Transcript: George Friedman on the Real Stakes of the Trump-Putin Alaska Summit

He’s failed at that. I mean, he’s had minor successes at very high cost militarily.

There is now evidence of what’s called a “peace party” arising in Russia, both in the elite and the country who are saying “this is quite enough” and the war party that wants to go on. So at the summit meeting, these forces all meet together and the fact that they are going to be meeting, if they do, which Putin may well punt this as he did other things, but I think it will happen.

And like a marriage, the important things were settled beforehand. This is for giving the blessing. So I don’t think to a great extent, if they’re going to hold a summit, both will want it to appear to be successful. Therefore, much of the discussion has been done already between two layers. They have a good sense of what this would be. They will take full credit for whatever comes out or blame or what have you.

But I think it’s both a symbolic attempt, an attempt to put their imprimatur on things that have been decided before. So it’s not the dramatic decision point that’s probably made by each side as a final discussion and it can break down. And there’s, with Putin, there’s always the possibility that he can’t make it. And so when it happens, it’ll be significant in the sense that it will indicate that there’s an evolution going on of some significance.

CHRISTIAN SMITH: When you say that Putin might not be able to make it, do you mean that he might have to go and open an ice skating rink somewhere, or do you mean that he decided it’s not worthwhile?

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Well, he’s had telephone calls. It’s not the first summit, it’s the first face to face, but they’ve had conversations in the previous ones. It appears that they had a very good conversation. And Putin made every indication that he wanted to move toward a peace, to at least ending the conflict physically.

In each case, it turned out not to be true. Instead of doing that, he increased the military pressure on Ukraine with massive drone attacks at the capital Kiev, with less success in his attempt to extend his power on the ground, because it’s still a small, really small part of Russia, of Ukraine that he holds.

So we’ve been through these summits by telephone. It’s significant that they said they would meet, but Putin has frequently used, it seems, words of encouragement and desire and speaking very nicely. And nothing happened except the war continued.

If he does that in this summit, reaches an agreement, and they publicly stand together at a press conference and declare it, it’s more difficult for Putin to pull back, especially with the pressure inside of Russia, and it has more substantial capability because the world will see what happened. He may decide not to go to the summits, find some reason that he was insulted by something.

So we’ll see if it happens. But I think it’s likely to happen. Putin has said he would go there and he has to find a very good reason not to. And so I think it’ll happen.

Russia’s Strategic Failure in Ukraine

CHRISTIAN SMITH: Let’s have a look at what actually might get decided, if anything there. I mean, take it back a few steps to start off with. George, you’ve told us on the podcast before, you’ve written about this many times, that you think that Russia effectively has already lost this war or certainly hasn’t won it. Remind us that thought process.

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Well, in Vietnam, we lost the war because we didn’t win it. So the United States failing to subdue that same thing happened in Afghanistan, we fought the war. The military was not defeated, nor in Vietnam or in Afghanistan, but we failed to achieve our strategic objective, and therefore we lost.

So you judge wars not simply by the question, if you’ve defeated the enemy’s army, that’s one dimension of it. But have you succeeded in achieving your goals? So after three years, I don’t think Putin has come close to achieving his goal of taking Ukraine. He wanted to take Ukraine, create the buffer zone, become a demonstrable major power.

What he did was fail to do it. It now appears to be much less of a power than he did before. And secondly, he has massive economic problems with a massive threat hanging over his head that the United States would take very strong tariff actions that could really damage the economy if he did what he said he’s doing.

So at this point in both countries, there’s a question of internal politics. In the United States, the Ukraine war is not a critical issue that we discuss a great deal. But he has presented himself as a peacemaker, Trump has, and he cannot afford to appear to be taken by Putin. That’s a relative mind.

Inside of Russia, there’s an economic crisis in that banks are asking for aid from the Central bank and a possible threat of a breakdown of Russian trade relations with other countries. So in there, you really have the question. We’ve been fighting for over three years. We’ve hardly increased our hold over the country, and our offensives have failed to break the Ukrainians.

So it’s more like the case for the United States in Vietnam and Afghanistan, where the question is, how long is this going to go on without us winning? So if we can’t win the war, end the war. So in that sense, the summit is an opportunity for the two sides. And there’s a third side, very important one, the Ukrainians themselves, Zelensky, to come to an understanding.

And I think the pressure is on Putin. He has extended the war in spite of talks. He has failed to achieve any major breakthrough anywhere. How long does war continue? How long is Russia isolated from the world? So I think he’s under the greatest pressure to succeed. Trump is very desirous to proceed because he wants to be presented as a peacemaker and relevant to the country, not being played by Putin.

So these are two men, I think, with Putin more under pressure, needing to end this war.

Putin Under Pressure

CHRISTIAN SMITH: Putin, I mean, looks can be deceiving, of course, but Putin doesn’t seem like a man, particularly under pressure. He sort of pushed off Trump’s meetings. And as I think you wrote, in some people’s minds, made Trump look foolish because he seemed to go in with a positive attitude. And then Putin just kept pushing him back. He’s still attacking Ukraine as much as he can. Is he under pressure?

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Well, if you are a Russian citizen and you suffered vast losses of men, massive decline of the economy, and when the fall of communism took place, everybody thought that Russia would emerge as a European style power economically. And that hasn’t happened.

So there is undoubted unhappiness among the public, not at the beginning of the war, but the way it’s gone. And undoubtedly there are people around him, and this is now fairly well stated in the media, that see no point in continuing the war.

So I don’t understand the internal power structure, but when a leader of any sort fails to achieve what he does, and he seems to be holding on to it and wasting lives and economic power so that he should not be embarrassed by having to concede in a war, you’ll find opposition rising.

Now, how that opposition presents itself inside of Russia. But you have to understand, he is not Stalin. He’s not even Khrushchev. He doesn’t have the massive capability of suppressing dissent that they had. They had the Communist Party and party members got much more money and they would report on things. He doesn’t have that structure.

So he’s had demonstrations in Siberia, riots in Siberia. This is a normal political process. You can be a leader and feared, which I don’t think he can mount that level of fear outside the leadership, or you can be successful. You can’t fail without consequences.

And I think this is the point that is most likely. I think he will go to the meeting and try to negotiate something. And I think that Trump was willing to let him save face. He doesn’t much care. And he’s already indicated that what he would like to have is a good relationship with Russia, good economic relationship after the war.

So he’s dangling this promise, promising, on the other hand, dire actions if he doesn’t end the war. In every country, a failed leader is a failed leader and how he gets pushed out, I don’t know.

The Deal on the Table and Ukraine’s Position

CHRISTIAN SMITH: But looking at what the deal on offer might actually be? According to Polish Media, the potential U.S. deal is broadly in line with what many people in Washington expected. There would be a ceasefire, a de facto recognition of Russia’s gains. The question of whether or not Russia would have control over all of the five regions that it wants, or just some of them so far is unclear, but a certain amount of territorial gain, the lifting of US Sanctions on Russia, and maybe linked to some kind of privileged access to Russian oil and gas for US Companies, as you suggest there, George.

I mean, we haven’t talked much about Ukraine so far, of course. These conditions, these offers are in many ways things that Ukraine says they don’t want and have rejected. I mean, is there any kind of possible deal actually there to be made if Ukraine just says we’re not giving up our territory?

The Stakes and Dynamics of the Trump-Putin Summit

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Well, we have to remember one thing. The United States doesn’t have very high stakes in this war. We are not fighting it. We’ve shown ourselves to draw back from that war. Putin has everything at stake in this war. He will be known in history as the man who either won in Ukraine, made a settlement in Ukraine, or was defeated in Ukraine. So he has much more stake than Trump does.

Trump comes home and he says, “Look, the guy is crazy, the guy is a liar. We’re out of the game.” So he has internally political process, much better position than Putin probably has.

The second thing is that Zelensky is going to have to show himself as forced by the United States into the settlement. Now, remember, the Ukrainians have suffered greatly in this war. So what emerges from that is a desire for revenge and desire for the end of the war. It was very mixed feelings.

If Zelensky would simply say, “We’ll take whatever the Russians, the Russians and the Americans decide,” the question would be, “My God, this is what we are pawn in there.” So he must look more significant than he is. So when you take a look at the three players, Zelensky has the least influence on it, but he has to appear both more vigorous and at the same time, listen to his peace party, who’s had enough, too.

Trump walks away and he says, “Putin is a crazy guy and he is a brutal killer and so on and so forth,” and life goes on in the United States. We’ve got no stake. Putin has the stake and has the big one. How does he explain more than three years of war in which from the beginning, he wasn’t able to extend anywhere near where he had to go? Not stopping now, continuing for what?

Historical Parallels and Political Consequences

And so this happened during the Vietnam War in the United States. At first, there was substantial withdrawal support for it. It was, “Yes, we’re stopping communism,” but as it went on and we failed to achieve our goals, the question became widely, “Why are we continuing this war?”

In the end, it destroyed people like Lyndon Johnson, who wanted badly, Robert McNamara, who was secretary Defense, these people were deeply ostracized and still held in contempt for that war.

So when you take a look at wars that do not end in victory by one side or the other, they’re always negotiated. They end. That’s a negotiation. But then it’s the internal political problems that have to be met. In other words, “Vladimir, you cost us a whole lot of lives, an entire economy, and all you got was 20% of Ukraine. And for what did we do this?”

And that’s why I say that Putin has the biggest problem. We don’t get a settlement, life goes on. Zelensky will probably get massive more weapons from the United States. Zelensky goes on in history as the savior of Ukraine and so on. So when you look at the internal politics of it, I would say that the internal politics make Putin fairly weak and maybe too weak to make a settlement.

CHRISTIAN SMITH: Well, that’s an interesting thing as well. Of course, you touched on there. There’s something else that’s quite interesting, which is the fear in Ukraine, of course, and across Europe as well, that if Putin somehow manages to make Ukraine look like the thorn in the side, the sticking point where a deal can’t be made, there’s a risk that Trump walks away, as he’s threatened to do before, and say, “We’re not supplying weapons anymore to Ukraine, we’re washing our hands of this.” Do you think that that could happen, or do you think that actually, if Putin doesn’t make a deal, Trump will do what he’s done so far and continue supplying weapons to Ukraine?

Europe’s Role and US-Russia Strategic Considerations

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Firstly, Europe’s concern is about as hypocritical as you can get. So why aren’t they the ones negotiating? Why aren’t the ones sending the weapons and so on and so forth. We used to have in the army that the Germans will fight to the last American death. It’s sort of a situation in Europeans want this war settled by a Russian defeat without taking any risks at the part of Europe. And yeah, it’s a good move, but I think they’re relevant to this.

The relevant issue here is what will the future of US Russian relations be. We have a high degree of tension of China also. China depends on us in many ways, and we done them. We don’t want Russia, Chinese alliance, but the Chinese are now claiming that the Russians seized part of China and they have to turn and give it back. So there’s tremendous tension between China and Russia.

If we can end the war with Russia, the World War II issue was Germany we ended with, became friends. Japan we ended it with. The strategy of the United States historically has been to form alliances with nations we defeat. Not always, but that was the model of the last 80 years.

In this case, we look at Russia as a substantial economic opportunity, good workforce, a lot of cheap land. There’s all sorts of opportunities there. And Russia looks at themselves in the same way, many of them. And we don’t want to have any settlement between China and Russia. So there’s a great benefit.

And we’ve been making tremendous pressure on Russia in the South Caucasus. So, for example, the road that we’re building through the South Caucasus there is an American troll. Turkey is excited about it. This is all on the border of Russia.

Putin’s Weakening Position

So as this war is going on, the United States has entered into interesting relation with China. Not as bad as it looks. It’s interesting. Secondly, they have the South Caucuses in their hand. So when everybody steps back and looks at the brilliant performance of Putin, everything went wrong. He failed in Ukraine. South Caucasus are now an American Saudi entity, sort of. China is very critical of Russia. They never supported the war. They sold things to them, but they never participated. The only real I had in the war was North Korea.

So if you’re a Russian citizen and you’re old enough to have your son going off to war, there’s the question that, the Vietnam question, the Afghanistan question, “What’s the point of this?”

So to me, the most important issue here is something that I don’t know. What is the methodology inside of Russia of changing regimes? Is it possible he doesn’t seem to have a secret police that’s that effective and so on, but he himself is seen not as a great leader of Russia, but inside of Russia seen as going to war that he failed to win and wouldn’t stop because of his own ego and so on.

So when you look at the situation, he needs to come out looking better. In all the talks, when he needed to come out looking better, he increased the war, but he did not gain anything significant from that extension. So the question is, as they’re not talking in Russia about a peace party and a war party, what’s the strength like? And when we look at history, he’s playing a very bad hand.

CHRISTIAN SMITH: And you say they’re about increasing the war. Of course, as you’ve written as well, George, of course, the last few weeks, couple of months, we’ve seen massive increased attacks on Ukraine, in particular on Ukrainian cities like Kiev. And in many ways, seems like a bit of a blitz London strategy like Hitler did. Whether or not that would work. Well, I guess. Well, I guess we’ll have to wait and see.

The Failure of Bombing Campaigns

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Well, the right the Germans we had a massive bombing attack on Germans and they didn’t surrender. Because of that, the Germans had a massive bombing attack on London and it Britain break them. So here he was with these historical parallels, attacking Kiev civilians as well as, you know, everything else, expecting that they would break.

I think he vastly underestimated Zelensky’s power as well as the loathing of the Russians as the war continued. So that conceding populations that the Russians want, I want more land. There’s a population there that really doesn’t want to be under Russian rule. May not have been that offensive to them at the beginning of the war, but at this point it is.

So what I’m saying is that he is under pressure to end the war because it is cost and may cost vast amounts of money for the rush for the Russians going forward. And, you know, he really doesn’t have the option of doing that without looking like a failure. He’s in a terrible position. And that makes it harder for him to make concession.

If he concedes that “We’re going to be satisfied with this,” then what do we fight and die for? If the war goes on, “What are we fighting and dying for? We didn’t succeed.”

So I would argue that he badly wants a settlement of the United States with the United States offering something of great value as an alternative. I think it still comes out badly, but something like that. And I think Trump is spirit do that and that will be closer economic ties, American capital flowing into Russia and so on and so forth.

And, you know, he will be talked of as an appeaser by everyone. Those who love him will love him. Those who hate him will hate him. Doesn’t change the American political system. So he has a stronger hand. He can make deals.

The India Tariff Signal

CHRISTIAN SMITH: And of course, the question of territory and whether or not the Ukrainians accept that. I mean, we’re talking about Trump now, and I want to just look at him and the US Position a little bit more. In particular, last week we saw these secondary tariffs on India because of India’s heavy purchasing of Russian oil and thereby the support of Russia’s economy. I mean, what do you make of those tariffs? Because they are quite something. Punishing another country for another country’s actions because they want to do business with them.

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: This was a deliberate move before the summit, forcing the summit. So what he has threatened, what Trump has threatened is to put massive tariffs on any country doing business with Russia if these talks fail. All right. By that, it meant that it would raise the tariffs. They could not export as efficiently to the United States as they did.

Now, what India did was buy a lot of oil recently from the Russians. What the United States did was slam 50% tariffs on India, not Russia, on India, saying, “If you trade with the Russians, we’re going to hurt you.”

Now, India was not a great friend of ours, but we had parallel interests. The fact that he slammed it on a major country, India, not a minor country, that he hit them with this because of the oil is a massive signal to Putin. In other words, “If you think we’re bluffing, here’s a welcome package.”

We didn’t choose a country like Somalia to do this with. We went to India, which was an alternative to China in terms of economic trade and so on and so forth. We told them not to buy the oil from Russia. They did. This is less an attack on India. That is signal to Putin that we are dead serious, that if the war continues, any country that trades with you in these terms will have massive tariffs placed on them.

It’s really going to happen, and they’re going to stop trading with you because they don’t want these tariffs on it. So it’s an economic attack along with the failure of the military attack.

So my read on it of why India, “My God, they’re fairly good friend. Why pick on them?” Because they’re a fairly good friend. That’s why we did it before the summit the week before, to show them we’re not kidding. We’re not going to send troops. We might not even send much weapons, but we’ll wreck your economy.

Because if the Russians can’t sell oil, that’s a game. And there’s other oil available. The Russians are not the only source of oil or any anything else. So my read on this would appear to be a very bizarre decision. To suddenly hit them a friend with massive tariffs was probably extinct from what we were doing. But it was directed to shape the summit, not to think that he can leave without massive effects on his economy. And we’ll see where he goes.

CHRISTIAN SMITH: Now, our concern is Trump and Putin make a deal. Ukraine jumps up and down, but reluctantly accepts because in many ways they don’t have much of a choice. Putting aside whether or not that’s a good way of doing things. Russia, it goes ahead. And Russia, then, as Putin being Putin, rebuilds its forces, decides to attack again in two years time after Trump’s out of office, whenever. What then?

Putin’s Precarious Position

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: I think there’s a massive force inside of Russia to push him out of his position for having been a failed leader. And if he tries to continue the war, which is what he’s trying to do so that he doesn’t have to admit defeat, that’ll get him, too.

I mean, the point is he failed to get the objective he wanted. He didn’t stop the war, he won’t negotiate the war. He’s going to drag us in here, our kids are gone. And, you know, it very much reminds me of Vietnam, when the idea the big stupid fool said “move on” was Lyndon Johnson’s story.

You reach a point where you’re no longer credible as a military force. You want to continue it because you don’t want the political cost domestically of conceding that point. And then there’s a political uprising. Now in the United States, it was electing other presidents and so on, but he was held in contempt afterwards.

So even now, and this is the terrible problem that Putin has created for himself. Wars end either by victory or by negotiations. Frequently the negotiations are put off by a ruler because he doesn’t want to be humiliated by it. He’d rather have people die. This is apparent to people there.

So whatever the Russian political system is, and I don’t think it’s a clear thing, he is trying to balance in a desperately difficult position. So when we talk about him, we think about him as an absolute Stalin, who does what he wants as he wants, kills everybody else. That’s not his position. It could have been his position if he won, but he didn’t.

Looking Ahead to Friday’s Summit

CHRISTIAN SMITH: Well, there is certainly a sense of anticipation in the air about Friday. I think we will obviously have to all wait and see what happens. But for now, thank you very much for coming on the podcast. We might have to talk to you again even sooner than in two weeks time to see what happens. But until we speak to you again, thanks very much and goodbye.

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Thank you.

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