Seyed M. Marandi: Houthis Expanding Fast & Iran Set to Escalate Big (Transcript)

And then we have the attacks on Saudi oil installations and oil facilities, added to the defeats on the ground and to what’s going on in the Strait of Hormuz.

But as I was saying before on your show, in my opinion, while Trump will continue to try to strangle the Iranian people — and I gave the example of the little boy — to strangle the Iranian people, to bring them to their knees, what he’s also doing effectively through this policy and the policy of his regional allies like Mohammed bin Salman, is that he is strangling the economies of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. And that could lead to instability and it could undermine these regimes altogether.

During the war, you recall, I would say that if Iran’s critical infrastructure is attacked by Trump or Netanyahu, Iran will destroy the critical infrastructure of these regimes, and that would bring about their collapse. And I said that on multiple occasions, every time it seemed like Trump may be going in that direction. Well, this policy ultimately can lead to the same result. Perhaps in a slower way, but often these crises, they grow slowly and then suddenly things explode.

So I don’t believe Iran will fall at all, but I do believe that the chances are good that the countries in the Persian Gulf will begin to grow unstable depending on how long this lasts and how bad things get. Because they’re completely dependent on oil and gas and none of them, as far as I can tell, have any public legitimacy. They are family dictatorships. And so if things grow bad, it’s unclear how many people will stay loyal to the ruling class.

And if that happens, then we have an even much bigger crisis because then there will be no oil and gas coming from these regimes, whether their assets are completely destroyed or not, because there will be instability in the countries.

The Escalation Cycle

So we are living in very, very dangerous times. Anything can happen. And usually when you have escalation, the chances for even further escalation grow. Because the tensions are high, people become more desperate, governments are humiliated, they feel defeated, so they feel they have to do something, they have to react, and then they do something foolish.

So for example, Bessent will probably intensify the sanctions on Iran in the coming days as revenge. And then what will Iran do? It will do the same thing in return. It will tighten the screw on the Strait of Hormuz. And then it could go further. They could start striking U.S. banks in the Persian Gulf region. It could bomb U.S. business assets in the Persian Gulf region, or assets that are affiliated to the United States — oil and gas — because Iran can’t sanction the Americans. They don’t have the ability to do so, they’ll take their revenge by military means. And then the Americans would feel that they have to respond, even though they’re the ones who started this whole cycle. So I think it’s most probable that things will increasingly get worse for the time being.

The Houthis’ Strategic Gains and the Interconnected Wars

GLENN DIESEN (00:12:28 – 00:15:21): It’s interesting what you said about all these wars being interconnected, because if you take a step back, the war against both Russia and Iran obviously has the intention of restoring the global primacy of the United States. But also on a more micro scale, when you see the Gulf states and the US now struggling and being weakened, you have the possibility of Israel re-engaging in the war against Iran. And I think this is probably one of the reasons why Iran is softening the targets in Jordan in case a bigger war breaks out between Israel and Iran again.

But when you see Iran targeting Jordan in this way, the whole sky was just lit up with all these interceptive missiles. And all of these missiles is essentially what Zelensky is begging for, so he can continue the war with Russia. I mean, you can’t really make it up how they’re all joined at the hip here.

But regarding the recent developments of Ansar Allah, or the Houthis as we call them in the West — only the past few days they had some pretty significant successes. That is the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia. I mean, this carries a significant portion of the world’s oil. And this had to be shut down after it was set on fire by an attack by the Houthis. And also you see this territorial conquest moving south along the Red Sea and also seizing this island, Perim Island, or the Arabs call it Mayun Island. And this allows them to choke off very efficiently — well, we haven’t seen it in action yet — but choke off the strait there going into the Red Sea.

What is the wider significance? Because you would think if this has a real prospect of strangling the Saudi economy, not only would Saudi Arabia go in, but the US would also go in. I thought if the US can’t invade Iran, then perhaps they could use ground force against Yemen. But the Saudis asked the US to help them strike Yemen, to slow down or stop their advances. And indeed, over the past 2 or 3 days, they’ve attacked them — I think like 130, 150 airstrikes against Yemen from the Saudi side. But Trump reportedly declined, if he’s not just delaying. But what cards do you see the Houthis having to play here? And how could the Saudis and the US respond?

Houthis’ Expanding Control and the Stranglehold on Western Economies

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:15:24 – 00:23:32): I was listening to this American analyst speaking about Trump’s objectives in Iran, and he was saying Trump is looking — he said, well, he was saying that Trump from the beginning knew that these economic problems would be created and he doesn’t care about the midterm elections. And he’s working to overthrow Iran during the last few years of his presidency. And he was saying that what the objective is, is to starve Iran, to bring the Iranian people to their knees. People will revolt and then bring about a normal government.

And I was thinking to myself that this person — he’s basically saying that he and Trump, because he seemed to be supporting this, he and Trump and the Trump regime, they are the ones who are abnormal, who would even pretend that to bring about normality, you’d have to strangle people to death. But again, that just shows the mentality of a significant segment of American society and the overwhelming majority of the elites in the United States.

But the problem is, regardless of the morality and/or immorality of all this, is that what has happened in Yemen has created an enormous potential to do the same thing, or it has enhanced the potential to do the same thing to the US economy and Western economies. Yemen, the Yemeni Armed Forces and Ansarullah, they’ve made huge gains in the south, stunning gains. About 5,400 square kilometers were liberated in, I guess, less than 48 hours, if I’m not mistaken. And the Saudi forces collapsed, which people should be asking themselves, how could this happen when the Saudis, when their troops are much better funded, when they have much higher salaries, when they have much better equipment, where they have air support, where they have everything. And Ansarullah and the Yemeni Armed Forces, they have very low wages. They don’t have that sort of weapon systems.

The reason is that Ansarullah is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people of Yemen, especially after the support that the Yemeni Armed Forces led by Ansarullah and the Yemeni government gave to Gaza. Where they blocked the Red Sea to the Israeli regime in order to stop the genocide, in order to put pressure on the regime to end the genocide in Gaza. And that made them heroes across the Arab world. For years, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya and all the media outlets owned by these despots were telling people how awful Ansarullah is. And a lot of people probably believed the propaganda.

But then when it turned out that all of these regimes — they’re all doing business as usual, transporting oil, importing gas, sending goods, having secret meetings and all that — all these regimes were on the side of the West. And of course they were allowing the Israelis to continue genocide. Ansarullah was standing up for the Palestinians despite all the hardship that they had gone through. And they actually made an impact, and it caused the Americans to come to the region to destroy them. It caused a war. And the Qataris, the Emiratis, the Saudis all helped the Americans. They used their bases and these countries were used to bomb Yemen, just like Iran. So they became heroes across the region all of a sudden.

And so in Yemen, you can imagine those forces that are being paid by the Saudis, they’re saying to themselves, “I am fighting for despots who are with Trump against people who fought to save Palestine.” That does not help with morale. And that doesn’t create an incentive to fight. And so despite all their equipment, they just collapse because people don’t want to be seen as fighting against those who’ve sacrificed for the Palestinian people.

Ansarullah’s Expanding Control Over the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia’s Vulnerabilities

So with this sudden collapse, now the Yemeni Armed Forces have control over the entire Red Sea. Now they’re also moving towards Taiz and moving inwards and moving to control literally everything that needs to be controlled. But the Red Sea now is going to be much more problematic for the United States because from the Bab el-Mandeb itself, which is easier to control than the Strait of Hormuz, significantly easier to control, all the way up to where they were before is all under the control of Ansarullah. So getting ships through safely without their consent becomes almost impossible, or very difficult or highly unlikely.

And then you also have to take into account that there are some striking similarities between Yemen and Iran, not just the strait itself, but the Yemeni side is mountainous. And that makes it much easier for Yemen to have assets — the Yemeni Armed Forces to have assets put in place to strike ships or to strike the enemy and to be protected at the same time. These mountains do help the Yemeni Armed Forces a great deal when it comes to dealing with Americans or any other adversary.

So now you have the Bab el-Mandeb and you have the Strait of Hormuz, both controlled by allies. And then you have Saudi oil assets being attacked every day by Yemen in retaliation to the airstrikes being carried out against Yemen. So one day the pipeline, the East-West pipeline, is badly damaged. Right now it’s not functioning. Oil is not passing through that pipeline. During the last few months, between 3 to 4.5 million barrels a day would go through that pipeline, which is very important under these circumstances. So that’s not happening. And then they also bomb refineries. They bomb other oil facilities across Saudi Arabia.

So the damage that’s being done to the Saudis every day is enormous and is coming at a time when the Saudis are already in deep trouble because of the war that they joined with Americans and Israelis against Iran. So while they want to strangle Iran and the hope is to crush Iran, now Iran and its allies have a much better hold over the neck of the economies of its adversaries.

Glenn Diesen on Houthi Escalation and the Land War Question

GLENN DIESEN (00:23:35 – 00:25:39): Well, I’m just thinking what possibly the Houthis might do. As you said, it’s very hard to — well, once you escalate, it’s easier to further escalate as the situation destabilizes. Obviously, along the Red Sea, we see now the ability to put a blockade on the Saudis. I assume that will remain in place until the Saudis lift their blockade on Yemen. And so again, it is significant though, that as you said, how everything fell so quickly, because people assume that after more than a decade of this — strikes and attacks and blockade and, well, a genocidal war against Yemen — that they would be ready to fall apart. But the way you see instead, the Houthis now just plowing over all these territories with very little resistance, it is — yeah, something is also due to escalate now because we can assume the desperation now, especially in Saudi Arabia, but also in Washington, as the entire strategic situation is now falling apart.

But I guess my question was, we know they can put a blockade on Saudi Arabia, they can bring immense pain to the US by shutting down the Red Sea, but what are the possibilities in terms of a land war though? Because if you ignore the big foreign population in Saudi Arabia, Yemen has twice the population. And as you said, the terrain is also favoring them. Do you see intensification of drone strikes against energy facilities, or do you think an actual fight is moving in physically into Saudi territory? I mean, what are possible steps up that escalation ladder?

Marandi on Ansarullah’s Strategy: Liberation, Political Deals, and Economic Pressure

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:25:41 – 00:31:01): I can’t say obviously for certain, but I think that what they will continue to do is liberate different areas in Yemen. They already control — even before this latest chapter, they already — like 75, 70 to 80% of the people of Yemen lived in territories that were under the authority of Ansarullah and the Yemeni government. So when people look at the map and see that before this liberation, the recent liberation, when they look and see that Ansarullah only holds like a segment of Yemen, or they say that it’s controlling like — I don’t know, 30% or whatever of Yemen — that’s very misleading because much of Yemen is desert to the east and there’s no one there. Very few people live there. And there are areas where no one lives. And the most important part of Yemen are those areas that they control. And of course, Sana’a, the capital, is in that territory. And that area is mountainous.

So after the operations that we’ve seen and their expansion into the remaining territories, they’re going to have, let’s say, control over almost all of the population except for some parts in the south. And I don’t think — again, I’m guessing — I don’t think they’re going to assault Aden. I think they’re going to do political deals with the south. The south is very fragmented, and the Saudis and the Emiratis fought over the south even though they were allies. So I think what Ansarullah and the Yemeni army and the government will do is that they will liberate the rest of the territories and then do political deals with the south.

After that, I don’t think they’re going to enter Saudi Arabia. I don’t think that’s their objective. They have what they need to put pressure on Saudi Arabia right now, and that is the capability to bomb their oil and gas installations. And they’ve said that they have 2 demands from Saudi Arabia. One is to end the siege, which is directed at ordinary people and it’s a crime against humanity. And the second is to stop interfering in Yemen. And so as long as this continues, then the situation is going to remain difficult for Saudi Arabia.

And in my opinion, it’s not sustainable forever because Saudi Arabia is very dependent on oil, just like the other countries, the Arab family-controlled countries in the Persian Gulf. And without oil or without enough oil, they cannot survive forever. They are probably going to have to start selling — I’m sure they already have been selling — many assets that they have in the West, stocks and bonds, and withdraw money from their accounts and sell assets. But I’m not sure if they’ll be allowed to do that for long because that will be very dangerous for the US economy under these circumstances. We all know of the concerns that exist over the Japanese yen and the fact that the Japanese government is selling or thinking about selling a large quantity of their assets in the bond market. So these Arab countries are no longer sending money to the United States, their excess money. They’ll have to sell assets and bring them home. I don’t know if the Americans will let them do that for long.

So Saudi Arabia is going to remain in a very difficult position until it listens. And if it continues to bomb Yemen, as it is doing right now, then Yemen is just going to fire more missiles and drones into their military bases, but also they’ll destroy their economic infrastructure. And since their economic infrastructure is basically founded upon oil, that’s what they’re going to strike. And again, just as we all know this — and I’m being repetitive, but it’s important — the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is not good for Saudi Arabia, but this is their only option. And it’s a large country. And their expenditures are high. And they’ve already wasted hundreds of billions of dollars on the genocidal war in Yemen over the past few years. And they’ve spent a lot of money on megaprojects. And all of those have reached a dead end like The Line and the others. So it’s not as if the Saudis have infinite money. And it’s not clear if the Americans will allow the Saudis to withdraw that money.

The Misleading Western Portrayal of Yemen’s Political Landscape

GLENN DIESEN (00:31:05 – 00:32:01): About deceptive ways, though, that Yemen is portrayed is — we often have, at least in the Western media, the competition within Yemen is between the Houthis or Ansar Allah on one side and the government on the other. But the capital is controlled by the Houthis, and the majority of the population — I think 65 or 75% of the population — live under Houthi-controlled territories. So when would you — I know, international recognition and all of this, but nonetheless, at some point, it doesn’t paint a clear picture of what exactly is happening within that country as it is, controlled mostly now by the Houthis. But I — sorry, it looked like you wanted to say something.

The “Houthi Rebels” Myth and Western Media Narratives

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:32:02 – 00:36:03): No, no, I was just laughing because they always say the “Houthi rebels” as if they’re like in the mountains somewhere hiding or they’re in some jungle or in the forest and that the central government is doing business as usual and they have to do counterinsurgency operations. That’s how Western media says it because Western media is completely a part of the state. It’s not independent. Over the last few years it’s become more openly so. It’s becoming increasingly like Soviet media back in the day.

So you would think that when Western media says “the government,” they’re talking about the government in the capital. It’s like, you know, Oslo, or like any other major city when you think that that’s being controlled by the people who the West says is the government. But the reality is that the so-called internationally recognized government is not the government. It’s just based in Riyadh, it’s based in Saudi Arabia. The only reason why it’s called the internationally recognized government is because the Saudis and the Emiratis and the Kuwaitis and the Qataris and all the wealthy regimes — they backed the genocidal war in 2015, and because of their economic clout, they were able to get a UN resolution and basically force this narrative that this government, which is not in control of the country, is the legitimate government.

That’s why the discussions over Yemen are often confusing, because when I say “the government,” some people are thinking about those who are being backed by the Saudis. But for me, the government is the entity that controls the capital and controls, let’s say, well, I think by now it’s probably closer to 80% of the population. And most of the territory that is livable, the water, which has water resources and so on. Again, the desert is not all that important unless it’s for pipelines or for roads or other things.

So this myth that they’ve created about these “Houthi rebels” — and it’s not even the Houthis either. If you look at Ansarullah, it is far larger than the Houthis. It has enormous popular support. And that’s why they win wars. That’s why they win the war against a far more powerful entity, which has complete support from the West. You have thousands of British military advisors helping the Saudi government bomb schools — I mean, they’ve been carrying out the genocide for many years. But with the full help of British nationals, American nationals, Australians, Canadians, and so on. And of course the other countries in the Persian Gulf were with them.

Despite all that, they failed. That shows that not only do they have popular legitimacy, but they hold the territory — the territory that’s of most value — and most of the population is there. So, you know, what is it they say? “When it looks like a duck, it walks like a duck, it sounds like a duck, it is a duck.” If it looks like a government, if it sounds like a government, well, that’s the government. But again, Western media will continue with this narrative that they’re the “Houthi rebels.” And the image that comes to mind is that this ragtag group, hidden in some mountain, in the caves of some mountains, they’re carrying out a fight.

Political Language as a Tool of Legitimacy and Delegitimacy

GLENN DIESEN (00:36:05 – 00:37:13): Well, yeah, that’s how language is used in political propaganda. That is, political language is supposed to either legitimize or delegitimize, which is why we never use the same language for us versus them, the opponent. That is, you know, we have governments, you have regimes; we do military interventions, you do full-scale wars of aggression. You know, we promote democracy in other countries while they do hybrid wars inside our countries. We support resistance, our opponents support insurgencies. We have allies, you have proxies. We represent the international community, you are pariah states.

I mean, this is how, once you build this into the language and you make people actually adopt it, there’s no way words anymore can legitimize opponents. Everything is already built into the language that this is essentially a fight of good versus evil. That’s usually how one would structure political language, and it does get quite intense at times.

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:37:13 – 00:38:58): It deeply affects policy because when they are “just proxies,” then you say, well, I can overthrow them. I don’t have to use all my resources. I would just give it a push and it’ll fall. If they’re a “regime,” so everything — my calculations are based upon that narrative. And then I hit a brick wall because I miscalculate because, well, it’s just, these are just proxies. This is just a regime. These are just rebels. And then, all the excellent examples that you gave — my calculations should work and they should be undermined and everything will, and then we’ll live happily ever after. And then that doesn’t happen.

But even afterwards, we don’t understand why it failed. We say, well, let’s try it again. And again and again, which is, as they say, the definition of insanity. But it’s based upon, to a degree, the narrative itself — this narrative that becomes a part of your unconscious. So no matter what atrocities one carries out, they’re the bad guys, we’re the good guys. No matter how stiff the resistance, they are about to fall because they have no popular support, no legitimacy, they’re unstable, and so on. So it helps contribute to further war, further aggression, further death and destruction, but also further failure.

Ukraine, the 2014 Coup, and the Language of Resistance

GLENN DIESEN (00:38:58 – 00:40:58): Well, we kind of saw this in the war with Ukraine as well. That is, in 2014, when the West backed this coup, it had to be referred to as a “democratic revolution,” you know. No one had to unpack it going, well, they removed the democratically elected president, it went against the majority will of Ukrainians, was not supported by the constitution, you know, all of these things. But still, it has to be a “democratic revolution.” And we supported those people resisting the regime of Yanukovych. But once he was toppled, you had all these people in the east, primarily Donbas, who resisted this post-coup government because it was also, well, extremely ethno-nationalist. And well, the first steps were essentially banning the Russian language to a large extent.

So when they started to resist, the language can’t give them legitimacy. So they were all “Russian proxies” and they were, you know, “terrorists.” And suddenly the whole resistance, which had been hailed and supported in the west of Ukraine, when that appeared in the east in response to the coup, it was just criminalized and stripped of all autonomy. It’s all Russia behind it. I mean, you know, this is how you build the case for war effectively.

But yeah, I wanted to ask about Iran. We’re seeing some big developments there as well. Is Iran now announcing that they will have this restrictive zone, push the U.S. ships out? We see Iran seemingly willing to at least soon begin to strike US warships, already striking US-linked tankers, suggesting that it might go more on the offensive. And some indications that Iran no longer sees any need for negotiations, or maybe call it renegotiations. How do you see, as all of this is happening in the Gulf states, what is shifting in Iran?

Iran’s Offensive Military Posture and the Strait of Hormuz

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:41:01 – 00:47:40): The Iranians have been moving towards an offensive military posture ever since the new chair of the Supreme National Security Council has been appointed. And we’ve been seeing that the US strikes were countered with much heavier strikes. And sometimes the Iranians would continue striking a couple of days after the Americans had stopped striking.

So when the Americans struck Iranian tankers — and I think this morning they struck another tanker — the Iranians would retaliate by hitting larger numbers of tankers. So the Iranians have put aside this tit-for-tat and they are now pursuing a policy where their strikes have become disproportionate. They’ll hit the Americans much harder, or US assets or US-linked assets much harder. And of course, the whole Persian Gulf region — Iranians consider these countries as proxies of the United States. So in the broader sense, the Iranians could say that everything there is fair game because they’re all US-linked assets. So whether it’s AI data centers or whether it’s oil installations or US banks or ships in the Persian Gulf or tankers, they’re all assets Iran could strike at in retaliation for the US sanctions.

So now with the situation in Yemen becoming more difficult for the United States, because it’s weakening Saudi Arabia, the Iranians have more leverage. So any pressure, any added pressure to oil exports in the Persian Gulf will have an even greater effect than before. The Iranians are becoming more strict about ships leaving the Persian Gulf and oil leaving. They do still allow some ships to go through.

There are, let’s say, 5 ways in which ships can go. One is through the Iranian corridor, and they just pass through and go — like Chinese ships or Iraqi ships, because they didn’t fight against Iran. But for the countries that fought against Iran, or countries that are taking oil or other resources from countries that fought or are fighting against Iran — like Kuwait, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain — there are 2 ways to go. One is through the American corridor. In that corridor, some of those ships go through with American consent, with Iranian consent. And some of them actually carry Iranian oil. So it’s very complicated.

The Iranians can hit some of those ships and they don’t hit other ships, but they could start hitting more ships, which they’re doing. So that’s lessening the American corridor, let’s say. The amount of oil that gets through is decreasing there. Then there’s this other means by which small ships take oil from tankers, clinging alongside the Omani coast, and these small ships go outside of the Strait of Hormuz and then they transport the oil to other tankers. This is very expensive and time-consuming, but because of oil prices, it’s still worth pursuing for these people.

All Iranian oil also goes through that corridor, but in a very complicated process. But the Iranians also strike some of the ships. Sometimes they don’t strike ships because they have deals with the Saudis or with the Emiratis or with others. Certain ships get through. The Iranians can decrease those too, which they’re also doing.

So the Iranians are turning the screw on the US in the Strait of Hormuz. They’re tightening the noose in the Strait of Hormuz, and it has a much greater impact, as I said, now after what’s happened in Yemen, because the oil shortages are going to grow. And of course, we always have to remember that there are all sorts of other shortages that are growing too — helium, sulfur — that have huge consequences. And fertilizer and LNG and all that. But here, and then there’s the refined fuel as well, not just petrochemicals.

But if I’m not mistaken, I think 3 million barrels of fuel that used to go out on a daily basis from the Persian Gulf no longer go. And they can’t get those ships through. So if you want to have gasoline or other fuels exit the Strait of Hormuz, that’s very dangerous because if that ship is hit, it’ll explode. It’s not like crude oil. So diesel, which is produced in the Persian Gulf, you can’t just get it through the Strait of Hormuz now because that’s highly inflammable.

So the Iranians — any added pressure that they build becomes far more consequential as a result of the events going on, not just in the Red Sea, but also the strikes on Saudi oil installations by Yemen. The Saudis, of course, say that the Iraqis are also involved. The Iraqis deny that. But in any case, I would assume Yemen is doing it for the most part. Now, whether the Iraqis are involved or not, I don’t know. But in any case, the Saudis are being devastated.

So the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf — when you put all these together, it gives Iran and its allies many more tools to use in the face of the Treasury Secretary’s attempts to strangle Iran.

Escalation or Diplomacy: What Are the US Options?

GLENN DIESEN (00:47:43 – 00:48:37): But as this is happening, the Iranians are tightening the noose on the US. Meanwhile, in Yemen, they’re creating huge problems for the Saudis and also, well, you can say tightening the noose on the Red Sea. What are the options here? I mean, either the US can escalate in a big way — the usual tactic to try to use overwhelming force to make the Iranians more compliant, let’s say. Otherwise, the alternative is to go back to a diplomatic path, either to put an end to this thing or to give some breathing space, buy some time, get some oil through, reshuffle the forces, whatever they need to do. Do you see any indication in either way — either honest or dishonest diplomacy, or towards escalation?

The Fragility of U.S. Allies and Iran’s Long-Term Strategy

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:48:40 – 00:54:03): Well, politically at the global level, things are not going well for the United States. We saw the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit where the statements were pro-Iran, and now in BRICS, we’re seeing statements in support of Iran, where all the, where countries, including countries that have been traditionally close to the United States, have been giving favorable, putting out favorable statements. India has also signed on to a statement basically condemning what’s going on in Gaza and in Lebanon.

So this is not good for the United States. And in the Western media, you don’t see anything about BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but these 2 summits, these 2 meetings with leaders within 2-3 weeks. These are important events.

What the United States plans to do and what the United States will do? I think it’s impossible to say because it’s Trump and Trump is just, you can’t predict him, but there are different ways in which this can play out. I mean, if Bessent escalates, then Iran will definitely escalate and things will get worse. And then that will itself create more potential for escalation. And military strikes. So we could be moving towards a hot war again.

Or, for example, Netanyahu, who seems to be losing the election, may carry out some act of desperation in Lebanon or against Iran, and that would start a hot war again. And the region, as I said at the beginning, is very fragile now. I mean, it’s been over 6 months and these countries are becoming increasingly fragile. They think that Iran will fall, but I think that they should be very worried about Kuwait and Qatar and the Emirates and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and their other proxies in the region. So if the war expands, I don’t think these countries can take it, and they’re not as wealthy as they seem.

And as I said before, these countries have been sending all their excess money to the US, to the West, but mostly the US for bonds and stocks and buying assets. And so have the princes and all those who’ve been taking their cut of the money, their portion of the country’s wealth. They would take it to the West too, alongside all the weapons that they’ve been buying that they don’t know how to use. As we’ve seen.

Well, that money is not going anywhere anymore because there is no extra money. They’re not selling any oil or gas, natural gas or anything like that. And then now they have to start selling because in order— they spend a lot of money, these countries, they expend much more than ordinary money, other ordinary countries. And so they have to start selling those assets.

And as I said earlier, the Americans, I don’t believe the Americans are going to let them sell those assets, those bonds and stocks, because the Americans are desperate to preserve their economy and at this very dangerous juncture, I don’t think the Americans can afford to allow them to have their own money back. I mean, they should do it if a country wants, but that’s— it’s the United States. If they want to take the money or they’ll prevent them from taking their money back, they’ll do that. So I think that these countries are very, very vulnerable now. And so if there is escalation, then I think that the chances that they collapse increase very by the day.

But I think it’s fair to say, from the Iranian side, is that the Iranians are prepared for a long war. You can see the shift in the way the government is moving forward with regards to economic policy. It’s now a wartime economy. And the way in which the Iranian president is dealing with leaders, the Chinese, the Russians, and others, and BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, they’re finding ways to manage the situation for a couple of years.

But I think also the Iranians are going to increase the pressure on the United States until the midterm elections. And I think the Iranians would like to see Trump lose the House by a bigger margin and for his hand to be weakened in the Senate. And if he loses the Senate, that would be excellent. Not that it would bring an end to the war, but just so that it would make life much more difficult for Trump in general, which would have an adverse impact on the way in which he carries out anti-Iranian policies.

BRICS, Multipolar Institutions, and Western Narrative Management

GLENN DIESEN (00:54:05 – 00:55:57): Yeah, well, I’m glad— sorry, I’m glad you mentioned the BRICS summit. It’s the last day today in India, and as you said, it just followed the meeting about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These 2 institutions, I would argue, are the 2 main ones that seek to find, I guess, an institutional format, political format to transition from this unipolar world to a multipolar. That is a lot to be organized.

You have all this new technological cooperation. As you hear from the BRICS summit, they all have to talk about how to manage the AI industrial cooperation, all this land and sea transportation corridors and new development banks, their payment systems, national currencies. I mean, I think the reason why it doesn’t get discussed properly in the Western media is because it’s easier just to put a little label that, some anti-Western club and then not delve into it.

But the whole world, which is supposed to be organized around NATO, G7, IMF, World Bank, the dollar system, Western NGOs, to reorganize, well, to do essentially administration of the world, all of this is now falling apart. And that’s the whole hegemonic model. So again, it goes back to language, which we discussed. I think there’s a legitimacy crisis for many of the political class in the West because this is essentially what they see as their responsibility. They’re supposed to govern international security, economics, politics, civil society.

So the role of the media, I think, has to— their efforts to do the narrative management, it prohibits them from informing the public what’s actually happening in the world. Anyways, I want to thank you unless you have any final thoughts.

Recommended Reading and Closing Remarks

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:56:00 – 00:57:46): No, thank you very much, Glenn. Again, I’ve been saying this for a while, I advise people to look away and ignore the Western narrative. And just by watching your show, that’s basically what they’re doing, to see a more objective picture of different analysts. I’m, of course, the least important of them all, but for people to go to alternative sources to get a better understanding of what’s going on.

And my advice, as I’ve said, I think, before on your show, is for people to read books not written by the mainstream, but by those who have alternative views. The book Going to Tehran by Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, I think, is a must-read nowadays. And they predicted this, all this happening. They promoted the rapprochement between Iran and the United States, and they dealt with many of the myths on Iran, and they spoke and they wrote extensively about the history. And they said that, look, if you don’t move towards rapprochement, it will move towards confrontation. Well, here we are. And they got punished for writing this book.

And another good book to have a better understanding of the resistance, the culture of resistance, the ideology behind it is Alastair Crooke’s book, Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution, or something like that. I think these are books that people need to read so that they get a better understanding of the situation because the West is implementing policy built upon a narrative that is, in my opinion, largely a myth based upon a myth.

GLENN DIESEN (00:57:48 – 00:58:48): Well, I think people are starting to pick up on it. I was just seeing them in a paper in my own country. They refer to Ray McGovern. Because, he’s making some comments about the Ukraine war, like 27 years in the CIA. He was offering the daily, giving daily briefs to President Reagan and they don’t like what he has to say. So he was just dismissed as he has been accused of being pro-Russian. So accused, which means not much. Who accused him? What the hell does pro-Russian mean? I mean, it’s just, I think people notice when they just do these labels all the time. Like, he’s not legitimate. Here’s a lot of bad words. Do not listen to it. We have the truth for you. And then, I think after a while, people start to pick up on the nonsense. And I guess in West Asia, this is how these problems and conflicts are portrayed. The case is the same. So thank you again and have a great Sunday.

SEYED MOHAMMAD MARANDI (00:58:50 – 00:58:53): You too. Have a great day. And I hope your audience has a great day too.

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