This is the transcript of a conversation between American political scientist John Mearsheimer and Zakka Jacob, Managing Editor, CNN-News18 on “India Wants To Send A Powerful Message To Pak But Doesn’t Want To Escalate”, May 7, 2025.
Listen to the audio version here:
The Indian Response and Strategic Messaging
ZAKKA JACOB: Everyone sort of scratching their heads and trying to figure out a, will there be a response, b, what is the nature of that response? What may be the targets that the Pakistan army could likely pick in terms of a retaliatory hit? Look, picking a military installation will have much wider ramifications. Then it means that again as Christine Fair was saying, then India is left with no off ramp. It means that India will also have to climb the escalation ladder.
Two things which stand out in the Indian statement. You heard from Vikram Misri, the Foreign Secretary. You heard from the two military officers, Wing Commander Singh and Colonel Qureshi, the two women officers who were chosen to announce this publicly to the world. The language that they used was very, very specific that it was non escalatory. India is not looking to escalate further. The targets were terror infrastructure and terror launchpads, not civilians. And also underlining the fact that the targets were not military installations.
I guess the messaging to the Pakistani military is if you want to retaliate, do not think of targeting military installations, do not think of escalating and do not think of targeting civilians. These are, you know, there’s a lot of fog of war happening right now. Let’s try and make sense of that again by speaking to yet another very, very influential voice, somebody who’s a familiar sight here on CNN News 18, one of the most noted American political scientists from the University of Chicago, Professor John Mearsheimer. Thank you very much professor for speaking with us. Good morning to you in Chicago. It’s evening here in New Delhi.
I’m sure you’re up to speed with the developments that we’ve had with over the last 12 hours or so. India has had these very specific targeted strikes at nine different locations inside both Pakistan occupied Kashmir as well as Pakistan proper Punjab, the heartland of Pakistan. What do you make of this Operation Sindoor as it’s known to avenge the terrorist attack that happened in India a couple of weeks ago?
Walking a Fine Line Between Message and Escalation
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, it’s hardly surprising that India retaliated. And I think the Indians, you know, are walking a fine line here in that they want to send a clear message. They want to send a powerful message to Pakistan that this is unacceptable behavior. But at the same time, I think the Indians are committed to making sure that this doesn’t escalate too far because that would not be in India’s advantage.
ZAKKA JACOB: But the ball is really in Pakistan’s court and the fear here in India is Pakistan will escalate. And the Pakistan army in particular. I was speaking to Christine Fair some time back. And she said there doesn’t seem to be an off ramp for the Pakistan army and therefore they will have to escalate.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: It seems to me that the Pakistanis have to retaliate. The question is, what does that retaliation look like? And then what does India do? I mean, what we’re talking about here is going up the escalation ladder. And if you’re India and you go up the escalation ladder, the question is, will you have escalation dominance? In other words, as you go up different rungs of the ladder, does India end up prevailing or is it basically a stalemate?
And the argument I would make is that Pakistan has substantial military capability and they can retaliate in kind. And it’s not clear to me that India can dominate until you get pretty far up the escalation ladder. I mean, there’s no question that India has superior conventional forces, but you’d need major war before those superior conventional forces could be brought to bear. So it’s not clear as you’re down on the lower rungs of the escalation ladder that India has much of an advantage over Pakistan.
The Risks of Limited War
ZAKKA JACOB: You don’t subscribe to the idea of a limited war, a sub, certainly sub nuclear, even subconventional war, a limited war for a few days or weeks that could, that could then eventually result in an off ramp where both sides can take away something.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, that’s a possibility for sure. But the problem that you then begin to run into is that if India’s conventional superiority prevails, the Pakistanis may be tempted to use nuclear weapons to rectify the situation. This is not likely, but it is a possible or a plausible outcome. And if you’re India, you want to avoid that. Furthermore, I don’t think at this point in time it’s in India’s advantage to get involved in a conventional war with Pakistan.
ZAKKA JACOB: Let me ask you this again. You know, all of us are trying to figure out, make sense of what may likely be the Pakistani retaliation. And obviously this is going to be determined in great measure by the current army chief, General Asim Munir. I’m sure you heard his comments a few weeks ago talking about how India and Pakistan and Hindus and Muslims are fundamentally two different people, never meant to live together, so on and so forth. If that’s his thinking, is there a way you can sort of gaze into his head and try and gauge the what kind of a response or what kind of a retaliation the head of the Pakistan army and his men could possibly undertake?
Predicting Pakistan’s Response
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: My guess is that what Pakistan will do is try to retaliate in a way that looks like the equivalent of the Indian retaliation that just took place. And the Pakistanis will do everything they can not to go further up the escalation ladder because there’s no advantage to Pakistan of going up the escalation ladder.
There’s no question that they do not have escalation dominance.
They, I think, have to retaliate against India. I’d be surprised. I’d be shocked if Pakistan doesn’t respond at all. But if they do respond, I think they hope that that would be the last round. But the question is, will it be the last round or will India retaliate again? And then if they do retaliate again, what will Pakistan do? And this is the real danger of escalation.
ZAKKA JACOB: No, I agree with you. I mean, it depends entirely on the nature of the response and the target of the retaliation. So let me, let me sort of delve into that a bit. If it’s a civilian target, surely India will have no choice but to retaliate further. Even if it’s a military target, India will, will have no other choice but to retaliate further. When you said earlier that it will be a target that is similar to what India hit today in Pakistan, the problem there is there are no terror camps here in India. So what does Pakistan hit?
The Escalation Calculus
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, the question is how many people did the Pakistanis kill? And I think it doesn’t matter that much whether it’s civilians or military. I mean, as you know, the Pakistanis are shelling the Indian part of Kashmir and a number of Indian civilians have already been killed. So that precedent has been established, the killing of civilians.
I think the question is just how big the attack is. If the Pakistanis were to attack in a way that made the Indian attack look like it was much weaker than the Pakistani attack, then the Indians would have very powerful incentives to really slam Pakistan. But if the Pakistanis retaliate in kind, it’s a similar retaliation in terms of the number of casualties, the scope of the target set and so forth and so on. Then the incentives for India to retaliate again are not so great. But I don’t see an obvious off ramp unless somebody comes in and can help put pressure on both sides to shut this one down.
ZAKKA JACOB: It’s interesting you say that, you know, in the Pakistani calculus, if they are able to demonstrate to the Pakistani public, if the Pakistani army is able to demonstrate to the Pakistani public that they have hit as many targets or they have hit as many individuals as India has done, then that should suffice.
Of course, the ceasefire violations are happening at the line of control and have been in a very intense way over the last 12, 14 hours or so since the announcement of this operation Sindoor, the Indian army has confirmed that 15 people have died. The concern and the fear here in India, and I guess part of it is built into India’s strategic calculus is if it cease fire violations, if it is fatalities at the line of control, that is something that is factored in India’s strategic calculus. But if Pakistan starts scrambling its jets and wants to hit targets outside of Kashmir, then that puts India again in a position where it has to again match retaliation for retaliation. Would that possibly be a window of opportunity for both sides to try and get, try and find the elusive off ramp?
Mutual Interests in Avoiding Escalation
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: I think it would be an incentive to do exactly that. As I said, I don’t think Pakistan has any interest in going up the escalation ladder. I do think they have to retaliate, but if you go up the escalation ladder, they can’t beat the Indians at any point. And the further up the escalation ladder you go, the greater the disadvantage that Pakistan is at.
At the same time, I don’t think India has a vested interest in going up the escalation ladder either because they have to go far up before they dominate. And a major war, even a limited conventional war, I don’t think is in India’s interest at this point in time.
The International Response
ZAKKA JACOB: So let me come to the international community and their response. Obviously, you know, President Trump has spoken about what happened last night. Secretary Rubio has spoken to the national security adviser here. He’s tweeted saying he wants to see a quick and hopefully peaceful resolution very soon. Do you think the Trump administration, the Americans, have leverage with Pakistan to get the Pakistan and the Pakistani army chief General Munir to back off and not retaliate.
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: I don’t think the United States has as much leverage as it once had. I mean, you can see the U.S. China competition playing itself out in terms of the India Pakistan competition. I think Pakistan is much closer to China today than it has been in the past and India is moving closer to the United States.
So you are reaching a point where you have the United States and India on one side and China and Pakistan on the other side. And this presents problems for India because India has a deep seated interest in keeping its competition with China at a low level. And if India gets involved in a serious way with Pakistan and the Chinese come in on the side of the Pakistanis. I’m not talking about them coming in militarily, but I’m talking about them coming in diplomatically and putting great pressure on India to shut the war down. This is not in India’s interest.
So I think from now on out, including what’s going on today, it’s quite clear that the US China competition and the India China competition is superimposed on the India Pakistan conflict.
Great Power Competition and Regional Conflict
ZAKKA JACOB: I just want to explore that thought a little bit, because if you’re saying basically that the India, Pakistan, you know, situation, the India Pakistan escalation is basically a proxy for the big power competition, the great power competition that’s going on between the United States and China, isn’t that even more of an incentive for the Trump administration to come in on the side of India, visibly do so and try and de escalate the side situation?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Yeah, I think that the Trump administration, from a strategic point of view, has a vested interest in siding with India, but at the same time going to great lengths to make sure that this does not escalate. It’s not in the Americans interest to see this war escalate, by the way. It’s not in China’s interest as well.
I think, if any, both the Chinese and the Americans and even the Russians will all go to great lengths to try and prevent this war from escalating. So I think, again, as we were saying, I don’t see great incentives on the part of Pakistan or on the part of India to escalate further once Pakistan retaliates. But at the same time, I don’t see any great incentive to allow this escalation on the part of the three great powers in the system.
China’s Role and Interests
ZAKKA JACOB: China agreement. You talked about China, and I’m curious to know, obviously China has leverage with Pakistan, influence with Pakistan to try and, you know, get it to de escalate. The question is, does it have the inclination, does it want to get in here and ask Pakistan to stand down?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, I think that China has a vested interest in seeing India pinned down in Pakistan. The Chinese have two points of potential conflict with India. One is the line of control, the border between the two countries, and the other is the Indian Ocean. And from a Chinese point of view, the more deeply involved India is in Pakistan, the less able it is to deal with the line of control and the Indian Ocean.
So there’s no question that China has a vested interest in tensions remaining in place between Pakistan and India. But whether or not China wants a war between India and Pakistan is another matter. And on that count, I think the Chinese at this point in time certainly do not have an interest in seeing this present conflict escalate. So I think they’ll be a force for moderation.
ZAKKA JACOB: I just want one more question on the Trump administration. And Trump has famously said he’s an anti war president. He said repeatedly on the campaign that, you know, in his first term, no war started. And his number one foreign policy priority is to put an end to the Ukraine war, put an end to what’s happening in Israel and Gaza. Would he want to see a third war started on his watch?
Trump’s Stance on India-Pakistan Conflict
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, this would not be a war that directly involved the United States. I think when Trump talks about the fact that he’s not interested in any more wars, he’s mainly talking about any more wars that directly involve the United States and India. Pakistan would not directly involve the United States. But I think that Trump’s basic inclination is not to fight wars and to do what he can to foster peace. So I think, if anything, Trump’s gut instinct will be to make it clear that the United States and India are close together, that they’re effectively de facto allies. But at the same time, I don’t think the Trump administration will want to see this escalate. And I think the Trump administration will go to some lengths. I don’t know if they’ll go to great lengths, but they’ll go to some lengths to shut the conflict down, to prevent further escalation.
Role of Gulf Countries
ZAKKA JACOB: Last couple of questions. One on, you know, the Gulf countries, Indian officials have spoken to their counterparts today, both in Saudi Arabia and UAE. These are countries that have had influence and leverage over Pakistan. They also help control the narrative in the Islamic world, as it were. You think those countries might be tapped or might be in a position to leverage with Pakistan and get the Pakistan army not to retaliate?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Yes, I think not in a major way, but I think they can contribute on the margins. I think they can make it clear that they support Pakistan in principle, but they do believe that going up the escalation ladder would not be a good idea. And I think that is their view, and it’s the correct view. So I think they will be a force for moderation.
Breaking the Cycle of Violence
ZAKKA JACOB: And finally, you know, I was speaking to Christine Ferrer also about this. This whole pattern of every few years there is a major terrorist attack. India responds with punitive action. Things are quiet for a few years, and then again, you have another terrorist attack, and there is more punitive action each time. The depravity of the attack, the visceral nature of the attack just gets increasing, gets compounded, and thereby, as a consequence, the Indian action also goes up the escalation ladder. It hits deeper inside Pakistan. Is there a way to break out of this cycle?
JOHN MEARSHEIMER: I think the answer is no. I think as long as the Kashmir issue is not settled, you’re going to have this terrorism problem for as far as the eye can see. As your comments indicate, this is hardly the first time this has happened. It happens every few years, as you pointed out. And I think there is good reason, I’m sad to say, to expect this to continue happening in the foreseeable future.
I mean, this is a very interesting case in that it illustrates once again that there’s really no military solution to the problem. It’s not like India can figure out a clever military strategy for solving this problem once and for all. The only way you’re going to solve this problem once and for all is with a political solution that both sides find acceptable. And it’s been impossible to find that political solution.
And as a result, the weaker side here uses terrorism as its principal weapon for dealing with the stronger side. And again, until you get a political settlement, I don’t think that this problem is going to go away. And I think India is going to be dealing with it for a long period of time.
ZAKKA JACOB: All right, Professor John Mearsheimer, thank you very much for joining us with your perspective, your thoughts, your insights, really, into what’s going on between India and Pakistan. Thank you very much for joining us.
