Chas Freeman: The Greater Israel Project Is Collapsing (Transcript)

Because it looks as if they’re getting a bit more anxious about the ambitions of Israel in the region as well.

CHAS FREEMAN: Well, they’re very coy typically. A Saudi press release is an oxymoron. It doesn’t really exist. I somehow, when God apportioned the public relations team, he omitted the population on the Arabian Peninsula for the most part.

But I would say several things. First, it’s become totally obvious to all of the GCC — the Gulf Cooperation Council — member states and peoples, that Washington pays attention to Israel and pays no attention to them. There’s a very articulate former minister of information from Kuwait who I listened to this morning on the BBC being interviewed, a very deft practitioner of public relations, notwithstanding the point I just made. And he was quite clear.

The context of the interview was probing the question of whether the Gulf Arabs would in fact defect from being platforms for American power projection in the region, make their peace with Iran, keep their distance from Israel, and participate in the emerging new security architecture in the Gulf. And now I’m extrapolating from what the interviewer said, but my own view is that there is an emerging core of that architecture crafted between Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

The objectives of this are both to manage cooperative security — that is, to produce a Persian Gulf which is free of any great power presence and which is self-managing — and also to build a military-industrial complex in the region that will promote self-sufficiency and self-reliance through partnership between these four countries and whoever else chooses to join them.

So I think the answer to the question is that the Gulf Arabs, Saudi Arabia included, are very much drifting into an arrangement in which these four countries work with Iran, not against it, and deter Israel.

The Fallout of the Israeli-American War Against Iran

Here, one has to look at the end result of the Israeli-American war of aggression against Iran, because that is producing a situation in which the United States will never again be with Israel in an attack on Iran. Politically, that is becoming impossible. Donald Trump sticks to the script that he was handed by Benjamin Netanyahu. But Benjamin Netanyahu himself is in a pillory in Israeli politics.

He is now openly devoted — he sees the Iran War and his relationship with the United States as existential challenges. And he’s more concerned about his own self-preservation than he is about the future of his country. This is quite a reversal, because I think he planned to go down in history as the man who opened the door to Greater Israel by seizing territory from neighbors in Syria and Lebanon, by awing and subordinating, subjugating Iran and Yemen and other opponents. And this dream is now in tatters. It is not going anywhere.

Why Turkey Poses Such a Significant Challenge to Israel

GLENN DIESEN: But on Turkey, what is it about Turkey that makes it such a big problem for Israel? Because I heard this comment being made by leading Israeli politicians that they could be in the future a worse threat than Iran, which is interesting because Turkey is, of course, a NATO member. It’s an important partner of the United States in the region.

Why exactly? Because I think many people are a bit confused in this regard, because the Turks appear to look the other way when it comes to, for example, the genocide in Gaza. They give some lip service, but it’s usually limited to rhetoric. They’re not actually doing anything. What is it that makes Turkey such a big problem?

CHAS FREEMAN: Well, I think you’re referring ultimately to the prediction by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett that Israel would have to eventually, after it had defeated Iran, take on Turkey. And the basic premise here is the Israeli concept of absolute security for Israel, which means absolute insecurity for everyone else in the region. And it means that any country with the capacity to confront Israel in any context is regarded as a target of efforts to subordinate it. That is the root cause.

There are details. The Israelis are in bed with the Kurds in northern Iraq. And although the conflict in Turkey itself between the Turkish and Kurdish elements of the population has been greatly moderated — the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan has made his peace with the government and so forth — Israel is very much in the business of divide and rule, and it is an opponent of Turkish policy, therefore, toward the Kurds. It’s also an opponent of Turkish influence in Syria, which it sees as a menace.

And so the Israeli perspective is essentially, as I said, that as long as someone else is left standing in West Asia, Israel cannot be secure. Israel has no diplomatic strategy at all. It has an entirely military strategy. It has put forward no peace plan for the Palestinians or anyone else in its 78 years of existence. And it doesn’t seem to be brewing up such a proposal. So its only approach to those who oppose it is military.

Turkey’s Central Geopolitical Position

Now, I want to make a couple of comments about Turkey. Turkey is in an absolutely central position with respect to many issues. You simply cannot conduct a policy toward Central Asia, Russia, the Black Sea countries, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Greece, Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, farther south in West Asia, Afghanistan, and the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, the EU, the European agglomeration in general, without the acquiescence or support of the Turks.

So they are in an absolutely central position. I know of no other country that touches on so many vital interests of so many other countries. And this gives them leverage. But it also, in the post-Cold War era, means that their relationships with their neighbors, European and otherwise, have changed.

Yes, Turkey is a member of NATO, which is an alliance — in the strict sense of the word, that is, the members of that alliance have an unconditional commitment to come to each other’s aid by whatever means they constitutionally determine in the event of a challenge. Turkey is now, I would say, more in an entente relationship with the rest of the alliance. That is, its engagement is conditional, not unconditional.

Turkey’s Shifting Identity and Its Implications for Israel

And it has turned its attention, after having been rebuffed by the European Union — mostly on the grounds that it’s Muslim and large, and some in Europe want to affirm a concept of Christendom which would be polluted by the presence of a large Islamic state. Apparently Albania is not considered a menace.

So the Turks followed a trajectory of assimilation to EU norms, which was very helpful. The European Union excels at assimilating countries to its norms. And that has changed Turkey. There’s been some reversal of that under Erdoğan. But basically Turkey is now affirming a non-European identity. It is affirming a West Asian identity, an Islamic identity, and a Central Asian identity. And this means that, like Russia, after 3 centuries of efforts to Europeanize, it has turned away from Europe and is emphasizing its own civilizational roots.

So this is a situation that greatly complicates the prospects for the continued existence of Israel, because Turkey is now an active partner not just of Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, but an active force in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation — 57 countries, 2 billion Muslims. Turkey aspires to be a leader in that context. This is utterly inconceivable, incompatible with a normal relationship with Israel.

So while you’re correct, Turkey has not done anything very concrete other than supplying some of its citizens to futile flotillas intending to resupply Gaza with humanitarian goods. Its attitudes have become resolutely, almost unanimously, very anti-Israel. And this also, because of the Israeli view that if you are anti-Israel, you’re anti-Semitic, this also grates on the Israelis.

So I’m sorry to offer such a complex answer to what ought to be a simple question. But it really isn’t very simple, I think.

The Iran Question: Has the Ship Sailed?

GLENN DIESEN: I liked your comment that 100% security for Israel would be 100% insecurity for its neighbors. Henry Kissinger once made a similar comment, and I often think about this comment because I think this was a key flaw in general in the post-Cold War era, that is with the hegemonic peace. That is if the political West would seek security through absolute dominance. And yeah, that would be 100% security for the West with the goal, which would mean often 100% insecurity for others.

And this is, I know the Russians, for example, have quoted this. I think Lavrov, maybe was it 15 or 20 years ago, quoted Kissinger on this simply because that’s how they saw it. Anyways, I digress.

I did want to shift a bit towards Iran though, because it looks as if Israel could essentially knock out Iran, this could turn everything around because they seem to be overstretched now — by the IDF’s own account, they say they’re overstretched in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria. Well, it’s essentially become too much. But if they could knock out Iran, which is seen as the head of the snake, then all the other pieces could start to fall into place.

But how do you see this actually developing? Because we hear that Netanyahu and Trump had a spat. I’m not sure how much of this is theatrics and how much is real, but it looks as if both the US and the Iranians believe that they can wait out the other side, that each side is being exhausted, especially in the economic sphere. So how are you assessing this? Is it possible to defeat Iran now, or has this ship sailed?

CHAS FREEMAN: I think the ship has sailed. There was a vigorous effort to take down Iran, so vigorous that it has depleted not just Israeli but American weaponry and defense equipment. The ability to intercept drones or missiles is greatly degraded. I don’t think the United States really has a military option now against Iran that would not be more costly than beneficial. Israel, of course, has essentially subcontracted the destruction of Iran to the United States.

The argument between Trump and Netanyahu, I think, was real. Trump is frustrated. Netanyahu is doing everything he can to prevent a negotiated end of the war, as he wants it to continue for the reason that we both discussed before. And that is Iran is the only effective obstacle to the establishment of Greater Israel. It is the only effective respondent to the Israeli effort to achieve absolute security.

I had very much in mind Henry Kissinger’s observation on this, which I think was wise. And I agree with you. We see in several contexts examples of why he was right about this.

No Negotiations, Only Stalemate

Anyway, what’s happening? First of all, there are no negotiations. And structurally, a negotiated agreement appears to be impossible for two reasons.

One is the structure of the negotiations themselves, which are indirect, either conducted by amateurs with no proven ability to reach closure in any context. I’m speaking of Misters Whitcoff and Kushner, who have totally discredited themselves with the Iranians, have no credibility at all with anybody, really, other than Donald Trump. Even he has turned to using Pakistani and Qatari intermediaries to exchange messages with Iran.

There are no negotiations. There may still be some message passing, but it is very clear that Iran understands that when it is negotiating with whoever — Pakistanis, Qataris, Kushner, Whitcoff, whoever — it is negotiating agreements ad referendum to Donald Trump. And when Donald Trump receives what has been achieved at the negotiating table, he feels free to alter it at will. So he rejects agreements that have been apparently reached. He prevents any meeting of the minds. And to the extent that he approves anything, he then checks ad referendum to Benjamin Netanyahu, who is determined not to have any agreement.

So Netanyahu either introduces poison pills into the process — “you must sign up to the Abraham Accords” was one of them, and “get rid of all your nuclear program” is another. These are non-starters, and he knows it.

Prisoners of Domestic Politics

In addition to this, both Netanyahu and Trump are prisoners of domestic political forces. Netanyahu is in danger of going to jail if he’s displaced from power. He has in his cabinet some of the vilest people on the planet, who are determined to eviscerate him if he makes any compromise with Iran or with Lebanon.

On Trump — he has the pressure of the midterms. The summer driving season, with the prospect that if the Strait of Hormuz is not opened without condition and continues to be blockaded by the U.S. Navy, we’re talking $200 a barrel of oil. Very good for Norway, by the way — replenish the state fund. He’s also under pressure from Netanyahu. It’s clear that he fears the release of the Epstein files. He’s also under pressure from his plutocratic Zionist donors to whom he owes his office, to whom he’s beholden.

So, stasis. Stalemate is what happens. Actually, it’s worse than that. It’s Zugzwang, as I’ve said before. That is the condition in a game of chess in which any move you make reduces your leverage and degrades your position and accelerates your defeat.

A Contest of Endurance

So now to go back to what’s happening — basically, as you said, we’re in a contest between Iran and the United States to see who can hold his breath the longest. We’re both underwater and in danger of drowning. Iran calculates, I think correctly, that it can outlast the United States for several reasons. It’s there. It’s not at a great distance. Its navy has been destroyed at least 8 times completely, but does seem to be able to close the Strait of Hormuz notwithstanding that.

What we have is not a ceasefire, although the press refers to it as such, because both sides are firing at each other intermittently. I would say it’s an agreed de-escalation. But there’s something very important that has happened in this context.

International law has always demanded that reprisal for attacks, violations of international law, aggression, be proportional — proportionate to the damage that you’ve suffered. Israel has never agreed with this. It has been deliberately disproportionate in its reactions to any slight whatsoever. Iran now appears to have adopted the Israeli standard. So if the United States Navy fires on Iran, the Iranians will fire back a response that is many times greater than the initial American provocation. This has worked for Israel. It probably will work for the United States.

The danger, however, is that Iran, which has clearly concluded that there will be no negotiated resolution of this war, the danger is that as Iran escalates in retaliation for American provocations, it will begin to fire real shots at American naval vessels. So far, it’s essentially fired warning shots. I think we’re going to see the sinking of a naval vessel or two in this part of the American blockade.

The blockade is difficult to sustain. It is in effect blockading the entire world’s access to the Persian Gulf. Iran is quite prepared to allow ships through if they respect its rules. The U.S. Navy is apparently not prepared to let anybody through. So we’re in an escalation mode and we’re probably looking at a resumption of the kinetic fighting.

Just this weekend, Iran has twice hit facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, apparently because these are the remaining functional bases for American activity in the region and most identified with the provocative attacks that have been mounted on Iranian communications towers, radar systems, and so on on the Island of Ketchum. So this is a pattern of tit for tat that is moving into higher gear, not lower. And no, there is no negotiation.

Trump: Master of the Shakedown, Not the Deal

I’ll just conclude by saying that there are some people who imagine that Donald Trump’s erratic behavior — repudiating positions he’s taken the day before, altering those to new positions, in other words repudiating his own prior statements, claiming preposterously that things are happening that are not happening, manipulating the stock market with these statements and so forth — are a deliberate bargaining style in which he’s trying to confuse the other side, which he has succeeded in doing.

I don’t think so. I think he is not the master of the art of the deal. He is the master of the art of the shakedown. He’s able to bully and coerce, but he can’t close an agreement that is a true meeting of the minds that leads to mutual advantage.

And so I think the Iranians are correct in their judgment. There will be no negotiated resolution of this war, which leaves Donald Trump with the option of sailing away, which is not easy for him, because he’s so eroded his own credibility that the claim he would make that he was sailing away from a victory would not be believed by anyone but his committed true believers.

Parallels with Ukraine

GLENN DIESEN: Yeah, I see some parallels there with the Iranian as well as with the Russian, that is they did the same after the Alaska meeting as well when they said, “Well, we will deal with all the underlying causes.” So in other words, a ceasefire is not peace, they kind of agreed. And then I’m not sure if it’s Trump just changing his mind or if he’s just weak, that he couldn’t get the Ukrainians and the Europeans on board. Anyways, he shifts back again.

And also, yeah, I think they look towards Iran because, yeah, how much he goes back and forth — everything they agree upon essentially means nothing. So you can only play this game for so long before all the other actors begin to pick up on it.

CHAS FREEMAN: Well, there is a consistent record of what I call contriving ceasefires with Israeli characteristics. Those are ceasefires in which one side is supposed to cease fire while the other continues.

And so we see a ceasefire in Gaza that is no ceasefire at all. People are still being subjected to genocidal attack. What was supposed to be a 53% temporary Israeli control of Gaza expanded to 60%. It’s now expanding to 70%, unilaterally by Israel. The condition that an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza would be accompanied by Hamas disarmament is nowhere in prospect.

And so there’s that example of the Board of Peace, which has no active members and is doing nothing. No money other than the initial funds kicked in by the UAE to establish an office and hire some people. So this is a farce.

And one could argue that the same thing has been true in the Ukraine dialogue with the Russians and Ukrainians. By the way, the Congress seems to be moving to restore some sort of aid to Ukraine, but I don’t know what the significance of this would be given the fact that we don’t have the production capability to replace the essential weapons for Ukraine. And the fact that the Ukrainian attacks on St. Petersburg and the international economic conference there, which appear to have used the airspace of the Baltic countries — NATO members — to vector in, this is clearly going to stimulate a Russian counter-escalation. And we’re seeing it actually with the increased savagery of Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure and production facilities.

In the middle of all this, Volodymyr Zelensky does not distinguish himself by writing a sarcastic, insincere letter to Vladimir Putin, which is guaranteed more to enrage than to engage, and which has of course been dismissed by the Russian president as a public relations exercise, which indeed it was.

Russia’s Endgame in Ukraine

But my guess is that the Russians are going to make a real effort to make Putin’s words real. He has said the war is nearing its end. What does he mean? I think he means Russia is going to move on the rest of Donetsk, the 15% or so that it doesn’t already control, and achieve its objective of controlling Lugansk, Donetsk, 80% of Zaporizhzhia, part of Kherson. And at that point, once it has achieved its objectives, it will be open to some sort of discussion, but not before, because it doesn’t have any confidence either in the United States or in the European Union, which is still essentially wasting everyone’s time by debating whether it should even talk to the Russians, and Ukraine, which is recalcitrant and living on fantasy hopes, not anything real.

The Collapse of Trumpian Foreign Policy

So I think we’re seeing the collapse of the Trumpian foreign policy — not just with respect to Iran, but with respect to Israel-Palestine, with respect to Ukraine, with respect to European security architecture, with respect to NATO, where the members are beginning to flake off from their core commitments, denying airspace or base usage to American forces engaged in West Asia.

So yes, this is a bad moment. And it’s one in which what we are seeing, once again, is that the United States is so-called agreement incapable. That is, we have so thoroughly dispensed with diplomatic professionalism and the normal rules of statecraft that we are unable to resolve the issues we want to resolve.

The Lebanon Ceasefire and Its Contradictions

GLENN DIESEN: Yeah, I keep always thinking as well as a comparison between the Iranians and the Russians as well, that a lot of the strategic calculations are wrong, I think, based on the failure to assess the threat perceived by the opponent. That is, if we recognize that Iran for very good reasons considers this war to be an existential threat, as opposed to simply a regime change, then we would then be able to predict that they would be willing to absorb all kinds of pain in order to get on top of this.

Same as the Russians. I mean, they see this as an existential threat irrespective of what NATO thinks. And for this reason, if we could recognize this, then we could see why there are some very strict limitations on what kind of an outcome and peace settlement it can accept, but also to understand how much pain it’s willing to absorb and also the lengths it’s willing to go to ensure that it achieves its objectives.

But again, in Europe, they think that recognizing that Russia sees this as an existential threat somehow legitimizes it, because that means that NATO is threatening Russia. And the European leaders refuse this. And of course, the talking heads in the media are the same. They insist that this is simply a story about Russian expansionism. But when you get the analysis wrong, then suddenly you can’t understand the motivations in terms of how far they’re willing to go, or what they can achieve in the peace. Again, I digress. You mentioned before you wanted to get to Lebanon, and I thought this was an important—

CHAS FREEMAN: Well, before we do, let me make a comment on statecraft as it relates to the Ukraine war, because I think it’s very clear that in politics, perception is reality, and perceived interests are the basis for actions. And there is a hierarchy of interests. The supreme interest, which Iran is fighting for, is national identity — the culture, the language, the existence of a community that calls itself Iranian.

But below that, there is a hierarchy of interests. There are strategic interests — interests which, if neglected, if not defended, lead to an attack on vital interests. And this is exactly the scenario with the Ukraine war. Iran is a different matter because it already faces a challenge to its identity. The whole idea of destroying the Iranian state, which is the basis of Israeli policy, aided and abetted by the United States, is one thing.

Russia, in looking at the expansion of NATO, the proposed incorporation of Ukraine into NATO and the American sphere of influence, followed by the introduction of American weaponry and forces in Ukraine — if the same pattern of previous NATO expansion were followed — Russia has seen preventing this as a strategic interest, because if it were allowed to happen, Russia’s vital interests would be under constant threat from the weaponry and the hostile presence in a hostile country of Ukraine.

So this is all very logical, and you don’t have to assert that Vladimir Putin is an evil man, or that the Russians are somehow viscerally savage or whatever the Russophobes claim, to see that they have a logic to their interests. They’re pursuing them on a very realistic basis. Maybe they’ve made some wrong choices, but the motivations and the motivating force, it seems to me, are quite obvious.

So I wanted to say this before talking about Lebanon. And let me talk a bit about Lebanon now. Because here we have a farcical ceasefire too, between two parties that are not at war. That is, the Lebanese government, which has not defended Lebanon, is not shooting at Israelis, not doing anything — and the Israelis — they have reached a ceasefire. But they weren’t firing at each other. So this is nonsense.

The party to the war in Lebanon is Hezbollah. That is the movement, the state within the state, if you will, that has to be dealt with — appeased perhaps, or defeated perhaps — in order to end the Israeli war of aggression. Hezbollah insists on the removal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. The Israeli defense minister says that the ceasefire agreement, so-called, that has been reached with the Lebanese government, allows a permanent Israeli presence in southern Lebanon. It basically enlists the Lebanese army as an auxiliary of the Israeli army in smashing Hezbollah.

Nabih Berri, the Speaker of the Parliament and the head of the Amal Party — a Shiite party that parallels Hezbollah in its constituency and some of its objectives — has described this ceasefire as “booby-trapped.” And I think he’s absolutely correct. It’s not going to stop the fighting. It is really farcical when you look at it because, as I said, it’s a ceasefire between people who aren’t fighting each other.

GLENN DIESEN: Yeah, no, that’s a great point. It is Hezbollah who’s fighting, so it’s a bit strange to leave them out of this agreement.

CHAS FREEMAN: Well, Donald Trump says he has spoken to Hezbollah somehow indirectly, and I think Rami Khouri said that he’d also spoken to Elvis. This was equally credible.

Trump’s Credibility and the Greater Israel Project

GLENN DIESEN: Well, this is the problem though — this kind of dishonesty, which is just so repetitive. And also, Trump essentially becoming the boy who cries wolf. All the time it’s, “Well, we’re close to a deal,” or, “We’re going to annihilate them,” going back and forth. You can only do this so many times before what he says means nothing. If he says, “I’m talking to Hezbollah,” I’m just assuming he’s not, because it doesn’t mean anything anymore.

But of course, Lebanon is also exhausting the Israelis. And to what extent do you think the Iranians will accept this? Because they made it very clear that they link any peace directly to Lebanon. And they can also shut down the Red Sea, and they have a lot of other things they can do if Israel does not tone it down. But it just seems like this Greater Israel view is hitting a wall at some point.

CHAS FREEMAN: Let me make several points. First, the concept of Greater Israel makes anything the Israelis do regional in nature, not limited to the specific target that it’s particularly attacking. So if Israel annexes lands in Syria beyond the Golan Heights on the pretext of protecting the Druze in Syria, that is part of this larger strategic expansion of Israeli territory. That’s true in Lebanon too. So Israel is pursuing a region-wide policy, and that makes its war with Iran regional.

Second, Iran from the very beginning has said that any war by Israel and the United States on it would be regional. And it has in fact attacked 8 countries in response to this war. It’s even bombed part of Turkey, as well as Iraq and the GCC countries. So it’s not a surprise that Iran sees the solution to this war in a regional context. And that has to include an end to the war of aggression by Israel against Lebanon, and some recognition by Israel of frontiers.

In the end, Israel cannot have peace, and the region cannot have peace, as long as Israel has no frontiers, as long as it cannot define its borders. And it has no agreements with anyone on borders.

So I think Iran calculates that there is not going to be a negotiated resolution of this war — in terms of the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, which the Iranians are effectively exerting administrative control of — unless and until the United States does what it could do, which is pull the plug on supporting Israel and incapacitating Israeli aggression.

So I think the foreign minister of Oman, Bussaidiya, was entirely correct when he said that the source of instability in West Asia is not Iran, it’s Israel. And that realization is what is driving things toward the future — the independent security architecture free of great powers that I mentioned, the rapprochement between the Gulf Cooperation Council members and Iran, and the inclusion of Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan, and Syria as a requirement for any kind of peace.

This is realistic in the sense that it’s the only way you can have peace — by dealing with all of these issues together. It’s unrealistic in the sense that Israel is completely unwilling to address these issues, and the United States is thoroughly confused. But to the extent it knows what it’s doing, it is backing Israel.

Israel’s Political Fragmentation and Long-Term Sustainability

GLENN DIESEN: Well, let me ask a last question about the sustainability of what the Israelis are doing, because you mentioned before that if Netanyahu goes down, there seems to be a very broad consensus anyway around many of its key policies. But again, you can say the same in the United States in terms of a lot of its wars — you find consensus across the parties. Both the Democrats and the Republicans tend to support a lot of these wars.

But in Israel, irrespective of what they want, the political stability seems to be fragmenting, and this is going to impact its ability to carry out the policies as it wants. How much do you see this as being a problem? Because some people refer to this as stable but very divided. Others see it as becoming increasingly unstable. I’ve heard people arguing that they could move towards civil war. I haven’t seen this in the Israeli media. So how do you see this?

CHAS FREEMAN: Well, let me first say that as far as the United States is concerned, the American public is thoroughly against this war now. It has very little support, even from Republicans. The cult that Donald Trump leads continues to back him. But there’s been a vote in the House of Representatives to invoke the War Powers Act against him. I think, frankly, it’s a pretty pathetic effort. Because if you read the resolution, you’ll find that it says he should not be allowed to start a war except in defense of allies or partners. What’s a partner? Anything you want is a partner. So this is very weak.

Nonetheless, Donald Trump accused the Congress of being treasonous for having questioned him. Anyway, so that’s on the United States.

On Israel, I don’t know what’s going to happen. I think first, the main point I would make is that it’s a mistake to focus on Netanyahu. He’s not the cause. He’s the symptom. He may have been the helmsman on a ship sailing to a disaster, but if you remove him from the helm, others will continue on the same course — maybe worse. We see this from the members of his cabinet who openly espouse genocide, torture, ethnic cleansing, mass massacres, and inhumane treatment of people. Generally, anyone who is not a Jewish Israeli is apparently not worthy of protection.

So you have an apartheid system working within Israel proper, and you have military oppression — Nazi-style, basically — beyond the original borders of 1967 Israel.

I don’t know what will happen in Israel. I think Israel is in a position where it’s likely to be gradually depopulated, and more and more of those who would normally be the backbone of the Israeli state will leave. I suppose the ultra-orthodox, who refuse to defend Israel and whose theology denies that the state of Israel should exist — that is to say, they do not believe that Israel should be recreated until their Messiah arrives, which no one has been able to prove has happened — will remain.

I think we’re really looking at an existential challenge — not just to Iran from Israel, but to Israel from not just Iran, but its neighbors. Because as I said, in 78 years, Israel has never taken a diplomatic initiative on its own to make peace, to achieve peaceful coexistence with anyone. When it has entered peace agreements, this has been after bludgeoning by the United States — Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, maybe with Jordan. And it is now directly defiant of the United States.

Donald Trump says that there’s a ceasefire in Lebanon, and that Israel must not attack Dahiyeh, the suburb in southern Beirut which is the stronghold of Hezbollah. And of course, first of all, that does not answer the Iranian demand, or the Lebanese demand, that Israel not attack anyone in Lebanon. It’s a partial gesture. But Netanyahu, in calling off an attack on Dahiyeh, says everything else is going to go forward as planned. So to Donald Trump — shove it.

And that is why I believe that angry phone call happened. I also believe it was leaked for effect — for political effect — both to convince Iran that Donald Trump was actually doing something against Israel, and because the Israelis benefit by agitating the Zionist donors to Trump against him and putting pressure on him. So it was a public relations move in the end. But I think the reality is the tone of the conversation probably was almost as ugly as Barak Ravid — he is the Mossad agent who’s also a journalist for Axios — reported.

GLENN DIESEN: Yeah, I initially thought that perhaps it was theater, but then with Trump, the language used — “everyone hates Israel now” — and delegitimizing Netanyahu, a lot of this wouldn’t fit in with the usual, what you would expect. So there might be some credibility to a divide growing between the two.

Washington’s Dysfunction and the Limits of American Leadership

CHAS FREEMAN: Well, there’s a key point here, and that is notwithstanding the House vote for the War Powers Bill application, the United States is now dysfunctional on many levels — domestically and in foreign policy terms. Therefore, whatever happens in these contexts, whether it’s Gaza, Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, or here, is going to happen notwithstanding American ineptitude. You cannot look for leadership from Washington.

Wrapping Up

GLENN DIESEN: Well, on that note, we’ll wrap up the video. So yeah, thank you very much as always, my friend. I appreciate sharing your insights. It’s difficult to understand what’s happening at times. There’s too many actors, too many variables. So I appreciate you clearing up this. So thanks again.

CHAS FREEMAN: It was not a jubilant conversation, but thank you for engaging in it.

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