Prof Kishore Mahbubani: The Surprising Twists and Turns in the US-China Relationship (Transcript)

Then when Joe Biden went back to China, even though he was Vice President, Xi Jinping received him and took care of him for a week. So these two men had a very close personal relationship.

Now you would think that would make some difference, right? It made no difference. The contest in fact got worse under a much nicer guy called Joe Biden. Now I make that point to tell you that geopolitics is not driven by personalities. It’s driven by deeper structural forces.

The Iron Law of Geopolitics

And the reason why I could confidently make the prediction that relations between the US and China will get worse is because of an iron law of geopolitics that has been around for only two thousand years — a bit older than NUSS.

Now in that iron law of geopolitics, whenever the world’s number one emerging power, which today is China, is about to overtake the world’s number one power, which today is the United States of America, the world’s number one power will always push down the world’s number one emerging power. And just to make the argument very clear, if China was the number one power and the United States was the number one emerging power, China will be pushing the United States down. It’s just logic.

It’s the logic of geopolitics. That’s how geopolitics has worked for two thousand years. And so what’s happening when the United States tries to stop China’s rise, as it is trying to do, is predictable, is normal, is natural. It happens.

But at the same time there’s a deeper question you ask yourself. How is it that human beings are not like billiard balls, right? Human beings got minds, they can think. They know they cannot be shoved around on a billiard table — you just kick the ball, you can predict exactly where the ball will go, because the laws of physics drives where the ball will go on the billiards table. We are human beings. We can think. We can say, “Hey, this is stupid. Why carry out this contest?”

Amazingly, even though we’re not billiard balls, when it comes to geopolitics we seem to behave like billiard balls. We’re driven by the laws of physics almost.

But of course as human beings we have to rationalise why we do what we do. And that’s why when you speak to many Americans, they’ll come up with all kinds of reasons why the United States should stop China’s rise. And obviously, they have to convince themselves. And I can tell you that they are very, very convinced.

The American establishment — I’m talking about the larger American establishment, not just the presidency but also members of his cabinet, members of the Pentagon, CIA, State Department and so on and so forth — when you ask them why are you pushing China down, they say, “Oh, because China is not a democracy. China is run by a communist party. The United States is a democracy. Democracies have to stand up to communist parties.” And that’s what they say.

But I can tell you that even if China was a democracy, the same thing would happen. Because again the laws of geopolitics override everything else. But you have to justify it.

The Fear of the Yellow Peril

And in the case of the US-China relationship, what gives it a sharper edge is that this is the first time in two hundred years where a non-western power is emerging. So whatever I have said so far, many other Americans will say, “Yes, I mean Graham Allison talks about the Thucydides Trap and so on and so forth.” But at the same time there’s an emotional dimension, and I call it the fear of the yellow peril.

I mention that even though it’s politically incorrect to mention it, because if you want to understand why many Americans get emotional about China, it is the fear of the yellow peril. And if you have any doubts about it, that this fear of the yellow peril exists, I can tell you a hundred and thirty years ago the US Congress passed a law called the Chinese Racial Exclusion Act in the 1890s. So the fear of the yellow peril is deep in the psyche of the Americans.

So therefore, as you see this contest proceed, you can say it’s all predictable.

Part Two: What Is Unpredictable

So what’s unpredictable? I can tell you that what has happened in the last twelve months was unpredictable. Because if you had told me — let’s say if I had been given this talk in January 2025 when Donald Trump became President — and if you had asked me, “Kishore, one year from now would it be possible for China to launch a retaliatory strike against the United States that would stop the United States in its tracks?” I would have said no way. The United States is far more powerful than China in many dimensions.

I can tell you therefore I was personally stunned when China had clearly worked out a very precise counter strike that stopped the United States. You remember when the tariff war began, when the Chinese refused to back down — Donald Trump put thirty percent, fifty percent, seventy-five percent, one hundred percent, one hundred and forty-five percent on China. He thought it could go as high as he wanted and the Chinese could do nothing. Then the Chinese responded and they cut off their supply of rare earths and magnets, and the United States suddenly discovered that it didn’t have an alternative supply. Almost ninety percent comes from China. So if China cuts it off, a lot of American industries, a lot of important American manufacturing, including manufacturing of key weapons, would have stopped.

The Strategic Mistake of the United States

But I make that point because one of the main theses of this book — and I hope you’ll read it someday — is that one of the strategic mistakes that the United States has made is that it has launched a geopolitical contest against China without working out a comprehensive long-term strategy, without anticipating how China will respond. And I warned them in this book five years ago. And if they had followed my advice, they wouldn’t have been surprised, because they would have sat down and calculated that the Chinese will come back at us. Where will they come back at us? Where are our vulnerabilities? They didn’t do that.

And I can tell you the man who gave me this insight actually was Henry Kissinger, when I had a one-on-one conversation with him in New York when I was writing this book, and he gave me his permission to cite him in this book.

So clearly, the Americans didn’t have a strategy. They didn’t anticipate the counter strike. And so the counter strike came as a big surprise.

So I think at least for the next year or so, things will remain relatively stable until the United States finds out in various ways alternative supplies for the rare earths and magnets that it now relies on China for. And I’m sure the United States is an amazingly resourceful country. They will find ways and means of getting around that, and that will then — once that is over — see the contest step up again.

So right now, we are in the midst of a one-year truce, which I didn’t anticipate and which no one anticipated. In fact, because as long as this truce holds, next year you may see President Trump going to China, having a good visit and so on and so forth. So for the next one year, the unpredictable dimension may actually lead to relative stability temporarily in the US-China contest.

Part Three: What Should We Look Out For in the Future

So I realise I’ve exceeded my twenty minutes. I’ll carry on for another five minutes on my third point. What should we look out for in the future? What are the key issues we should be paying attention to as we watch this US-China relationship? And I would say focus on three Ts.

The First T: Tariffs

The first T is tariffs. And the reason is that that’s the current war that is going on, as you know. And as you know, President Trump tried to raise the tariffs, China counter-retaliated, and the US brought the tariffs down. So on the tariff front, right now there’s a ceasefire.

But as you have seen over the past year, tariffs is President Trump’s favourite weapon. If he doesn’t like what Canada’s Prime Minister says, “I’m going to increase your tariffs one hundred percent.” He doesn’t like what President Macron says, “I want to give a two hundred percent tariff on French champagne.” He loves tariffs. And for reasons that are very hard to understand.

I can tell you I used to know someone who was a CEO of Goldman Sachs and he was the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers for President Trump in the first term. And this gentleman tried to explain to President Trump that tariffs are actually not good. Tariffs don’t hurt the country that is exporting. Tariffs will hurt the American consumer. Economic theory is right, it does hurt the consumers. So he spent three hours explaining to him.

The Three T’s: Tariffs, Technology, and Taiwan (Continued)

So at the end of the discussion it was very clear President Trump wasn’t convinced. So this gentleman asked President Trump, so why do you like tariffs so much? And President Trump replied, “I love tariffs.” It’s true. I’m not exaggerating.

He loves them. He sees them as a weapon that he has and he can apply them to anybody and which he has, as you know. And most countries have one way or another, they’ve to accept it. They have no choice. They can’t fight the United States.

Only one country by the way has successfully retaliated against United States and that is China. Everybody else including the Europeans have accepted the tariffs, right? That shows you the power of the weapon. That’s why you’ve got to watch the tariff dimension.

The second T is technology. And I can tell you the real battle will actually be fought on the technological front. And here I’ll be very cautious because as you all know I studied something very practical in NUS, something called philosophy. Very useful. It didn’t give me much insight into technology. So I cannot talk to you intelligently about the technological dimension and especially about the latest incarnation of the technological dimension which is the AI struggle.

And what is happening in the AI field is absolutely amazing. And here too, if I can mention another unpredictable element, again if you had asked me, I don’t know whenever, two years ago after US produced ChatGPT and all, when will China catch up? I will say five or ten years maybe before China can catch up with ChatGPT. Boom, within one year, DeepSeek came along. It was a big surprise.

So it shows you that in the technology dimension both sides are incredibly powerful. In fact, at the same time I can tell you about a year ago, a year and a half ago, I published an article in the magazine Foreign Policy in Washington DC together with a former president of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Tony Chan, and an American saying all efforts to stop China’s technological development have failed. Have failed.

An example is the Soviet Union refused to give nuclear bombs to China. China said no problem. They developed nuclear bombs on their own. Therefore, the technological dimension will be a very important dimension of this struggle but no one can tell you who’s going to win. Because whatever you do, in my argument I’ve always said don’t underestimate China but whatever you do please don’t underestimate the United States of America. The United States is a remarkable country, truly remarkable country and its capacity for innovation is absolutely amazing.

And I can tell you when I speak to the Chinese, they don’t take United States for granted. They know that they’re dealing with a formidable competitor, certainly in technology.

Taiwan: The Most Dangerous Flashpoint

And finally, the third T is Taiwan. Why Taiwan? Because there’s frankly only one issue that will bring, that could bring the United States and China into a direct conflict, a direct war, and that is Taiwan. Because from Chinese point of view, Taiwan is not negotiable.

Not negotiable. It’s the last living symbol of the century of humiliation that China suffered. As you know, from 1840 to 1949, China lost Taiwan after it lost the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. And from China’s point of view, getting China back, getting Taiwan back to China is non-negotiable. It has to happen.

By the same time, the good news is the Chinese are prepared to be patient. They’re not going to rush it. They believe time is on their side, they don’t have to rush it. But if Taiwan declares independence, it is one hundred percent certain that China will declare war. And since the United States has self-created an obligation to defend Taiwan.

As you know the US Congress has passed something called the Taiwan Relations Act, even though it doesn’t explicitly say the US has to declare Taiwan, defend Taiwan. If the war starts within China and Taiwan, the US will be under tremendous pressure to intervene. And if it intervenes, this will mean a direct war between US and China. So therefore, it’s important for both sides to understand how important the Taiwan issue is and why you have to manage it very, very carefully.

Here fortunately the remarkable thing is that even Joe Biden was a much nicer guy, he didn’t understand how sensitive the Taiwan issue was and he unwisely said not once, not twice, not thrice, but four times that United States will defend Taiwan. This by the way erased the policy of strategic ambiguity that the United States has created saying, “Hey, we will not declare that we will either defend or not defend Taiwan. We want the Chinese, we keep the Chinese guessing, right?” And that way the United States may not feel obliged to defend Taiwan if a war breaks out. That was a reason for strategic ambiguity. But that policy of strategic ambiguity was thrown away by Joe Biden.

But fortunately Donald Trump has brought it back. And so on the Taiwan issue, surprisingly things will probably be calmer under Donald Trump than it would have been if Joe Biden had been re-elected. So that’s an issue for which we should be grateful that Trump is around at this time.

So I hope by now I’ve given you some sense of the complexity of this contest and I’ve given you just a few layers, but there are more and more layers as you examine each issue in-depth. And I hope that this has piqued your curiosity enough for you to sort of look deeper into the subject.

Thank you very much.

Q&A Session

MODERATOR: Thank you, Professor. Just invite Professor to just take a seat. Okay. We’d also like to invite Mr. Soh Yi Da, the chair of our intellectual pursuit committee, to moderate our session for tonight. Mr. So.

MODERATOR: Good evening, everyone. Thanks, Professor Kishore. I think few have examined this topic of US-China relations as deeply, profoundly and as provocatively as Professor Kishore. So it’s indeed our privilege to hear from you.

Just now, Professor Kishore mentioned he’s amongst the oldest members in NUSS. I think we also like to add that he’s also our distinguished NUSS member. So that’s another affiliation that you forgot to mention. Just wanted to highlight that. Thank you.

Revisionism: Who Is Really Upending the World Order?

MODERATOR: To ask today’s first question, I wanted to talk about the whole idea of revisionism. You spoke about the iron law earlier, that rising powers are typically revisionist powers. And a lot of literature, scholars have talked about China as the revisionist power, the rising power trying to upend the entire international global order. But what we saw earlier at the start of this year, just a few weeks back, what America had done in Venezuela, they essentially upended the whole international world order, whatever that had taken the world eighty over years to build, that long lasting peace that we had had. How do we make sense of that? It’s ironic that China today is the one that’s trying to push for multilateralism, but America is the very one that’s trying to destroy whatever that has been put in place over the past eighty years.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, I mean, that’s another, well, in some ways it’s not surprising because President Trump was always suspicious of multilateral organisations. He had actually withdrawn from the World Health Organisation and UNESCO in his first term and he’s withdrawn again in his second term. But the question is, in the case of the United States, President Trump I think will be president for three more years. And the likelihood is that whoever succeeds him will probably go back to the policy of sticking to the 1945 rules-based framework because it has worked in American interests to support that framework. There’s a reason why the United States actually was a supporter of it for eighty years and only President Trump in some ways backed away from parts of it. So the likelihood is that things could go back at the end of President Trump’s term.

But I also want to add, reinforce a point you made, that one of the points that the United States makes about China is the word you used, China is a revisionist power, China wants to overthrow the 1945 rules-based order. Actually, the Chinese have no desire to overthrow the 1945 rules-based order because China today is the most successful China you have seen in four thousand years of Chinese history. Never before has China been as powerful as it is today. The amount of power that China has is the highest it’s ever had. How did it become so successful? Because it plunged into globalisation and it functioned by the rules-based order.

So today China is the one trying to defend the World Trade Organization and it’s the United States that’s trying to undermine the World Trade Organization, which is a paradox because the United States set up the World Trade Organization. And that’s a paradoxical situation we are in.

But I would say that I don’t write off the 1945 rules-based order yet because as you know, one English word that has become very famous in the last week is a word called rupture. I’m sure you’ve all heard that the Canadian Prime Minister gave a speech in Davos a week ago in which he said that there has been a rupture with the old global system. But he was only half right. There has been rupture and there has been resilience.

And why do I say there’s been resilience? In the past when the United States took the lead on something, whatever, other countries will follow and say, “US does it. We must follow. Obviously the US has calculated everything properly, correctly.” But what’s interesting is that out of the 193 countries in the world, only one country has raised tariffs, United States. 192 countries have refused to do so. So 192 countries are sticking to the system. So the global system therefore has shown resilience and global trade should have gone down in 2025. It went up surprisingly. So it shows you there’s a resilience in the global system that we underestimate.

Spheres of Influence in a Multipolar World

MODERATOR: You mentioned earlier about rupture as a buzzword. And in recent weeks, the other term that we see quite frequently in the papers would be fears of influence. Do you think that in moving forward, there will be America dominating the Western Hemisphere, China and Asia Pacific, and Russia dominating the ex-Soviet Union land space? What sort do—

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: The danger of that phrase fears of influence is that it’s very easy to use but it doesn’t capture the complexity. And the United States has a lot of vested interests in East Asia in many ways. United States has invested more in ASEAN than in China, Japan, South Korea, India combined. So United States has got strong interest in Southeast Asia. So United States is not going to give up these areas. And they can try to carve out spheres of influence, but there’ll be overlapping interests.

And so when you mentioned, for example, some people say there’s a new Monroe Doctrine, which means that the Monroe Doctrine of United States dominating South America. But United States militarily is dominant in South America, but all the South American states do more trade with China than they do with United States. And they’re not going to stop trading, including his good friend, Milei of Argentina. So the phrase fears of influence doesn’t capture the complexity of our current world order.

The Fourth T: Thinking — Quality of Strategic Thought on Both Sides

MODERATOR: Alright. One more question before I open the session to the floor, and that is, I wanted to add another T to the three T’s that you mentioned earlier. You talked about tariffs, technology, and Taiwan. I wanted to talk about thinking. Right? So from your engagements with all these world leaders both sides, with America, with China, what is the quality of strategic thought in Beijing and Washington? What’s your assessment of the people you interact with?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, on both sides, they have very thoughtful people, very, very thoughtful people. And in the case, but you see the structures are very different. So in China, for example, if you want to find the best strategic minds, you would go into the government because the Chinese Communist Party is one of the most meritocratic political parties in the world, and it selects only the best to come join the party. And so the quality of mind of the Chinese leaders who work on this issue is incredible.

Now in the United States, the best minds don’t go into the government, right? If you work in the government, you’re lucky if you earn $200,000. You work in the banks, you earn $200 million. So you have to take a small pay cut when you go from private sector. So the best minds are in the private sector. So for example, the people advising the US government on the technology competition are the best minds from the private sector. For example, Eric Schmidt, I think he was in Google, right? He’s advising the US government. The head of Palantir, I think his name is Alex Karp, is advising the US government. So these guys are incredibly brilliant. So on both sides you have incredibly brilliant minds working. And I wouldn’t say one mustn’t underestimate the other.

MODERATOR: Alright, maybe we open the session to the floor. If any questions please, come to the microphone. Professor Lau and gentleman at the back.

Audience Questions

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Good evening, Professor Kishore. Thank you for your introductory insights. I love your thing, LA480J. My main question is should China be more assertive and lead more in international affairs?

Should China Be More Assertive?

AUDIENCE QUESTION:

The reason why I ask this question is actually when I go online and look at various reports about what’s happening around the world, then I look at the commentaries, I find that one common feature is people commenting that China is weak, not doing enough, talking too much only. So the question is should China be more assertive especially when US appear to be now leaving various international organisations. Should China go in and try to lead, like UN will function effectively with US breaking all the UN rules actually in a way, right? WHO, like you say, US have left. I was thinking this morning if we have a pandemic now, which country will follow the lead of WHO and which country will ignore and then how can we effectively deal with pandemic?

Should China lead, provide strong leadership then hopefully WHO can lead more strongly in the case of a pandemic. The other thing is China also to me had to look after its own interests by being more assertive like when there’s a breaking of international law like in Venezuela, actually China has investment in Venezuela and there are rumours, I don’t know whether it’s true or not, that even Chinese tanker taking oil away from Venezuela got seized by US. I don’t know how true it is. And what is China’s reaction? So far we see that China basically they just respond verbally.

So we can keep the question short. We have a long queue behind. Okay, okay. Okay, the last part is even China looking after its own interest back home like Taiwan. Now US have a package of 1.1 billion military equipment to Taiwan.

Should China be stronger and try to force the thing not to go through? Because once Taiwan is armed more and more, it’s actually very difficult for China to deal with Taiwan in case the red line is crossed. We let Professor answer.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI:

Okay. I think there are two big questions. One is should China be more assertive? And second, how should Taiwan be managed?

The question of China being more assertive, China’s influence in the world has grown by leaps and bounds. You see, the thing is that in Singapore you read only the Anglo Saxon media, right? The Anglo Saxon media gives you a distorted perspective of what’s happening in China. To some extent when the Straits Times publishes the Anglo Saxon media articles, those articles also give a misleading view of what’s happening.

Chinese influence in the world has grown by leaps and bounds. And so for example, I’ll give you a concrete example, China has launched something called the Belt and Road Initiative more than ten years ago. And when China launched the initiative, the United States saw it as a threat, and as you know, the Obama administration launched a global campaign to persuade countries not to join the BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative. So out of 192 countries, some didn’t join clearly, you know, India didn’t join, Australia didn’t join, but 140 countries joined.

So 140 out of 190 countries went against American objections and joined the Belt and Road Initiative. But this is just one example of China’s influence. Today if you look around the world and look at the world leaders and you ask them what is their first preferred stop they want to go to when they become a leader, they want to go to China. And if you look at the number of world leaders going to China today, it’s much higher than the number of world leaders going to United States. And so China’s diplomatic influence has grown significantly, and they’re steadily, slowly and steadily increasing their role in the world. That’s not diminishing at all.

Now on Taiwan, I think the Chinese are being very wise in keeping things, keeping the temperature down as much as possible, but at the same time they have to give a warning to the current president of Taiwan by organising these military exercises that show that they can encircle Taiwan whenever they have to. So they have ways and means of conveying their message without necessarily having to be more assertive or aggressive on the Taiwan issue.

How Much of US Foreign Policy Is Personality-Driven?

MODERATOR:

Questions from this gentleman? Sorry, before the next question, just a reminder that please keep your questions short and concise so that others have a chance to ask. Thank you.

AUDIENCE QUESTION:

Hi, Professor. My name’s Lucy, and I’m from Brunei, but I’m a permanent resident in Singapore now. Now you prefaced your talk by saying that geopolitical relations, it’s not personality driven. It goes beyond. Right? It’s highly strategic. US foreign policy in the past year, in the past months has been highly unpredictable as you have also said. You have the tariffs, you have Venezuela, you have the threat of Greenland and NATO, okay, as examples.

So I’d like to hear a comment from you. How much of these recent moves in, let’s just say, the last twelve months is personality driven by the sitting U.S. President, and how much of this is calculated U.S. foreign policy strategy?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI:

That’s a very difficult question. I mean, you’re right. Personalities do make some difference, okay? Certainly before President Trump, no U.S. President would have threatened the takeover of Greenland. No U.S. President would have threatened making Canada the fifty-first state of United States. That’s true.

But don’t forget that the United States has been intervening in other countries almost since World War II, right, consistently. This goes back sixty, seventy years. You mentioned Venezuela. Venezuela was a very small operation. Iraq was a — they conquered the whole country. They sent, I don’t know, few hundred thousand troops. So that’s a much bigger intervention. So U.S. intervention in other countries goes back a long way and it’s an expression of their power.

And even a nice guy like Obama would go round setting off revolutions, personally approving assassinations. I mean if you look at this book, the last chapter, I talk about how unwise it was to carry out these policies of assassinations. So this idea that the United States is only suddenly woken up to intervene in other countries is not true. It’s a consistent pattern, but that’s also a pattern that all great powers carry out. When you’re powerful, you do what you must. And that’s why they can get away with it.

Trump’s National Defence Strategy and the Davos Speech

AUDIENCE QUESTION:

Professor, I have a question on Taiwan. I think as recent as two days ago, the US published a paper on the National Defence Strategy saying that airlines should now take care of their own security. What is the implication of this on Taiwan? Does it mean US is giving up on Taiwan? Second question, what do you make out of the recent ministering speech by Trump at Davos? Was it deliberate? If so, what was he trying to achieve? And did he achieve what he wants?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI:

You’re referring to the Davos speech? Yes. Okay.

The first question — one lesson I’ve learned after observing international relations for fifty-five years now, don’t pay attention to words. Pay attention to deeds. So you can have a wonderful document, National Defence Strategy, forget it. It doesn’t mean anything. May be a signalling thing but it doesn’t indicate what they will do. So US will continue to try and defend Taiwan regardless of what the words say. The deeds will be they’ll do something. So don’t pay too much attention to words.

And similarly in the speech that President Trump gave, I think one of the biggest mistakes we make — I mean, he is clearly unpredictable. That’s a given, right? But some people think, “Oh, he must be crazy, irrational.” He’s not. In his own way he’s very rational.

Now let me — I gave some remarks about Trump. Let’s see if I can find them. I have a little black book. Okay. He’s — I would say he’s unpredictable, but he’s also very rational and very shrewd. And these are five examples of how he can be rational.

President Trump. Number one, he knows when he has hit a wall. He doesn’t bang his head against the wall, he walks away. So when he imposed the tariffs on China, it didn’t work, he walked away. That’s a rational thing to do.

He knows how to be the centre of attention. He makes sure that every morning when you wake up and have tea and coffee the first thing you talk about is Donald Trump. That is not by accident. He knows how to seize your brain. He’s very smart and he does seize your brain.

Number three, he understands markets very well. So whatever he does, if it has any negative impact on markets, he makes sure that he backs away from it. So he has constraints. He’s not irrational.

And number four, he can smell weakness. And when he sees weakness, he goes for the jugular. And that’s why the Europeans were so stupid in practising what an American writer calls strategic self-abasement. Strategic self-abasement means kowtow. The Europeans tried to kowtow in all kinds of positions and they got kicked in the backside. So they can smell weakness.

And the fifth thing which is very important, he hates wars. He doesn’t mind doing limited military operations like Venezuela, but he’s not going to send a few hundred thousand troops to fight Iraq. He said publicly the Iraq war was a big disaster for United States.

Now I tell you all this because again if you read the media, even our media, they give very simplistic analysis of these issues. When these issues are much more complex and so don’t write off Donald Trump. He obviously is turning out to be one of the most consequential American presidents and he’s not stupid. And so don’t write him off in the way that many of the media write him off.

Singapore’s Geopolitical Strategy

AUDIENCE QUESTION:

Hi, Professor Kishore. My name is Kai Tie, I’m a year four pharmacy student. I read your book when I was in National Service and it furthered my interest in geopolitics, which is why I’m here today for your talk. So thank you for the insightful sharing. I have one question for you. In light of the developments in the recent years, how do you think Singapore should approach this geopolitical type of war in order to best serve her own interests?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI:

Well I think I’m not very worried about Singapore because we were blessed. One thing that many Singaporeans don’t appreciate is that among our founding leaders, we had three geopolitical geniuses. Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Rajaratnam were off the charts in terms of their geopolitical acumen.

And I can tell you one reason why I wrote my memoirs, Living the Asian Century, was because I wanted Singaporeans to understand how remarkable Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and Rajaratnam were. They were streets ahead of everyone. I mean, by now, as you know, I’ve shaken hands with so many world leaders. Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Henry Kissinger, Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand. I’ve met many world leaders so I can in some ways assess what is the average quality of leaders. And Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Rajaratnam were off the charts, okay?

And as a result of which, they ingrained some habits and patterns of thinking into Singapore’s foreign policy making which are remarkable. And so we have, we know how to survive these geopolitical storms only because of what Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, Rajaratnam did, by the way. Therefore you notice that in one way or another, even though we do make mistakes from time to time, everybody makes mistakes, okay, we are human. But overall, our track record is among the best. And as you know, we still have managed to keep good relations with both US and China. And that’s that in today’s day and age is quite an achievement. And so I’m confident that Singapore will do okay.

MODERATOR:

Maybe just broadening that question a bit or extrapolating it. So how would middle powers or small countries be able to maintain strategic autonomy, between these two big powers? Besides Singapore, right?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI:

Well, one — we are very lucky that one of the gifts that were given to us, especially by Lee Kuan Yew and Rajaratnam, is that they spent a lot of time and effort building up ASEAN. ASEAN would not have happened if Lee Kuan Yew and President Suharto had not developed a close personal relationship. That close personal relationship was the foundation for the whole ASEAN arrangement.

And the fact that we have a strong ASEAN is the best defence that Singapore has. Because if we had to stand alone against US and China, we’d be in deep trouble. But because we have all of ASEAN and all of ASEAN says we’re going to be friends with US, we’re going to be friends with China, we don’t want to take sides, that’s one protection we have. So I think that’s why I’m reasonably confident that we will be okay.

President Xi Jinping and China’s Long Game

AUDIENCE QUESTION:

Good evening, Professor. My name is Tim, NUS alumni. I’d like to hear your views on President Xi’s thoughts on this whole issue on how he’s managing it because what I feel is that he comes across as very guarded, but yet he’s totally consolidating power on his home front and seems to be playing the long game. So I’d like to just hear your view, what is his position on this, and is he trying to get strategic advantage from this current situation? Thank you.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI:

So your question about what is President Xi’s views of the current situation, right? Perhaps what are his thoughts and is he really playing the long game because he seems to be concentrating power at home?

Well, I cannot step into President Xi’s mind. I mean I met him twice, I’ve shaken hands with him. He paid me the ultimate compliment. He says he’s read my articles. I mean you all never read my articles but he has read my articles.

Yeah, you’re right. He’s not just President Xi, it’s China. You see there is a lot of geopolitical wisdom in Chinese thought, going back to Sun Tzu and all that. And again if you read this book I cite Henry Kissinger about how China plays the game of Go rather than chess. You don’t try to kill the king, you try to accumulate assets and then you dominate the board. And that long-term strategy China is carrying out.

Managing the US-China Contest

China is making sure that every country in the world in one way or another is dependent on China for some things, and therefore will not become hostile to China and therefore will not join a containment policy against China. They worked this out a long time ago. So it’s amazing how the Chinese are always looking down the road and anticipating developments and preparing. And they always have option A, option B, option C.

They have worked this out also, all in advance. So therefore I am confident that China will find ways and means of managing this contest. Which is why, by the way, I keep warning my American friends, I say you completely underestimate China. And then when I say you underestimate China, everyone says, oh, you’re pro China. Actually, I’m pro American.

I’m warning the Americans, you’re underestimating China.

Internal Power Struggles and the Chinese Communist Party

MODERATOR: Maybe just building on that question and discussing something more contemporary. I guess we saw what happened in China recently. The second most senior military commander of the Central Military Commission was purged. It is in fact Xi’s good friend and senior. They have a close relationship. How do you read the tea leaves? What are the implications for foreign policy?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, number one, I don’t read the tea leaves. Because for us, frankly, there will always be internal power struggles, not just in Beijing, in Washington DC also. It doesn’t matter to us. At the end of the day, whoever wins, you deal with them. So for us it’s inconsequential. It doesn’t matter which General he picks. Whoever he picks, we will work with that General.

But what happened to some Generals and what the stories, I honestly don’t know. Frankly, by the way, anybody who tells you he knows what is going on inside the Chinese Communist Party is lying to you. Nobody knows.

MODERATOR: But are there any hints of structural weaknesses within the China system we should pay attention to?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, that is the American wish. The American wish is that the structural flaws in the Chinese system will lead to a Chinese collapse. That’s what they believe. But that’s again, I tell my American friends, you know, the most dangerous thing in geopolitics is to engage in wishful thinking.

MODERATOR: Will you take that hint? Next gentleman, please.

Singapore’s Position in the US-China Relationship

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Thank you, professor. My name is Chen Xing, and I’m an NUS alum. So my question is very simple. It’s about how we, Singaporeans, position ourselves and survive in this US-China relationship. Because I’m bilingual, I’m pretty good at Chinese, and since last year, November, I noticed on Chinese social media there’s a huge unhappiness and upset of the majority of the Chinese netizens towards Singapore regarding PM Lawrence Wong’s remarks about the China-Japan conflict.

So my observation is that the majority of the Chinese citizens or netizens, they already position Singapore as having sided with the US. So in that kind of social unhappiness and upset, how does Singapore position ourselves and build a more balanced image from both sides? Thank you.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, I mean you’re right, there was a social media storm in China in response to the remarks that PM Lawrence Wong made. But I think that’s also partly because they misunderstood what he was trying to say.

But the good news here is that the Chinese government did not say anything. I think the Chinese government is much more sophisticated. They understand where Singapore stands, and Singapore is definitely not — Singapore doesn’t take sides between US and China, and Singapore is not going to take sides between China and Japan also. That’s not our fight. We’re not going to get involved in that.

So that social media storm came and it went. But I think the Chinese government has a very sophisticated understanding of where Singapore stands because we’ve had constant dialogues and conversations with them. So from time to time, in any relationship, even with your wife, there’ll be bumps on the road. But those bumps on the road are not going to affect your long term relationship.

But I just worry that in a lot of societies, the people’s feelings will cause the leaders to react. Otherwise, they cannot answer to the general public’s feelings. I think in the case of China, public opinion will not determine what the Chinese government does. The Chinese government is quite immune from public opinion.

MODERATOR: Thank you. I actually do see that as a deep seated informational campaign that is targeted at our Singaporeans. A deep seated informational campaign to sway the population and moving towards a certain direction. So I think on that front, actually, China has done very well in trying to win people over to their side. What do you think — in the court of public opinion between China and America, who’s winning?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Who’s winning in Singapore or where?

MODERATOR: Globally.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, globally, you ask yourself a simple question. If you are a young person in some developing country and you think you have some potential — leave aside Trump and these four years because Trump is cancelling visas for countries — most young people still want to go and work in the United States, not in China. So you know, larger — remember this is in all dimensions — this is a long term game. And China has got some long term advantages. The United States has got other long term advantages. So nobody is writing off the United States anytime soon.

Will There Be a World War Three?

MODERATOR: Take the next question, from the gentleman.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What time are we finishing?

MODERATOR: We take another — I think we finished all the questions. We’ve been queuing for some time.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: I’m working overtime now. Double pay, right? We need to do book signing later.

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Good evening, Professor Kishore. My name is Siew Kiat, and I’m a huge fan of yours. You earlier mentioned the iron law of geopolitics, and I fully agree with that, except that I think it goes back to the dawn of man when the first caveman threw his spear at the other cave. Now in view of this iron law, which is fully predictable, do you think a hot World War Three is imminent? I mention the word “hot” because I think some feel that we are already in the midst of a world war in terms of trade and finances. Thank you.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Okay, that answer is quite easy to give. There will be no World War Three. And for a simple reason — if there is a war between United States and China — can you hear me with this echo?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You can, yeah.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: If there is a war, it will quickly scale up to a nuclear war, and in a nuclear war you don’t have a winner and a loser. You have a loser and a loser. And both United States and China, and indeed Russia, understand that a nuclear war cannot be won. So they all understand where the red lines are that may cause a nuclear war, and they back away from it. And President Trump is particularly frightened of nuclear wars, and he’s one of the few presidents who speaks out against nuclear weapons.

So I’m not worried about World War Three, but there’ll be proxy wars. And proxy wars can be very destructive. But the Americans won’t die, Chinese won’t die, but some other people may die in the process.

Philosophy, Will, and the Iron Law of Geopolitics

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Kishore. My name is Zach. And I understand that you studied philosophy in university. So I have a philosophical question about geopolitics. Some interpretations of modern philosophy suggest a growing emphasis on the will and agency. Do you see this in Western diplomacy today? And how useful do you find this philosophical lens? Thank you.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Sorry, I didn’t quite get the question. Maybe you want to repeat — no, no, it’s the echo. Keep getting an echo here, that’s why. Some interpretations of modern philosophy suggest a growing emphasis on the will and agency? Do you see this in Western diplomacy? And how useful do you find this philosophical lens in geopolitics?

I didn’t get that. Did you? Maybe you want to rephrase your question in less philosophical terms. You can rephrase it for me.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (Zach): Oh, this is a challenge. The philosophy is — I did political science. I didn’t do philosophy. Just repeat the words. The will and the agency.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Oh, I mean everybody’s got will and agency. See, that’s what I mentioned about the paradox. When an iron law operates, human beings become like billiard balls, right? But surprisingly, even though we have brains and minds, we function like billiard balls in this geopolitical contest. How you resolve that tension is unclear.

And in theory you should be free to come up — if you read the last chapter of this book, I try to suggest ways and means in which United States and China can avoid this conflict. I’m trying to use the power of reason to persuade them. But even as I use the power of reason to persuade them to stop this contest, I know that my words cannot change the iron law of geopolitics. That’s the paradox, but I keep trying. Hope that answers your question.

China’s Growing Global Influence

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Evening. My name is Jackie. I’m working on my paper on China’s rise regionally, domestically and globally. So in recent years, we have seen the emerging partnerships, or rather strategic partnerships, that China has made, particularly with the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Do you foresee that it will overtake the role that America has?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Oh, will China overtake the role that United States plays in the world today? I mean, as China’s influence grows, it will definitely grow. China’s influence will grow. So in that sense, up to now, United States has been able to dominate the global multilateral institutions and control them in many, many different ways.

I mean, if you read my book, The Great Convergence, I tell a story about how when I was ambassador to the UN Security Council, we would begin our meetings with a report given to us by the Secretary General. And I thought the report was written by the Secretary General. But I happened to be in a car with an American diplomat. This American diplomat got a call, and this American diplomat was talking to someone whom I knew, saying, “In the report tomorrow, please remove paragraphs five and six and change paragraph three and add this in paragraph eight,” giving precise instructions. Now in theory, that report came from the UN Secretary General. In practice, it came from Washington DC.

So when you have a lot of power, you control things. So it’s quite natural when China becomes more powerful, it will also control things. Because you must — geopolitics is a very cruel business. It has no room for nice people. You have to understand it’s a brutal game and no country is nice. Every country will put its interest first. And as China becomes more powerful, it will become more assertive. This is a given. You cannot change it. That’s the logic of history. So you have to get ready for the new world.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (Jackie): Will language be a barrier?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: No. Absolutely not. And by the way, Chinese diplomats today speak very good English.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (Jackie): That’s right. Thank you.

Russia’s Role in the US-China Relationship

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Good evening, Mr. Professor Kishore. My name is Sunith. I’m currently a year two Mechanical Engineering student here at NUS. My question is actually quite similar to what Ms. Jackie asked, but in a different angle. So my question is that amidst the trade dependency that China has on Russia, and both rumors and facts about Russia’s military sponsorship in terms of equipment, arms and technology towards China, basically that sector — how does Russia actually fit into this US-China relationship? And is it operating as a hidden entity that we should be concerned of?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: So your question is about Russia? Where Russia stands in all this?

AUDIENCE MEMBER (Sunith): Yes.

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Well, I think the tragedy about Russia is that the Ukraine war could have been prevented. The Ukraine war was completely unnecessary. And frankly, now that he’s died, I can tell you, Henry Kissinger told me that the war was a result of European geopolitical incompetence. I can understand why United States wants to push NATO, right? But why are you Europeans so stupid? Russia is going to be your neighbor for the next one thousand years. Why are you going to slap Russia in the face?

So the Europeans were so stupid in slapping the Russians in the face, and they gave Russia no choice but to retaliate. And that’s why the President of Brazil has said, “Why are you only blaming Russia for the Ukraine war? Europeans, you should blame Europeans also.”

Again, in Singapore, we get the Anglo Saxon media so we succumb to the Anglo Saxon view where it’s only Russia is evil, Ukraine is innocent, Europeans are good guys — that’s rubbish. In geopolitics, there are no nice guys. So Russia was just doing what it thought it had to do to defend its interests, and that war could have been avoided.

But now that Russia has got into the war, Russia clearly needs China’s help in a big way. And that’s why Russia and China will get closer and closer. And it’s also not in China’s interest to see Russia collapse, because if Russia collapses, all the pressure goes to China. So therefore it’s in China’s interest to make sure Russia continues. So that’s the relationship between the two of them.

AUDIENCE MEMBER (Sunith): Thank you.

Post-Xi China and the Question of Leadership

AUDIENCE QUESTION: Yes. Thank you for the talk. I’m Justin. I’m not a student of history, but is Xi creating a Mao-like cult around himself? And should we be wary of post-Xi China?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Post-Xi China. Is he creating a — well, you know, it’s not going to happen anytime soon. I mean, in the Anglo Saxon media they say leaders should have term limits, and if you have a leader who stays for five years, ten years, that’s good. If a leader stays too long, it’s bad.

Closing Remarks

MODERATOR: Now let me ask you all a simple question. How long was Mr Lee Kuan Yew influential in Singapore? How many years? What’s your rough guess? He was Prime Minister for thirty one years. And then Senior Minister, fourteen years. And then Minister Mentor. I don’t know how many years. Five years, ten years. Add it up.

So countries, if they have a good strong leader, can benefit from it. Of course if you have a bad leader you will suffer a lot too, definitely. But Singapore benefited a lot from continuity of leadership. But it’s the Anglo Saxon media that’s trying to tell Xi Jinping get out because maybe he’s doing too good a job. And that’s why they’re anti Xi.

But this idea that, we agreed that, sorry. So I would say President Xi will be around for a while and don’t believe what the Anglo Saxon media says.

So Professor, just to conclude, one final question for me. We spoke about the long game. So what does the end game look like essentially? What does a win for either China or America look like?

PROF KISHORE MAHBUBANI: Very good question. That’s the subject of my next talk.

MODERATOR: Thank you, Professor. Thank you. Let’s invite our NUSS President, Mr Tong, on stage to take a photo.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us this evening. And before we bid you good night, just take note that we have a book signing session right at the back, so you can purchase your book and get it signed by Professor today for a special price. Thank you and hope you have gained many insights. Have a good evening. Thank you.

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