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Home » Friedrich Merz Remarks @ MSC 2026 (Transcript)

Friedrich Merz Remarks @ MSC 2026 (Transcript)

Editor’s Notes: In this powerful speech at the 2026 Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz outlines a strategic shift for Germany and Europe in an era of renewed great power competition. Merz explicitly rejects the “America First” isolationist trend, calling instead for a revived and more balanced transatlantic partnership where Europe takes greater responsibility for its own security. He proposes a four-point program for “European Self-Assertion,” which includes significant increases in defense spending, the strengthening of a sovereign European defense industry, and deeper integration with NATO allies. This address serves as a clarion call for democratic nations to stand united against revisionist threats and to defend the international rules-based order. (Feb 13, 2026

TRANSCRIPT:

Opening Remarks and Historical Context

FRIEDRICH MERZ: Dear Wolfgang Ischinger, dear Markus Söder, colleagues from different governments, parliaments, excellencies, guests, ladies and gentlemen, with only a few interruptions I’ve attended the Munich Security Conference for more than 30 years. The Munich Security Conference has always been a seismograph for the political situation. In the early years a seismograph for the relations between the United States and Europe. For many years it’s been a seismograph for the political state of the entire world.

In the early years I came here mainly to foster the relations with our American friends but also to meet new actors in foreign and security policy from many parts of the world. For several years also here in this room we’ve had an atmosphere marked by increasing tensions and conflicts in the world. And at the latest with the beginning of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine four years ago we have entered a new phase of open conflicts and wars that make us hold our breath and that change our world more comprehensively than we also we in this room would have thought possible for many years before.

Against this backdrop, Wolfgang Ischinger, it was important to me to open this conference today because we need to talk. This is more urgent than ever. Before we do that, allow me to thank Wolfgang Ischinger on behalf of the federal government for heading this conference once again this year. I may say this, Wolfgang, thank you very much for your great work, especially in this year.

The Collapse of International Order

You’ve chosen a grim motto for this conference, “under destruction.” And it probably means that the international order based on rights and rules is currently being destroyed. But I’m afraid we have to put it in even harsher terms. This order, as flawed as it has been even in its heyday, no longer exists. And we, Europe, well, Peter Sloterdijk wrote a few weeks ago that Europe had just returned from a vacation from world history.

Together, we’ve entered an era that, once again, is marked by power and big power politics very openly. First of all, we see Russia’s violent revisionism, its brutal war against Ukraine, against our political order, with daily cruel war crimes. But this is only the shrillest expression we see on a daily basis. We see other developments in the world as well that are different to what we in this room would have expected or discussed in the years before.

The Rise of China and Shifting Global Power

China wants to be a leader in shaping the world, and it has paved the ground for that over many years with strategic patience. In the foreseeable future, Beijing could be on an equal footing with the United States in military terms. China systematically uses dependencies of others, and it redefines the international order in its own favour. If there had been a unipolar moment after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a unipolar moment in history, it has long passed.

The United States’ claim to leadership has been challenged and possibly lost. The return to power politics, however, is not only rooted in the rivalry between great powers. Ladies and gentlemen, it is also a reflection of restless, agitated societies in times of revolutionary changes. It is an expression of a wish, also in many democratic states, a wish for strong leadership in a globalised world, in which especially democratic states are coming very close to the limits of their ability to act.

The New Rules of Big Power Politics

Big power politics, it seems, gives strong and easy answers, at least to the big players, and at least at a first glance. With disillusion, big power politics turns away from a world in which increasing connectivity translates into the rule of law and peaceful relations between states. Big power politics has its own rules. It is fast, harsh, and often unpredictable.

It fears own dependencies, but uses dependencies of others, and, if necessary, even exploits them. At the heart of this stands a battle for spheres of influence, dependencies, and deference. Natural resources, technologies, and supply chains are becoming bargaining tools in the zero-sum game of the major powers. This is a dangerous game, at first for the small players, but later on probably also for the big players.

And our friends in the United States are adapting to this at a fast pace. They have realised their own need to catch up in some areas with China, and they are drawing radical consequences in their national security strategy. They do that in their own way that does not slow down this trend, but rather accelerates it.

Europe’s Response and Germany’s Role

And we, the Europeans, too, are preparing for this new era. And we reach different conclusions than, for example, the administration in Washington. Our prime task as Europeans, and, of course, as Germans, too, is to accept this new reality today. It does not mean that we accept it as an inevitable fate. We are not at the mercy of this world.

We can shape it. And I have no doubt that we will preserve our interests and our values in this world if we step up together with determination, with confidence in our own strengths.