because Bibi can be voted out. Bibi might not be there in a year or two, though his survival capacity politically has been underestimated by many. But only a small minority of Israelis today support a Palestinian state. And I think that any government that would be voted in, any coalition that would come in to succeed Netanyahu would oppose a Palestinian state. And so I don’t see it happening.

A Halfway House of Governance

Now, absent a state, can you have a governance model where local Palestinians have control of sectors of the bureaucracy, of a civil society, of distribution of humanitarian aid, of hospitals, of a whole bunch of things that feel state like, but they don’t. They certainly don’t control a military, they don’t control their border security. They may or may not control policing functions. That’s not really a state. They don’t have representation globally in the same way that other states do.

So I think that what we’re looking at is some kind of halfway house of Palestinian local governance with significant oversight constraints and resources that are being provided by and imposed by external actors. But the key point is that those external actors are not Israel. They are not seen as enemies to the Palestinians on the ground. That is the core in what this ceasefire and a peace agreement would transition into.

HELEN WALTERS: So you described pretty eloquently the state of the world for Palestinians over the last couple of years. Many people are describing it as a genocide now. It’s clearly been catastrophic. What are the consequences for that? Are there any consequences for either Netanyahu or Israel?

Consequences for Israel

IAN BREMMER: The consequences for Israel so far have been pretty limited. Yes, a whole bunch of countries recognized a Palestinian state. It is true that there have been some limited economic costs that have been imposed. Norway, which has the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, has taken Israeli investments in certain sectors out of their portfolios. One could argue that has downgraded the value, the shareholder value of some of the Israeli economy as a consequence.

There certainly has been major economic consequences of fighting the war, because the Israelis have been on a war footing with a lot of very talented Israelis, small population that otherwise would be involved in the technology, the knowledge and the service sectors. And they’re not, or they’re doing two jobs. In many cases, they’re actually doing both. And that has meant that the Israeli economy has been functioning as poorly as we’ve seen in decades in terms of growth and productivity, except during the pandemic. So that’s been a consequence.

Now in the last two weeks, the potential for those consequences to become more severe has grown. The Emiratis, who of course signed the Abraham Accords on the back of promises that a two state solution would happen, created a clear red line, that if the two state solution were to be destroyed through an annexation or through a Gaza occupation that led to the removal of Palestinians, that they would exit the Abraham Accords.

And on the back of that, and having met with the Emirati leadership, President Trump publicly posted that they would not accept an annexation, that there would not be one. Now, this is a decision that, however disagreeable you may find, it was a decision that Bibi was prepared to make unilaterally, with the support of his war cabinet and his government. And Trump made it for him. So Trump basically said, “Sorry, Bibi, you don’t have sovereignty over that issue. I make that rule.” That’s a pretty big deal.

The Qatar Apology

Now, Netanyahu came to the White House. You saw that he read a letter. That letter was an apology to the Qatari Amir. That letter had been drafted at the request of Trump by the Qataris. So they gave the letter drafted by the Qataris to Netanyahu in front of Trump on the phone to read. And by the way, a senior advisor to the Qatari prime minister was in the Oval Office watching Bibi do that when he did. That’s a humiliation for the Israeli prime minister.

You thought you had sovereignty in making that attack against Hamas political leadership in Qatar. I’m saying you don’t. You now promise that you won’t do it again. You’re sorry that you did it. And there’s an executive order from Trump, unprecedented, providing for economic, diplomatic, and if necessary, military, American support to defend Qatar in the event of an attack, any attack.

So what we’re seeing is that Trump has imposed direct consequences against Bibi and direct consequences against Israel that we could say are actually limiting the sovereignty of Israel. Now, I mean, look, in an America first world where the United States is still providing enormous intelligence to Israel and vice versa, the US is spending billions of dollars on Israel’s defense capabilities, not vice versa, providing a lot of technology to the Israelis to help defend them, and the US is not doing that to that extent with any other country around the world. Then clearly the US has an enormous amount of leverage, and Trump is showing he’s deploying it.

Potential International Pressure

Final point, Helen. There is the potential for other countries to engage in more leverage. We’ve seen talk of the Israelis being booted out of the Eurovision contest by the Europeans and countries saying they’d boycott if that didn’t happen. We’ve seen talk of Israel being booted out of the World Cup and FIFA. I’ve spoken with many European leaders with talk of sanctions, talk of refusing to allow Israeli citizens visas, all sorts of things that would feel to Israeli citizens like isolation.

It would feel to Israelis that their prime minister was leading them down a path of Israel being treated the way the Europeans treated South Africa during apartheid. And that could easily lead to Netanyahu being voted out. But the reality is that this peace plan, which Israel has now accepted, takes a significant amount of that pressure off.

And if Hamas goes ahead and accepts that outcome, then Israel can be back. I wouldn’t say in the good graces of the Europeans, but it would certainly be more normalized and more stable. And if Hamas refuses to accept these terms, then Hamas is going to bear the blame for the deal falling apart. So I think that the consequences clearly have come from the United States and not from anyone else.

HELEN WALTERS: Thank you so much for describing that phone call. What an extraordinary vision. I’m curious, given, as you describe it, given that humiliation, what does Netanyahu do next? What happens to him? I know there are many factions within the Israeli government who are pushing him from all in all different directions, but what do you think he does now?

Netanyahu’s Position and Constraints

IAN BREMMER: Well, he’s got no choice but to take the win. I mean, you’ve seen some of the reporting about Trump telling the Israeli Prime Minister, “Why are you always so effing negative about everything? This is a win. Take the win.” Bibi’s going to have to take the win unless he can blame Hamas for refusing to implement.

And Trump has certainly, over the last 48 hours, also publicly made statements that says, look, Hamas now has to actually go forward. Trump is giving them a level of credibility which goes well beyond what other American presidents would do for Hamas. Because he wants the deal. He wants his deal to work.

But if Hamas doesn’t implement quickly, then, you know, Bibi will do what he needs to do to scuttle it, and then we’re back to the status quo ante, with the exception of the constraints on Israel that I mentioned before, but they’re not very big constraints.

If the deal goes forward, he’s going to have to accept it, and his wings will have been clipped. And he will need to be more careful with the American president than he was with Biden historically and with other presidents historically, including frankly Trump first term and Obama and I mean, heck, even Bill Clinton.

I mean, look, Bibi has a long record of dealing with American presidents and being very savvy in getting a lot more out of them than his leverage and his diplomatic throw weight and economic importance would normally have presumed. And again, it’s not like Bibi has 60% approval ratings in Israel. He doesn’t, not even close.

But Israel is not a two party system. It’s a multi party system. And he continues to have enough support to maintain a coalition with the far right. And he’s given that coalition a lot. He has succeeded militarily in blowing up Hezbollah. He has succeeded in taking out Hamas military leadership. He’s failed in taking out their political leadership.

He has succeeded even in rolling back Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Something you and I have talked about extensively. But by perhaps 18 to 24 months, it still looks like that is indeed what we talked about before, looks like the best intelligence we have on that.

And at the same time, he’s been supporting the settlers in the West Bank, continuing to annex illegally more and more territory incrementally without formally recognizing that annexation is legally Israel. So, you know, he is not in a weak position right now.

I kind of wish, I mean, part of this issue of course, is that Bibi has ended up, you know, essentially attached to a religious fundamentalist, extremist view of achieving a greater Israel, what the far Israeli right wants. And he’s done that not because that’s his long term perspective of what’s best for the country, but because it’s the only way that he personally can stay in power and avoid jail.

And I think it would be very useful for Israel long term if there could be some form of deal cut where Bibi and his family would be fine and safe and secure and have a well being after leaving power so that his incentives become more aligned with that of the Israeli people long term and less aligned with the aggrandizement of Bibi. I would love to see that happen. I don’t see that happening, but that is a problem.

What to Watch For Next

HELEN WALTERS: Fascinating. Fascinating. So as you mentioned, the Egyptians are talking with Hamas right now. What do you think? As people who are non behind the scenes, what should we be watching for and what do you think is going to happen next?

IAN BREMMER: Look, I mean, as I said, there’s a lot that needs to happen to get to yes here. The 20 point plan said that the hostages would be released, all of them, within three days of a deal being put forward and being agreed. A deal being agreed. And Hamas has said in principle that they agree with that formula, but they said that there have to be conditions that are met on the ground.

We don’t know exactly what those conditions are. And once the 48 hostages are given up, that’s game over for Hamas. They no longer have that leverage. Right. And that’s been their core leverage all the way through. Despicable, illegal leverage, but nonetheless, so, you know, them actually agreeing to it. Clearly they have conditions that they want to be achieved, and we’ll see what they are. And if that’s something that Israel will agree with.

There’s the issue of Hamas disarming itself. And, you know, Israel has said all the way through that Hamas needs to be dismembered. Well, what exactly does disarmament of Hamas look like? How would it occur and when would it occur? Historically, Hamas has always said they would only do that once there’s a Palestinian state. Well, that’s not where we are right now. So are we going to get to actual Hamas disarmament? And it’s not clear if that’s going to occur.

Hamas also has to accept that they will not be a part of governance at all in Gaza. So far, they have not actually accepted that. I assume they will, but they haven’t. So that needs to happen, and that’s what Hamas has to do.

There’s also the issue of Israeli withdrawal and the timing of that. There’s been a map that the White House has put out publicly that has different stages of Israeli withdrawal, with first about half of Gaza being withdrawn from by Israel, and then by the third phase, the final phase, only 15%, essentially a buffer zone that Israel maintains as security land they didn’t have before, but land they apparently will have going forward.

And the rest goes to this local governance that is being put in place. All of those things have to happen. All of those things have to happen. They have not yet happened. So there is a lot between what Trump has said and what has been announced and getting to a ceasefire that creates a peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Timeline and Urgency

HELEN WALTERS: And what would you say would be the timeline for this? I mean, Trump had said he wanted an answer within three days, I think, when he issued the plan. We’re past that. Just give us a sense of what kind of timing we should be looking at throughout.

IAN BREMMER: Well, usually two weeks is Trump’s preferred timeline. Of course I’m joking, because he says that a lot. And then it becomes another two weeks. Another two weeks.

Look, this has a level of real urgency because the world is paying attention and has a lot at stake. So Hamas is going to have to either agree. I don’t know that it has to be three days. I think that they can, you know, continue to send all the right signals and say this is a great plan and Trump’s an amazing peacemaker, but I don’t think this can go on for months.

I think it might go on for days to weeks. But if we are still talking about implementing this within two to four weeks, I suspect the war then goes back on and Israel’s bombing again, and then you’ve got, you know, questions around, can you find all the hostages? And, you know, the whole thing could blow apart.

So it is, this is, this is a very, it’s going to be a very tense, a very intense time, and Trump is going to put a lot of elbow grease with his people to try to ensure that you get to yes. But again, if you were asking me right now, I wouldn’t be putting a lot of money on this is going to happen. There are too many ways for this to blow up. Still. Still.

HELEN WALTERS: All right, well, we hear that we hope it doesn’t blow up and that peace becomes reality. We are so grateful to you, Ian, for giving us your candid idea and take on what is happening and explaining what we should be looking for. I’m sure we’ll be back here again soon. But for now, thank you so much for your time and have a lovely day.

IAN BREMMER: Great to see you.

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