Read the full transcript of EAM S. Jaishankar remarks at The Arctic Circle India Forum 2025 on May 4, 2025.
Listen to the audio version here:
Opening Remarks
SAMIR SARAN: Good morning. Before we begin, let me just request both my esteemed speakers on stage to keep the mic close to you. We are going to be sharing this telecast with those online. And, of course, we are also recording this for postproduction, so audio always helps. This is the headline session of this conference that we are hosting with President Grímsson and his team, and we at ORF are delighted that we were able to bring a slice of Arctic to New Delhi in the month of May.
In many ways, there is a symbiotic relationship between better systems, now even the economy, the trade arrangements, and, of course, the security architecture. And to unpack some of this, we are delighted that we have Dr. Jaishankar with us, one of the world’s leading political thinkers, perhaps one of the veteran foreign ministers now, sir, and obviously, someone who is in the thick of things on multiple fronts. And we are delighted he was able to take time out from his busy schedule and join us at this particular event.
So without further ado, sir, let me just ask you a question. One, what is the messaging that comes out of hosting Arctic Circle conference here, something that you readily agreed to when these were being discussed in the later part of last year? And in many ways, how is India reassessing both its roles as well as its opportunities in dealing with that region?
India’s Growing Arctic Engagement
S. JAISHANKAR: First of all, great pleasure to be here. And, President Grímsson, always good to see you, good to see you back here. You know, we’ve had a growing involvement with the Arctic. We had an even earlier involvement with the Antarctic, which is now more than forty years.
And over the years, you know, we have come up a few years ago with an Arctic policy. We have a research station there. We have today agreements with KSAT on Svalbard, which is relevant to our space. But when I look at it, what does it mean to have this event? What does it mean for India in a way?
I think without exaggeration, what is happening in the Arctic and likely to happen will have global consequences to put it very mildly. Now as the country with the most people in this planet and especially the most young people in this planet, obviously, what happens in the Arctic is of extreme importance to us. And what happens there, a country like us has to decide whether we know about it from others or whether we also try to develop an understanding of our own. And an understanding will happen when obviously there are activities and resources and scientific research which is applied there. So I think in a way, the Arctic has a value, has a global significance in itself, especially so for a country like us, purely in terms of, you know, shall I say, our shareholding in the world.
A second derivative is given the direction in which things are moving. The consequences are going to be felt. The consequence not just by us, but the entire world, but certainly by us too in many ways from all that I read quite significantly. So we have stakes in all of this.
Arctic’s Strategic Importance for India
Now there are other, I think, conversations going on. The combination of global warming and what’s happening to the permafrost there. It is having implications on connectivity. Now, again, that has crucial implications. If one were to look, let us say, even ten, twenty years ahead, I mean, we are seeing both on land and on sea, very radical new connectivity possibilities.
And this is going to be very important for India. You know, we are the fifth largest economy. We’d be the third largest probably by the end of the decade, and we will be an increasing resource consumer. We will also be a more prolific producer. So our interest in trade and connectivity and movement is going to grow.
There will be the technology side of it, which is the Arctic today has got a lot of attention for the promise of resources that it has, and resources can be many. I mean, the marine resources, energy resources, but particularly, I think the resources in terms of minerals. So when you look at the combination really of global warming, global weather patterns, what it would do to the global economy in a way to global society. When you look at connectivity, when you look at the possibility of what relevance the Arctic would have to global technology growth, I think I mean, to me, it’s very obvious why we would be interested, and that is why we are here.
SAMIR SARAN: So, minister, I’m going to turn this over to President Grímsson. But before that, just a quick follow-up. You seem to have figured this out in some sense from an Indian equity in that region.
S. JAISHANKAR: And I would say, you know, if anybody has helped me in that direction, it is President Grímsson because, you know, every meeting has led to my reading up a little bit more. Obviously, as a government, we have taken many initiatives in the recent years. But, certainly, it helps to meet people who try to develop and grow that interest.
SAMIR SARAN: So Minister Jaishankar, my question was that amongst the non-Arctic states and perhaps the Sub-Arctic countries who are obviously influenced by the proximity and intimacy with the region, which are the big global countries who are now really getting what is happening in that part of the world?
Geopolitics of the Arctic
S. JAISHANKAR: I think that question should probably be better directed at him. But, you know, if one looks at the Arctic Council, I mean, from what I was reading, the way it was portrayed, seven are NATO members and one isn’t.
Now I’m not sure in the last year whether being NATO members makes that much of a difference on this issue.
So what we are seeing, when we say minerals, when we speak about new energy possibilities, when we speak about new land, which is emerging, which could – there will be countries close to the Arctic which would gain substantial amount of arable land. So there is the economics of it, but there is the geopolitics of it. And I think it’s essential to see what is happening in Arctic like any other issue today as part of a composite change in global geopolitics and geostrategy.
This issue is not about decision A or demand B. I think there is a larger setting. There’s a larger setting of a fundamentally changing world. A fundamentally changing world order, and it has to be examined. And I think different countries are approaching it from their respective interests.
SAMIR SARAN: I failed in this question. I couldn’t pin you down to an answer, but I’m going to come back to you. President Grímsson, over to you.
The Arctic’s Global Significance
ÓLAFUR RAGNAR GRÍMSSON: Well, first of all, thank you very much for your support for this forum and for finding so much time out of your schedule in these critical times to be here with us. Of course, we knew beforehand that it was quite a challenge for Samir and me to conduct this conversation. But I would like to note, I didn’t expect you would turn the difficult questions over to me, which is a very clever ploy, by the way.
But I think it is important to realize for India because the terminology, the Arctic, is to some extent misleading. Because if we add up all the areas, Alaska over Canada, Greenland over to the Nordic countries and Russia plus the oceans, it is in global terms the size of Africa. It is the size of Africa. And it’s only recently, to some extent, we can say until now, first time now, that the leading countries of the world as well as the rest of us are now struggling with the challenge. How do we govern this territory? How do we use the resources? How do we create a certain balance of power and economic interest?
And to some extent, I see it as one of the biggest challenges in global governance in the coming years to make sure that this huge territory rich in resources, absolutely critical for every major economy in the world, and for that, in a way it’s true what Trump says. I mean, it’s essential for The US interest to have some access to Greenland. I say access in terms of the resources, the mining, the economy, the defense structure, the security and so on. Which they already have, by the way.
So when India comes into this, in this very strong way as this forum demonstrates and your own role demonstrates, my first point is this, this will be welcomed by many wholeheartedly because without India, with your traditions, the way you intellectually look at global challenges and governance challenges, which you have demonstrated yourselves frequently in the last few years in these difficult times for many European countries and so on.
India can have a voice apart from your former role, which is absolutely crucial because you can direct the discussion and the negotiations in a way which perhaps no other country can do. Secondly, as you have basically listed out, there are huge economic and climate and food security interests for India to be involved in the Arctic. And if I may say so, I still think the leading forces in the Indian economy, the big corporations, the business leaders and so on, they still have not yet woken up to the reality that the future of the Indian economy will depend to some extent largely on access to the resources, on the shipping and everything in the Arctic.
But we are already seeing a new type of power play in the Arctic. I said yesterday in the first session with the new leaders of the Arctic Council after the war in Ukraine, there was one elephant in the room. And since we are now in the country of the elephants, I pointed out there are now two elephants in the room.
So India is now entering a very complicated geopolitical territory where not only Russia and China are building alliances among themselves with respect to the Russian Arctic, but the new administration in Washington has thrown in dramatic proposals regarding the largest non-Russian territory in the Arctic, Greenland. So my question is this. As the preeminent diplomatic leader of India, how are you going to navigate the increasing role of India in this territory of new global power tensions between not only US and Russia, but also China, to some extent, Europe as a whole?
Navigating Global Power Dynamics
S. JAISHANKAR: Thank you for that easy question. Look, I think in a way, it begins at home. It begins at home to get people to understand that we have now reached a size and a stage where almost anything consequential that happens in any corner of the world matters to us. And, you know, if we are setting up a research station there or if we have a policy or, you know, a few years ago, we passed legislation on Antarctic. We created an Indian Antarctic authority.
These are not just scientific initiatives. I mean, they are obviously. But there is a larger importance to what is happening there, especially the Arctic. And in an interesting way, I think the controversies of the last few months, not just in India, I think it has brought out to the lay person the significance actually of the Arctic and, you know, people write learnedly and talk learnedly about this today, which they wouldn’t have done six months ago.
So in a paradoxical way, the shifting, the sharpness of the geopolitics and the geoeconomics actually has brought attention and created an awareness. Now what should we be doing? Again, I put it to you that whatever we seek to do or we hope will happen in respect of Arctic will be a function of what is happening in the world. I mean, countries are not going to do one kind of diplomacy on every other issue and a different kind of diplomacy on Arctic. So what is today happening in the world? Because you can’t divorce the future of the Arctic debates from the direction of the world.
I think you are having, because President, you brought it up, a United States, which has a dramatically different position. And it has a dramatically different position, actually, again, for two very ostensibly contradictory reasons. On the one hand, there’s a belief at least in large circles, the ruling circles in The United States that the developments of the world, the direction of the world order in the last twenty, thirty years has not gone in their favor and that they no longer benefit by upholding a world order in which somebody else has gained to their detriment.
But there’s the other side of it. The United States is also today much more self-sufficient than it has been for a long time. Self-sufficient in energy. Self-sufficient interestingly, The US today, you know, there is immigration is part of the debate, but The US is really looking at rebuilding using technology and a certain level of manufacturing as a game changer.
So the combination of what they believe are better resources, greater creativity, their technology leads. So you have both a disenchantment with the past and a promise of the future, which say where The US is, you know, the rest of you who used to be with me, well, you know, I’m now done a cost benefit, and maybe you don’t look so good now. So I am willing now to navigate the world much more on my own. Now if you look at the number two economy of the world, they were pretty much doing that anyway because that has been part of their history and their tradition and their politics. Now when you come to Europe, I think Europe has a real predicament on its hands.
Europe’s Changing Position
SAMIR SARAN: A few years ago, say five years ago, Europe thought it had an optimal positioning that, you know, between energy from Russia, the Chinese markets, and American security, it looked all very neat. Each part of it today is under stress to put it very politely. Now on top of it, you know, Europe had a selective belief in the indivisibility of the world. When it liked the world to be connected, they believed in indivisibility. When it didn’t, there was a fortress Europe.
So what has happened is Europe is today under pressure to change because the realities of multipolarity are dawning on it. I think it’s still not adjusted and absorbed it fully. United States has dramatically changed position. The Chinese are doing what the Chinese were doing. Russia has again you know, Russia has connection with the Arctic.
You know better than me. I mean, they have built it into that history. I would say almost their forefloor in a way. So we are going to see, in a sense, arena or a domain of contestation which is not going to be easy to recall.
Now this is not unique. I mean, we are going to see it in space. We’re going to see it underwater. We’re going to see it in AI. So we are looking at a much more contested world, much sharper competition where it will be a challenge for the world and for individual nations to find some kind of equilibrium and get people to work together. It’s not going to be that easy or comfortable to arrive at.
India’s Expectations from Europe
SAMIR SARAN: Minister, if I can jump in here and maybe ask you a more specific question. What are the expectations? And I know there are plans for a visit to this part of the world. But more broadly, if you take Europe and the EU as an actor in this particular equation, what are India’s expectations from a EU partnership? That’s the first part of the question.
And the second, of course, is that, you know, you did make a very important point that maybe Donald Trump has popularized Arctic beyond the traditional circles of examination. Now as a follow-up the syllabus has become more popular.
S. JAISHANKAR: The syllabus has become more popular. That’s right.
SAMIR SARAN: So now the question for you is, how do you mobilize constituencies at home to respond to perhaps this moment when maybe, like, president mentioned, Indian private sector and other stakeholders could be motivated to look at this region more closely?
S. JAISHANKAR: Well, when you ask me about Europe, you mean on Arctic or generally speaking?
SAMIR SARAN: Generally speaking. Again, considering where they are right now, you know, they tried to play the strategic autonomy game. Like you mentioned, security from America, energy from Russia, markets from China, strategic autonomy of a European variety, not going that well right now. But how do you and what do you as India expect from Europe?
S. JAISHANKAR: Well, look. When we look out at the world, Samir, we look for partners. We don’t look for preachers, particularly preachers who don’t practice at home what the preacher brought. And I think some of Europe is still struggling with that problem. Some of it is changing.
So the issue for us, I mean, in many ways, Europe, I think, has entered a certain zone of reality check. Now whether they are able to step up to it or not, it’s something we will have to see. But from our point of view, if we are to develop a partnership, there has to be some understanding. There has to be some sensitivity. There has to be a mutuality of interest, and there has to be a realization of how the world works. And I think these are all work in progress to differing degrees with different parts of Europe. So some have moved further, some a little bit less.
SAMIR SARAN: I’m so tempted to make this conversation about the point you’ve just raised, but we will end it there on this particular aspect that Europe has to get beyond preaching and start acting based on a framework of mutuality. What about India’s own constituencies? How do you mobilize them to act in this new world which is so, in some sense, geometrically different?
India’s Broadening Horizons
S. JAISHANKAR: You know, part of the reason why I always found President Grímsson’s visits and our conversations interesting because he was, I mean, at least speaking for me, he was broadening my horizons with every conversation. And I think as a country today, we need to broaden our horizons because as I said, when I look at the size, I mean, just think of an India. Let us say population would be about 1.6, one point seven billion per capita income of say, 10,000, 12 thousand, 15 thousand dollars. What would be the resource demands of that India on the world? What would be the contribution of India to that world?
So even today, we look at key partners, sometimes people read us too tactically. You know? If I were to refer, for example, to a subject which has been, you know, last few years, a little controversial, India, Russia. You know, there is such a important fit, a complementarity between India and Russia as a resource provider and resource consumer.
When I look at where all Indian diplomacy, you know, typically, we would look at, you know, a very simple sort of political metric. Today, I have a different range of partners in different domains, and one very important domain is resources. So that is why Russia and Australia, Brazil, and Indonesia, Africa, these are important for us. And that is why connectivity.
You know, we’ve been discussing, for example, you know, president, we have a project called Chennai Ladivostok.
ÓLAFUR RAGNAR GRÍMSSON: Ladivostok Corridor. Yeah.
S. JAISHANKAR: Now this was our little bit of preparation for something which is to come, which is the Northern Sea route. So for us today, the NSR, the NWP, Northwest Passage, the TSR, these matter because just like IMEC matters that or the India, Middle East, Europe corridor. Because the world is, you know, we’re going to if technology changes literally with climate change, geography is going to change. Climate is going to change. Our definition of which economies work to what extent in which areas is going to change.
With all these moving parts, I think it’s kind of important that there is an awareness in our country. And one of the, I think, positives I see when I look today at the number of universities, and I’m sure many people sitting here are connected to them, that I think at last count, we have about 25 universities, and my number may be a bit behind. 25 universities actively connected with research or, you know, some kind of policy making on the Arctic policy.
The fact that we are today producing research papers much more prolifically than in the past. So it isn’t just a question of one research station, two observatories, two antennas, and a ground station out there. I think things are happening at home that is supporting a much deeper engagement with the Arctic.
And I would even say to president, and I’m sure I’ll make a few other people in the room happy. That is one of the drivers of our intensive engagement with the Nordics. That, you know, if you look at it, we are due for the next India Nordic summit very shortly. Among the initiatives that you have seen in the last ten years under Prime Minister Modi, one which nobody saw coming, but which has actually been sustained, which has been very serious, has been really the extent of our Nordic engagement.
Nordic-India Relations and Arctic Security
SAMIR SARAN: You know, before I turn to President Grímsson, President Grímsson, please go ahead.
ÓLAFUR RAGNAR GRÍMSSON: If I may follow-up on that. First of all, on the summit between your prime minister and the Nordic prime ministers, I think it’s a fortunate coincidence in timing that it takes place so soon after this forum. And I can assure you that the Arctic is now on the mind of the Nordic Prime Minister to a bigger extent than ever before.
S. JAISHANKAR: I wonder why.
ÓLAFUR RAGNAR GRÍMSSON: Yeah, you wonder why. And it’s interesting that both the President of Finland and the Prime Minister of Norway, together with the former Secretary General of NATO and now Finance Minister of Norway and Stoltenberg, paid court to the new President of The United States quite recently.
So I hope Prime Minister Modi will, at this summit in Oslo, also make use, first of all, of the evidence of the forum here taking place of how India will be taking an increasing interest in the Arctic. Because, quite frankly, and I can say so because I’m out of office, those prime ministers are looking for partners in probably the greatest difficulty in terms of diplomacy and how to position the Nordic countries they have faced in our lifetime.
And nobody has the answer. So I think if Prime Minister Modi brings the Arctic and the engagement of India into the Arctic and uses this forum as an argument for the legitimacy of India as a player in this, it will be welcomed for numerous political reasons, which I don’t have to go into here.
So I think that is really a very serious follow-up and also a very serious contribution to the future of the Nordic countries within the Arctic. If there is a message from India through the Prime Minister in two weeks’ time or so that India intends to be a new kind of effective partner in this whole difficult situation with The US on one hand, the one elephant in the room, with Russia on the other, the other elephant in the room, and with the third elephant, China, waiting outside the gates to enter the room.
We in the Nordic countries almost thought we had a kind of kindergarten politics of foreign affairs where we never had to deal directly in our home ground with big power rivalry. They were in some other places on the planet. But that’s no longer the case. So I think this summit has reached a new level of political importance, which it did not have before.
My question to you is that in addition to all these climate, economic, commercial interests which you eloquently described, we are increasingly seeing for multiple reasons, one of them is the war in Ukraine, one of them is, of course, the Russia Chinese cooperation. One of them is the new policy of President Trump. We are seeing the security of the Arctic, the military aspect of the Arctic, the threat of missiles that President Trump says one of the reasons he wants Greenland is the threat of missiles from Russia and China to The United States.
So my question is this, do you foresee that India somehow would also enter this security military dialogue, debate, planning and so on, which to the surprise of most of us, because we always thought the Arctic would be a peaceful territory and so on, we now have to deal with. So you have not mentioned it so far, but that issue is already on the table. The seven Arctic Council countries are now all members of NATO. America is putting new defense security elements on the table. How do you foresee India, if at all, coming into that discussion?
SAMIR SARAN: I love the way President Grímsson scares you from the Arctic and then asks you, are you willing to come in? You know, he paints his rather grim picture and then says, why did you step in?
S. JAISHANKAR: No. The issue is reality. I mean, this is…
SAMIR SARAN: But he’s painting a picture of things going above the other.
S. JAISHANKAR: Sure. Sure. Look. I think India has many things to bring to the table. You know, when I when we look at the Arctic, it is a mix of risks and opportunities. When we think of the risks, obviously, you know, what happens in the Arctic will affect global weather, global climate, global sea levels, all that we know.
Okay. There are other aspects to it. You know, I think one of the areas which we have an interest is the microbiology of what is emerging because there are understandable concerns about, you know, what it would mean to global health security when, you know, lands emerge from under the glaciers.
So at the same time so when one looks at the risk side of it, I’m just putting the political…
ÓLAFUR RAGNAR GRÍMSSON: Oh, sure.
S. JAISHANKAR: The strategic risks aside for a moment. I think there is a whole sort of domain there waiting for international collaboration, closer, greater collaboration. And, certainly, that’s an area where India can is beginning to, you know, step in and make a difference.
On the opportunity side, as I said, you know, we are looking at new shipping lanes, new forms of navigation because it’s not just the lanes will be different, the ships will be different. There will be new technologies. You know? When people talk of, you know, potentially of resource exploitation, you are talking of a different kind of mining, you know, application of drones, different kinds of rigs.
Now, again, for a country which is at the cusp of technology leapfrogging, because what we want to do is we don’t want to go down the pathway of other major industrial economies who preceded us. So we are trying to take a different path and invest much more into smarter manufacturing in a way in more in emerging technologies and, you know, products and services derived from that.
So I would argue that in different forms, India can contribute, can make a difference. And I can fully understand from the perspective of the Nordics that to the extent there is a greater level of interest and more players with a less sharply strategic interest, there is a greater chance of Arctic issues being deliberated upon with a higher degree of global comfort. I can see that, you know. So there is a logic. So you have clearly something to gain if we show more interest and frankly our own interest require us to do that. So I think that part of it again.
On the other scenario that you painted, you know, look, it’s very hard for us to answer simply because we have in our history, as you know, we had kept away from alliances.
Russia’s Role in the Arctic
ÓLAFUR RAGNAR GRÍMSSON: But if I can interrupt you, you’re absolutely correct, and I understand that. But we, in the non-Russian Arctic, meaning Nordic countries, US, Canada, we have this long-term challenge because Russia is half of the Arctic. In the long term, we are not going to have a constructive cooperation on the Arctic without somehow getting over this isolation of Russia, this situation which we have had for the last sort of two years, simply because of the size of Russia within the Arctic. And also because of the resources, as you and China know very well, the energy, the minerals and so on, but also because the threat of the melting of the Russian tundra could emit all kinds of gases and bacteria and so on into the global atmosphere is one of the great health risks of the future if the Russian tundra keeps on melting.
A few years ago they had an epidemic which they didn’t tell anybody about, which was of a kind of COVID proportions in certain Arctic parts of Russia. I think in an analytical way, we—I mean, the non-Russian Arctic, the Nordic, America, Canada—we are a little bit at a loss at the moment of how are we going to deal long term with approaching Russia.
India, however, is the largest democracy in the world. With all your ties with America, Europe, other countries, but also with these very strong, one of the perhaps strongest long-term ties with Russia in terms of economy, politics, security, etcetera, etcetera. Do you see a possibility that within the next few years, as we try to grapple with this situation, India could bring to the table, for example through your own personal involvement as well as the tradition of diplomatic involvement, some of the Indian expertise and understanding of Russia to be a kind of an intermediary that helps the rest of the Arctic somehow to fight—
SAMIR SARAN: We are very out of time, but I think that’s a valid question. India has role in a complicated region. But let me complicate that question a little more, and let this be the final response from you.
India is also going to be hosting the Quad. And very soon, the Quad ostensibly is now looking at global issues, but based out of the Indo-Pacific. That was the region. As the seas melt and the Arctic flows into the Indo-Pacific, what is the role of that particular partnership in responding to both the opportunities that you outlined eloquently as well as the risks that you’ve alluded to.
So the role of India in trying to be the platform where everyone can come and speak as President Grímsson suggests, but also the role of India’s own plurilateral groupings to respond to a wider body of water that is going to be interconnected in the days ahead.
India’s Approach to Russia and Global Governance
S. JAISHANKAR: Well, President, I think where Russia is concerned, we have always taken a view. There’s a Russia realism that we have advocated. When passions were very high in 2022, 2023, and, you know, if one looks back at that period, the kind of predictions and scenarios which were put forward have turned out not to be well founded.
I mean, again, we are not necessarily taking the case of one party or the other, but we’ve always felt that there was international relations conducted on the basis of some fundamental realism, and that realism requires an engagement with Russia. And the idea that a solution would come about—because if you remember, there was a period when countries were gathering, and everybody was there except Russia, and they were discussing Russia. So the idea that you will get a solution out of Russia without inviting Russia challenged the basics of realism.
So we have felt always that there is a need to engage Russia. I mean, nobody wants wars. These are particularly in a very interdependent world. These are lose-lose situations. But I think for us to engage Russia and if there is any way we can be of any help, we have always been very open about it.
Having said that, you know, we have also been very careful not to prescribe a solution. We have not told one or the other party do this or do that. And that’s important to remember because that’s a courtesy which apparently is not always granted to us. So we get advice on what we should be doing.
So the point I’m making is, yes, it is going to be a challenge from an Arctic Council perspective. I mean, if you look at your own past presidencies, I think there was a two-year Russian presidency fairly recently. So if you have situations where everything is gridlocked and then say, well, you know, how do we get a global governance answer?
Answer is you’re not going to get it. And that is what I mean, it’s not just the Arctic Council. It happened in the Security Council as well. So I think it’s important to get global governance back to work. It is important we may disagree. I mean, we disagree with some countries. But because you disagree doesn’t mean that there is a total breakdown in that sense.
And your answer, Samir, is yes. When the Quad meets, which it is expected to do later this year. I mean, the Quad is essentially focused around Indo-Pacific. But, you know, the Indo-Pacific is a very interesting region because it points in different directions. So I’m sure and, again, just like I’m an advocate of Russia realism, I’m also an advocate of America realism. That, you know, I think the best way to engage today’s America is also through finding mutuality of interest rather than putting ideological differences upfront and then allowing it to cloud the possibilities of working together.
SAMIR SARAN: I think we like this because we’re really out of time, and I can see that the clock has gone beyond what we were promised. Thank you so much for joining us this morning. Thank you, President Grímsson, for hosting this event. And ladies and gentlemen, please applaud both the gentlemen who made this possible. Thank you.
