Trump Will Hit Iran After the Midterms w/ Ian Bremmer – One Decision (Transcript) 

He’s going to have a hard time in an environment where the Democrats are making a lot more headlines. They’re driving a lot more of the storyline because they can, because they’re in charge of the House and Senate.

It’s not going to lead to meaningful legal outcomes, not least because the attorney general is Trump’s former personal attorney. And so there is no independence of the AG of the Department of Justice anymore. That is a check and balance that is no longer meaningful on the sitting American president, which is a serious problem for the United States.

So, I mean, Trump will still be able to operate in an extralegal fashion, and he could engage in preemptive pardons, for example. And there’s nothing stopping him from doing that in the Constitution. And that undermines the American legal function and rule of law in the United States. But still, there are consequences of that. There is a reduction of political power that comes from that.

And of course, so many of these people, even if they’re given pardons, you can still have civil cases against Trump and family and Lutnick and family and Witkoff and family in many, many states that will tie them up and cost them legal fees and cost them money. And, you know, I wouldn’t be surprised if that leads to a more, again, significant egress of a lot of leaders. I suspect that will not persist for the next year.

And, you know, when you ask me about vindictiveness, pardon me, but my knee-jerk thought was you were going to ask me about Trump’s vindictiveness.

JOHN RAINE: Well, let’s go there.

IAN BREMMER: Because Trump is particularly vindictive about people from his own administration that then leave and start spilling the tea, which they will do. And so I think there’s going to be huge storylines about the folks that right now are insiders that suddenly decide that they have had enough and they start writing books and talking to you guys and all the rest. And Trump will be far angrier at them than he is at the Democrats.

The Future of the Republican Party

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: Taking your analysis, are we likely to see then a sort of flood away from MAGA towards the sort of Republicanism that someone of my generation would be more familiar with? Because there’s the whole issue of who could be a presidential candidate for the Republicans, and that would suggest that people start positioning themselves immediately after the midterms.

IAN BREMMER: I think a lot of Americans feel very differently about the political issues that exercise them. I think that what Trump ran on was actually quite popular, which is, you know, America first. It is no more global sheriff, no more forever wars, certainly not the presence in the Middle East, not the support for all of these countries and foreign aid. And these are things that Republicans of your generation, Richard, would have supported: a much tighter border security across the board and no free trade, and instead tariffs and subsidies and industrial policy.

And I think that those policies, together with a drain-the-swamp orientation of Trump when he ran, people liked those things. And then it turned out that with the exception of him being tight at the border, most of what he said he was going to do, he ended up not doing. You know, I mean, it was not just no draining the swamp, but enriching himself beyond the wildest dreams of anyone out there, and also being in the pocket of deep-moneyed interests in the private sector, which the Americans can’t stand. And it was not only no forever wars, he’s now started a war of choice in Iran, which is going on for, you know, coming up on a year, that’s costing Americans and everyone else around the world a lot of money.

So I think the question is, how does populism in the Republican Party remake itself? Is J.D. Vance… Tucker Carlson, some would argue, outside of Elon Musk, is the most important voice of right-wing populism among the grassroots in the United States. He said he’s left the Republican Party, but he still loves J.D. And he’s super anti-Israel. He’s super anti-Iran war. He’s super anti-corruption. He’s really focused on the Epstein files. I mean, is Vance going to try to pivot if Trump falls apart? He’s got Elon right on his side. That could be interesting.

And if that were to happen… because, I mean, if Vance is perceived as the Kamala Harris for Donald Trump, that’s not a winning solution. But if Vance can somehow become the real populist that isn’t corrupt, that isn’t focused on all the cash and is going to do what the average American person wants, he can get back to his Hillbilly Elegy J.D. Vance, which, I mean, I would be skeptical about, but I am not, you know, sort of a typical right or left-wing voter in the United States. In other words, I still think there’s a lot of space and momentum for that.

I think that the civilizationalism, which you saw in the National Security Strategy document written by Michael Anton back in December, which has really infused J.D. Vance’s speeches, the nativism, the American by creed as opposed to by citizenship, and the values and the culture which Elon has been a big adherent to, and which frankly, even Marco Rubio’s speech in Athens was, you know, one could argue a more palatable version of that, but absolutely was in that direction. I would argue that those directions are more likely than a return to a, say, Reagan-Bush Senior Republican conservatism. I don’t see that.

Is Trump a Temporary Phenomenon?

JOHN RAINE: This sounds a little bit like neo-Trumpism, which would in turn suggest that you see the center of gravity of American politics migrating to the right? Do you see that? And that’s something that’s been also said by way of comparison about Israeli politics. Or do you think that actually we may see it going in the other direction and that there’s a more familiar correction going to happen here? Because I think for a lot of outsiders trying to understand whether or not Trump is a temporary phenomenon followed by a reset, or the beginning of something which we’re just gonna have to get used to, I think that’s the big challenge.

IAN BREMMER: I think that Trump is a temporary phenomenon. I wouldn’t call it neo-Trumpism because I don’t think that Trump deserves a neologism. I think Trump is a unique animal. Remember, he used to be a Democrat before he was a Republican, and in reality, he doesn’t care about his political party, which is one of the reasons why the Republicans will lose in the midterms, because he has promoted loyalists to Trump over people that can actually win for the Republican Party.

Trumpism to me is a manifestation of a unique individual who displays levels of incompetence, authoritarian impulses, and personalized corruption that we’ve never seen before in any presidential candidate, Democrat or Republican, consistently putting himself over the interests of the American people, incredibly short-term and transactional. And I don’t believe that anyone that becomes president in 2029 will reflect that impulse. So neo-Trumpism is dead with Trump, in my view.

But I think that there is a strong nativist impulse for real right-wing populism in the United States. And I think that there is a strong impulse for economic populism and redistributionism on the progressive left. And I think that they will jettison some of the woke identity politics that have worked out badly for them. They will jettison some of the pro-immigration, “we don’t care if illegals come over in millions,” that have worked out badly for them.

But they are really anti-AI, really anti-data center, really anti-corruption, really anti-big money, deep pockets. That’s how you got Zohran Mamdani. They’re really anti-Israel, right? Like, why are the Americans spending billions of dollars on this advanced industrial democracy that actually has nuclear weapons and is killing a bunch of Palestinians? That’s the progressive left in America right now.

So I don’t know if there’s more energy on the progressive left or the progressive right. And I also don’t know what the actual candidates will be since there’s only going to be 2 in 2028. And whether one of them will end up being more centrist, not because America’s becoming more centrist, but because the candidate happens to be better, or because the math doesn’t math for the progressive because there are too many people in that lane, and in early states they knock each other down and the centrist ends up doing better, which is how you got Biden, by the way.

Remember, I mean, there was a lot more momentum for the progressives, but no one was breaking out, so they all came together, the centrists, and they said, okay, let’s make it a Biden win as opposed to Bernie Sanders, who otherwise is going to take us out. So I don’t know the answer to that because the American elections are, you know, a long-run affair and you’re going to have 25 Dems running.

And if I’m right that Trump implodes after the midterms — and I don’t have a lot of confidence in that call. I believe that will happen, but I don’t feel strongly about it. I have a lot of uncertainty. But if he implodes, then you could see 10, 15 Republican candidates in 2028, as opposed to a few munchkins and then whoever Trump wants. It might not be that.

And Ted Cruz at the Republican mini convention in Texas in the run-up to the midterms was creating a lot of space for Republicans in that non-Trump lane, saying, I’ve done a lot more for you guys than anybody on the Trump side. And I think there are a lot of people that don’t think that Ted’s going to get the nomination but see that this is a way to run.

So, you know, again, it really depends on how much Trump is crushed in the midterms, how much he overextends himself and is therefore undermining himself as a consequence of that. How much does he focus on things that don’t matter? I mean, when you look at his racist screed the other day against the Somalians, saying that 98% of Somali Americans are not in the labor force and they all drive Mercedes-Benzes, right? Maybe this is something that usually only the inside voice of Trump says, but him saying that in public shows he’s starting to lose his mental faculties.

And there are very few Republicans, House or Senate, that are comfortable with a president of the United States that is promoting that level of overt racism. That is not the future of the Republican Party, in my view. And so if that’s where he’s going for the next 2 years, like Grandpa Trump, who’s like, take away the frickin’ keys, right? Then I think you’re going to get a lot of Republicans running. I really do.

And it’s funny because, again, we’re still away from the midterms. I was recently at a meeting of the top CEOs in America. And I will tell you that privately, the antipathy that they are showing for what Trump is saying and what he presently represents, compared to even 6 months ago, is striking. I do think that there’s going to be some outrage of “what he’s doing right now does not represent me. This is beyond the pale.” I believe that.

Trump as Catalyst: “The Pitchforks Are Coming”

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: That’s a fascinating analysis. And looking into the States from the outside, one has this feeling that Trump is an aberration, but on the other hand, that he’s also been a political catalyst. So there’s this sort of balance between firing this extraordinary political change towards the populism you are describing, and, let’s say, the lack of anchors in the Democratic Party.

And at the same time, there are people who are very familiar with the United States like myself, who look at Trump and think, this isn’t America. It has very little to do with what most of us who have close friends and are familiar with American society are about. But he has been the agent for this extraordinary sort of shift in the whole nature of American politics. I mean, I find this, you know, quite a confusing analysis because you have to balance these 2 views.

IAN BREMMER: I don’t know. I mean, when I look at Nigel Farage, he doesn’t strike me as what I think of as the UK, or Jeremy Corbyn. Although, you know, I’ve been to football matches, so I’ve seen that side of the UK. I know it exists. I know that not everyone is Eton educated, right? I mean, I’m much more comfortable with Rishi Sunak, certainly.

I think that these things all exist. The United States has historically been a melting pot, but over the past decades, a lot of the people in the US who willingly supported that idea felt like they were forgotten. And instead, America today, to the extent that America stands for something, I think a lot of American elites stand for money.

And if America no longer has its core values among its leaders, who are instead just trying to enrich themselves, and if you go to an American bar and they say, what do you do? And “what do you do” really means how much money do you make and how much status do you have? If that’s what it means to be American today, I think a lot of young people say, I reject that. That is not the American dream that I’ve been promised. And I want these guys out. And I am willing to vote for someone that is going to put a knife to these guys.

The pitchforks are coming. And Trump was a pitchfork. And Tucker Carlson’s a pitchfork. And Marjorie Taylor Greene and J.D. Vance are pitchforks. But so is AOC. And so is Zohran Mamdani. And there are going to be a lot more of those.

So, you know, the fact that 70% of Americans say they’re fearful of AI, for me, that doesn’t make me feel like America’s going down the tubes. For me, that is a necessary correction. If 70% of Americans are saying we don’t believe the American dream applies anymore, but we want it to, and we’re prepared to vote the bums out so that we have a chance for ourselves and our kids, I think that’s ultimately a hopeful message.

I don’t think 70% of Americans suddenly hate technology. I think 70% of Americans mistrust that the leaders — the business leaders, the media leaders, the university leaders, and most important, the political leaders — will use that technology in ways that will benefit the average American. And I think that they are correct in that assessment. So for me, that’s a hopeful thing.

If the American political system has become coin-operated and short-term, as we see with the way that we address climate change, as we see with the way we address the deficit, as we see with the way we address technology, social media, and the rest, then there should be a response from young people who are saying, what the hell is wrong with all of these geriatric assholes that are refusing to care about the next generation? And okay, it’s more obvious in France because they have a culture of let’s all go out and demonstrate every weekend. But it’s happening in the US too. It doesn’t make me hopeless. It doesn’t make me feel unmoored.

Look, maybe part of this is because I grew up in the projects. And my mom did not finish high school. And my dad died when I was 4, and he was an enlisted man. And my mom never would have voted for any of these establishment people. And she read the National Enquirer on the weekends that she picked up in the local Stop & Shop, the supermarket. And she wasn’t educated, but she fundamentally understood that these political leaders were never going to help her raise her children. And she was correct in that assessment.

The fact that there are far more Americans that now have gotten that math, I think should not make us hopeless, because ultimately my mother created me and my brother, and I think a lot of these people that are voting outrage right now are going to create some great kids. I really do.

Democrats and Trump’s Foreign Policy Legacy

JOHN RAINE: And what do you think the priorities will be for the Democrats? Let’s assume they have something of a blue wave, at least in the House of Representatives. They have talked about having an aggressive 100-day policy with some immediate domestic and geopolitical requirements. But what do you think in terms of Trump’s geopolitical legacy? Do you think they might now try to overturn or reshape it?

IAN BREMMER: It’s hard to overturn foreign policy as the Congress. Now, there’s going to be an awful lot of investigations into Trump corruption, and a lot of Trump’s foreign policy has been pay for play. It has been monetizing the presidency. So to the extent that that gets a lot more scrutiny and pushback, that will have geopolitical implications.

There’s also the power of the purse that comes from Congress. And as much as Trump has been taking a more pro-Putin perspective on the war in Ukraine, I think that a Democrat-led Congress is not going to be interested in passing a budget for the DOD unless support for Ukraine continues to flow, intelligence for Ukraine continues to flow. So that’s meaningful in my view.

But overall, in terms of the disruption that comes from, you know, an ongoing war in Iran, I’m not sure that that can change much just because Democrats are in the House and Senate. I think his willingness to engage short-term constructively, long-term perhaps destructively, with the Chinese leadership is not going to change because the Democrats are in power.

And I think that the lack of personal trust that so many allies around the world have in Trump clearly persists as long as Trump remains in office. Again, he’s quite old. He’s 80. He’s losing mental, you know, coherence. I wish that weren’t true. It is clearly true from talking to many world leaders that have been sitting down with Trump over the past few weeks. And we saw how that affected the way the world looked at the United States at the end of the Biden administration. I think that that is absolutely going to happen with Trump as well.

The Iran War: Best and Worst Cases

JOHN RAINE: Absolutely fascinating insights into what’s going on deep inside the US. I wonder if I could try to just turn your gaze now back to Iran. And the reason is because I think—

IAN BREMMER: Something completely different. Yes. Okay. No problem.

JOHN RAINE: It might be refreshing to turn away from the US. But also because, Ian, I think so many people feel that this is the most macroeconomically sensitive global conflict at the moment. And it’s the one where people, most desperately inside the US and outside, want to find at least some sign of progress that we can get back to more normal business and oil flows. So what do you think the best thing is that we could hope for in the Gulf conflict as a result of both the midterms and some of those scenarios that you’ve sketched as to how the post-Trump politics, or the politics of Trump’s declining years, plays out? What’s the best we can hope for? What might it look like?

IAN BREMMER: Well, look, this is an incredibly stupid, you know, own goal by the Americans. The antecedent, of course, was Trump unilaterally pulling out of the JCPOA, the Iranian nuclear deal, which was functioning perfectly well according to America’s core allies and members of Trump’s own cabinet in his first term. But because it was Obama’s, it was unacceptable to him.

And then he decided on the back of the war in Venezuela, the removal of Maduro, the military intervention, that he could do it again in Iran. Turns out, shockingly, Iran is not Venezuela. Trump did not know that. I think he’s now sort of learned that lesson. But so here we are, 8 months in, and enormous economic costs and enormous human costs in Iran and across the Gulf as a consequence of all of this, completely on Trump and the Israelis.

So what’s the best scenario? I mean, the best scenario would’ve been for him to have recognized that early, declare victory and get the hell out. A little late for that, but that’s still the best scenario.

The best scenario that is likely is that after the midterms, he engages in some additional strikes to show that he can, including on some of the ballistic missiles that have been stockpiled and dug out, and drone stockpiles, and maybe some of the nuclear targets like Pickaxe Mountain. And he probably launches off a mother of all bombs, or 5, because he seems to be personally quite taken with that, as I’ve heard from members inside the White House.

But these are military targets. There’s not a lot of critical infrastructure. There are not a lot of civilian casualties and no assassinations. The Iranians respond with something, but limited. And then Trump declares victory and the Gulf states do their own individual deals with the Iranians that give them some money but ensure safe passage through the Gulf. And we start to rebuild supply chains and prices start coming down again. Not food, because we lost an entire year of fertilizer and crops, but plastics, you know, sort of petrochem, oil, gas, helium, all of that. That’s probably the best plausible outcome over the next, say, 3 to 6 months at this point.

JOHN RAINE: And short of that, at the other end of the spectrum, could it just continue to be an unstable, volatile arrangement with long-term damage to Gulf confidence?

IAN BREMMER: Well, the worst scenario is that Trump decides to go bigger and hits critical infrastructure after the midterms, and does act, as Richard suggested, in a more unhinged and uncontrolled fashion, and that the Iranians in response to that go gloves off on the Gulf allies, which they have not done heretofore, and hit not just energy infrastructure, so prices go way up, but all in an environment where the Chinese are picking up demand and stockpiles are considerably thinner. So we could be looking at 150, 200.

And you also see them hitting civilian targets and desalination plants, and millions flee the Gulf. That is a horrible, horrible outcome. That’s a massive global recession, which we are not in right now.

Now, it happens under Trump. So the reaction to that is that the Democrats are much more likely to win in 2028 and that his precipitous decline in the United States becomes much more immediate. So, I mean, there is an action-reaction function, but nobody should be wishing for this outcome, right? This would be a horrible, horrible outcome.

I don’t think it’s likely. I think that Trump is actually much more contained because he understands. That’s why he doesn’t send ground troops. Remember, he’s threatened that. He’s threatened taking the oil, Kharg Island. He’s threatened ending the civilization of Iran. He hasn’t actually, even internally in his meetings, really pressed for any of those things. And that implies that he understands that there’s no fist in his glove, kind of like after the Chinese hit him back.

Trump can throw a punch, but he has a glass jaw. And it’s a fairly consistent political impulse on his part. When he’s facing someone who is actually tough and has the capacity to hit, he backs down. He backs down. And we see it whether it’s with Putin or Xi Jinping or whether it’s with the Iranians. And so, ultimately, I think that matters.

Even Elon Musk — I mean, it’d be harder to find a Republican insider that has hugged the third rail with a tighter embrace than Elon. I mean, after blowing up with DOGE, remember that? And then he said that Trump was all over the Epstein files, implying that Trump was a pedophile, and then said he was going to start and fund his own third party. And yet, you know, months later he’s back in the White House. Why? Well, because he’s a lot richer than Trump and he’s got a lot of social media presence and he owns X. It turns out that really matters to Trump. So you can get away with a lot with the American president if it turns out that he thinks you’re more powerful than he is, right? And that really matters.

JOHN RAINE: Well, the Iranians and their allies are doing a good job of showing they can still pack a punch. So I think there’s a lot in that, Ian.

IAN BREMMER: That is the issue.

Ukraine, Putin and Zelensky

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: That could take us on to Ukraine, I think. We talked about the most economically sensitive conflict, and I guess if you’re in Europe, the most strategically sensitive conflict is the war in Ukraine and the extraordinary behavior of Trump in terms of his apparent sympathy towards Putin. And I think this is the area in which most Europeans really do part company completely with Trump.

Latest statistics indicate the Russians may be losing up to 38,000 a month, unsustainable in terms of boots on the ground, but at the same time blasting the critical infrastructure of Ukraine in the hope that, you know, the will of the population will collapse, which, if you’ve been in Ukraine, seems to me highly unlikely. So how do you explain, A, Trump’s attitude towards Putin, and B, where do you think this might end up post-midterms? Are we going to see an adjustment because of a Democratic Congress and Senate?

IAN BREMMER: It’s more about Trump’s view on Zelensky. And, you know, Trump sees Zelensky as responsible for his impeachment in his first term. So he really doesn’t like Zelensky. By the way, Biden didn’t like Zelensky either.

I mean, Biden described Zelensky to me as “a piece of work.” When Zelensky first met Biden as president, he basically said, it’s because of you that the Ukrainians couldn’t get into NATO. And Biden’s like, what are you talking about? And he is like, well, no, I know that if you supported it, the Europeans would go ahead. And I mean, first of all, the fact that little Zelensky was talking to the president of the United States that way was very off-putting, right? And Biden was a massive Atlanticist and really supportive of the transatlantic alliance and relationship, but really didn’t like Zelensky.

So, I mean, the fact is Zelensky is an incredibly courageous leader, but also can be emotional and can be hotheaded, and is willing to give pretty hard against any foreign leader in service of what he wants. That has rubbed Trump the wrong way. And so Trump is more than willing to throw Zelensky under the bus, as we saw a year ago after they had met at the White House, when he threw him out without lunch and suspended intelligence.

So what we see happening now is Trump much less popular, with an economy that’s doing very badly, about to get destroyed in the midterms. And he’s trying to find anyone to blame because it can’t be Trump. And so Zelensky is part of that blame because he wanted Zelensky to stop hitting the refineries. And he said that privately to Zelensky. He said it publicly to Zelensky, and Zelensky refused. So Trump said, fine, screw you, I’m done. And that’s it. That’s where we are.

And Trump has always, again, been more willing to engage with authoritarians that are strong. And Putin is a stronger authoritarian with no significant internal opposition that matters, despite the unsustainability of the casualties from a Western perspective.

I don’t think that Trump is a Putin agent. I don’t think that there is any intelligence that Putin has on Trump. It’s Occam’s razor for me. You don’t need that explanation to explain why Trump would rather just do a deal with a stronger Putin, who also could help enrich Trump if the business could get turned on — enrich Trump and his family and others around Trump’s orbit who have been trying to get deals done in the Arctic and on Nord Stream 2 and a bunch of other areas.

I think that that’s all you need to explain the behavior, as long as you understand that Trump doesn’t care how much territory Ukraine loses. Trump wants the war over. He doesn’t care who’s responsible for the war. He doesn’t care that the Russians initially invaded. It doesn’t bother him in the slightest. He is in disagreement with almost every European — not every, but almost every European — on that issue. He’s much closer to Gerhard Schröder than he is to any existing European leader.

And I think if we treat him as Gerhard Schröder, we understand the transactionalism: this is about money, this is about me, this is about me being able to solve a war that I promised I was going to solve. And here we are, 5 years into this war, and it’s still not solved, and that makes me look bad. So I need the war over. It’s much easier for me to beat on the Ukrainians. And let’s face it, Trump will be much more likely to say the war is over if he forces the Ukrainians to surrender. It’s the easiest way for him.

It’s not like the transatlantic relationship matters to Trump. It doesn’t. I mean, the criticism of Biden, especially in the early days, was that Biden was not giving a lot of military support to Zelensky. He was very reluctant to do so. And one of the reasons for that is because Ukraine didn’t matter that much to Biden. What mattered to Biden was the European relationship. And so he wanted to make sure that the Europeans and the Americans were in lockstep every morning.

And if that meant that the Germans were a little bit more cautious than the French, for example, then that meant you were going to take a lower common denominator to keep that European-American relationship intact. And if that meant the Americans were going to go slower, they were going to go slower. That was fine because Ukraine did not matter that much.

And what’s truly interesting about Trump is he’s the first American president for whom Europe actually doesn’t matter. The only thing that matters is me getting credit for ending the war.

The One Decision

JOHN RAINE: So we’re going to ask you the question that we ask all our guests, which is, what is the one decision coming up that you’re going to be watching closely? I realize we’ve got a huge event coming up in the midterms next week. What would be the one decision that you’re watching?

IAN BREMMER: I want to see, when there is real pressure on AI valuations in the coming months, when suddenly it looks much harder for the AI leaders, to what extent do they work together, and to what extent do the long knives against each other start coming out? That’s the decision that I am most interested in. Or should I say the series of four decisions: Sam, Zuck, Dario, and Elon. That’s what I’m watching most closely.

JOHN RAINE: Ian, thank you. That’s the power perhaps we should all be watching. That was fascinating. Ian Bremmer, thank you very much indeed.

IAN BREMMER: My pleasure, John. Richard, really enjoyed joining you.

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: Excellent.

Reflections from the Hosts

JOHN RAINE: Well, Richard, I found that a really bracing appraisal of what’s going on inside the U.S. and indeed what might go on after the midterms. What was it that struck you?

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: Well, I guess what struck me was the profound cynicism of his analysis of Trump — if you can call Trump a statesman; maybe we shouldn’t even use that phrase — Trump as president of the United States. The cynicism of his analysis of Trump’s motivations, if you are non-American and not, as it were, thoroughly engaged in Washington politics, is pretty terrifying.

I personally, as a non-American, would never go that far, because one doesn’t have enough of an inside picture. Ian presumably does talk to a lot of people in DC around the president, whether they’re in the administration or not. That I found fascinating, but actually thoroughly depressing as someone who is quite an admirer of the United States as a country and as a civilization.

I’ve spent a lot of time there. I went to school there. I’ve served there. I’ve been there privately. I’ve got lots of American friends. A lot of my life is tied up in things I do in the United States, and I’m a big admirer of the country overall. And to hear him talk about the country being in the hands of a personality like that — and a lot of it was about Trump’s personality and behavior — is thoroughly depressing. Even if he’s only half right, I’m still thoroughly depressed. But what did you feel, John?

JOHN RAINE: I share some of that depression. I thought the cynicism, the callousness that he attributes to Trump is really disturbing. It opens onto a complete mismatch of interests, objectives, and values between Trump and Europe.

I also found fascinating, but equally unsettling, his views on how the populist Republican right might reinvent itself — that so much territory of the populist agenda has not yet been satisfied. It’s still out there, and that might stay with us for a while. Not, as he said categorically, in a neo-Trumpian way, but nonetheless in a way that perpetuates a lot of the traits of right-of-center US thinking under Trump. So that sort of medium-term look at what US politics might be, I thought was both very realistic and quite something for Europeans at least to get their heads around.

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: Yes, I agree. I’m not sure I agreed with him about Vance, because I think Vance has a track record which shows he can blow with the political wind. And I’m sure he has ambitions to be the Republican candidate. The question is, would he be a thoroughly populist candidate, as Ian was suggesting, or would he incline more to — maybe it’s wrong to say the Republican center, but something which would be more recognizable as traditional Republicanism?

The other thing I disagreed with Ian about was when he said, if you’re talking to an American in a bar and they ask what do you do, the real question is how much money are you making. I think that shows quite a cynicism in his analysis of his fellow countrymen. I do actually have a higher opinion of Americans than that, a significantly higher opinion. There is a civic morality about the United States, which I’ve certainly experienced personally, which I think is much stronger than Ian Bremmer was suggesting. I just don’t think that all Americans are worried only about making a fortune.

But okay, his political commentary was hugely interesting, hugely entertaining, hugely depressing, and obviously hits a lot of bullseyes. So I don’t part company with him entirely.

JOHN RAINE: Talking of Americans in bars, I was in a bar with a lot of young Americans who were studying in the UK, and they were full of civic engagement and responsibility — you put it so well, civic morality. They were also getting steadily full of Scottish beer at the time, but it was a very heartening insight into the next generation. And you and I were talking about these generational movements that are occurring all over Europe at the moment. You wonder whether there won’t be something of that in the US too.

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE: Yeah. And maybe it will assert itself. And maybe the Democratic Socialists of America, whatever they call themselves, are pretty disconcerting given the nature of American politics and the fact that you haven’t really had a viable socialist party of any consequence. And suddenly you have this movement. But I just wonder whether it’s more about civic responsibility than it is about left-wing politics.

And the one thing that has always impressed me about the United States, which he ignores in his analysis, is the strength and integration of local government and local communities. If you are at the level of the township in America and you live in an American town, the way it’s run — okay, there will be disagreements and there will be problems, but overall it’s a pretty impressive way of conducting day-to-day life. You sometimes forget about that when we’re talking about Washington, D.C.

JOHN RAINE: Yeah, it’s true, you can. And indeed, at the midterms, it’s not just members of Congress that are being elected. As ever in the US, there’s a very long list of other officials who’ll be elected. So the democratic habit goes deep.

Richard, thank you very much. That’s all for this episode. Please do join us every Thursday for new episodes. Subscribe to One Decision so you never miss out on a conversation. And leave us a comment on YouTube, email us at hello@onedecision.com, and do check out onedecision.com for commentaries and explainers that you might have missed. I’m John Raine. Thank you for listening.

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